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Abstract 
 
History, Organization and Strategies for Grain Producers and the Grain Industry in Michigan 
 
By 
Alan J. Thrush 
 
            The grain system (grain producers and the grain industry) in Michigan finds itself in a 
transition period.  Production (yield) and price limitations along with escalating cost factors 
have left producers in a situation where, without government assistance, many more would 
have to exit the farm.  The grain industry (in this study, the industry refers to the grain 
handlers and processors), while in a stronger financial situation than producers, would suffer 
negatively if volume of grains bought and sold through their facilities decreased, and more in 
the industry would have to exit. 
            A transition is needed to increase profitability of grain producers and the grain 
handlers and processors in Michigan.  Without a transition, the trend of decreasing farms and 
acres will continue, to the detriment of the Michigan grain system. But how does the system 
make a transition, and what kind of transition is needed?  This study strives to find the 
strategies, through understanding the history and organization of the system, that will provide 
direction.  
            This study uses two analytical approaches to understand the grain system from the 
producer level and the industry level.  By comparing the Industrial Organization approach and 
the Strategic Management approach, a clearer understanding of the problems should be 
ascertained.  That understanding, with a background of the history of the grain system 
development in Michigan allows a thorough discussion of  the possible solutions that can help  
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both producers and grain handlers and processors be more profitable and continue to be an 
important economic factor in the state. 
            The findings of the study indicate that there are several partial solutions to the 
problems, depending on the region of the state, the attitude of producers and companies 
within the industry, and the markets themselves.  The situation can be improved by 
differentiating, coordinating, cooperating and adjusting processes in those areas that can 
successfully be addressed and changed by individual producers and each firm.  Further 
research could overcome constraints of this study to find alternative and successful 
adaptations for the system.     
 




            The span of this economic study has taken more or less twenty five years of 
experience in the grain industry, from my undergraduate work that led to a Bachelor’s degree 
in Agricultural Economics from Western Illinois University, to a prolonged graduate program 
accomplished by beginning in an MBA program at a non-agricultural university, and then 
undertaking the final stage at Michigan State University’s Agricultural Economics Department 
while working, raising a family, and taking one class at a time for the last five years. 
            I thank all those in the Agricultural Economics department that allowed me to pursue 
this accomplishment, particularly their patience in letting me take so long to finish the 
program.  My advisor and major professor, Dr. Chris Peterson, and the other members of my 
committee, Dr. Kellie Raper and Dr. Rick Ward were among those who have directed and 
prodded me to think academically (like an economist), which can be difficult after thinking 
mainly only practically for so many years. 
            I thank my family for their patience while I juggled the time between them, work, 
school and community activities during the length of the program.  If they hadn’t been so 
understanding, this would not be possible. 
            It has been a fun experience, going back and applying my experience to the academic 
foundations for economics.  The progression of economic theory since the time of my 
undergraduate work is impressive, and the ability to use computers, particularly for 
econometric applications, is astounding.  I hope that this study will put to full use the 
combination of the two realms of knowledge and that it can be useful to those involved in the 
grain system in Michigan.     
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Chapter One 




            This research will provide a history and economic review of how the grain industry 
has developed in Michigan.  The organization of the grain market, as well as strategies grain 
producers and grain handling and processing companies might enlist to be successful 
participants in the 21st century will also be discussed.  The production, marketing and 
processing of grain covers a wide array of economic considerations.  It is an integral part of 
the food industry chain, as well as a provider of raw resources for many industrial uses and for 
export. Changes in farming practices, industry organization, vertical coordination, 
specialization, marketing and price discovery, profitability, logistics and technology need to be 
considered. In addition, consideration of producer and firm strategies, government agricultural 
policies, land use and availability, biotechnology and environmental aspects  will be needed. 
            The author’s twenty five years of experience in the grain industry enable a unique view 
and interpretation of the industry’s economic conditions.  Many of the observations in this 
study are based on the author’s experience.  The author has worked in the grain industry in 
many business structures including cooperatives, partnerships, and family owned and 
corporate enterprises.  The author has also served in various capacities such as managing 
grain facilities in country elevators and in major terminals, merchandising many commodities, 
coordinating logistics by truck, rail and barge, and involvement in mergers and acquisitions.  
These personal experiences are the basis for statements in the study that are not referenced. 
Using this experiential knowledge combined with the academic knowledge gained from the 
Masters of Science in Agricultural Economics program at Michigan State University,  the 
study applies practical solutions that are based on economic theory.  
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            Practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge can serve each other to analyze a 
market or industry in a way that is practical in its applications and sound in its economic 
conclusions. When practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge agree, a strong basis exists 
for action because both how and why are understood (Peterson - AEC 800). That is the goal 
of this research. 
            The main points to be discussed throughout the study will be mentioned now, with 
further illustrations and documentation exhibited as the study moves into the particular areas 
of interest.   
            The consolidation in the production and marketing of grain has been slower (or at 
least less noticeable) than in other sectors of production agriculture, in particular the broiler 
and pork industries.  However, there are several indications that the grain system could 
change appreciably toward tighter vertical coordination in the next five to ten years, due to the 
increased consolidation.  
            In this study, the Michigan grain producers and the related grain industry will be 
shown to have characteristics that may cause coordination (also industrialization) of the grain 
system (grain producers with grain handlers and processors) sooner than other major 
Midwestern states. 
            The study will show that most of the reason for Michigan being quicker to coordinate 
is the variation of corn and soybean producer revenue that is lower compared to the national 
average and other major Midwestern grain states, in combination with higher expense dollars 
per acre (Figure 1-a) compared to the seven major Midwestern states in this study (Ohio, 
Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota and Nebraska).  The result is that the grain system in 
Michigan will be forced sooner than other major crop producing Midwestern states toward 
changes to ensure or prolong viability, or trend toward exit from the industry.  
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Figure 1-a 
Revenue and Expense Comparison 
      Michigan     Ohio  Indiana   Illinois  Iowa   Minn     Neb 
Revenue $ per Acre (variation to the national average, 1990-2001 average) 
  Corn         -32.89     8.86    18.37    31.71      9.64  -19.53    10.73   
  Soybeans       -5.96      17.03   33.76    33.49     32.84   -4.56     10.77 
  Total         -38.85    25.89   52.10     65.20     42.48   -24.09    21.50   
Expense $ per Acre        359        318      312        232   313    296      343 
Net Cash Return  $/acre   10143    11643  15982    28271   25278    18576    29556  
(Expense $ per acre from 1997 U.S. Census for Agriculture, Net Cash Return from average of 
1987,1992 and 1997 Census for Agriculture)   
          (For more detail, see Tables 1-1 through 1-3 and Table 3 in the table appendix) 
  
           The variability in yield and price for corn and soybeans means that in most years 
revenues for grain producers in Michigan are less than other major Midwestern crop 
production states (annual details in appendix Tables 1 through 1-2).  This is due to a 
combination of yield, price and expenses that generate less net cash returns per farm. 
This deficit of revenue means that grain producers as well as grain companies may need to use 
surplus years to retain capital instead of using the income to improve or acquire assets.  It also 
means that competition from other uses for the land is more intense.  Urbanization and 
industrial uses for land may show greater long term revenues than uses for agriculture. 
With lower revenues and higher expenses, the average net cash return per farm for Michigan 
is less than the other major crop producing states in the study (Table 4).            
       These conditions are what will make the grain system (producers, handlers and 
processors) in Michigan more likely to look for alternatives to organizing the way grain is 
produced and marketed, or alternative uses for the land.  The outcome of the changes will  
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benefit those who can adapt to the reorganization in ways that reduce costs and risks and 
stabilize income while providing the marketplace with the products they need at competitive 
prices. 
       The “final cause “ (Bromley) strategy is and will continue to lead the changes.  This 
strategic approach says that the mission and vision for the future drives current actions, which 
generates current and future outcomes (Boehlje).  The overall goal in the food, feed and grain 
industry will be to coordinate the system all the way from “genetics to grocery” (Barkema) in 
order to reduce costs and increase profits.  In the grain industry, this can be done by 
coordination, involving production, handling, transportation and processing or exporting 
within the same company system if possible, to reduce transaction costs in moving grain from 
production to the end consumer. 
       It will be helpful to understand the basic history of the grain industry in the United 
States, and for this study, with special concentration on Michigan.  With that background, the 
analysis and conclusions of the economic aspects of the study will be more evident.   
       The study will start with a history of grain production, handling and processing in 
Michigan and nationally, and then work through the organizational aspects of the grain 
industry using an Industrial Organization approach for grain handlers and processors and then 
relate that to grain producers.  A Strategic Management study that involves a strategic 
analysis and plan for grain producers and its relation to grain handlers and processors is the 
next step in the study.  A summary, with conclusions about the solutions for problems in the 
system will bring all three aspects of the study together.  The end goal will be a theoretically 
sound and practical outlook and strategy for the participants in the system.      
        
1.2  Problem Statement and Research Questions     
 
       Michigan has lower average yields and a higher negative yield variations to the 
national average for corn and soybeans than any of the other states in the study.  Michigan  
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also has a less significant amount of production compared to other major grain producing 
states (Table 2).  The lack of correlation between supply and price (Michigan is not a 
significant enough producer of grains to influence price as much as other states) creates 
situations in poor production years where Michigan revenues are much lower than in 
competing states (Table 1).    
       On the average, when production varies in those states that have a higher percent of 
the total production, price adjusts to the change in the supply more closely.  This is reflected 
in the decreased variation in revenue to the national average for those states that have a higher 
percent of the total production.  This indicates that Michigan yields have less influence on 
price, so that when yields are low, price may not adjust higher, and when yields are up, prices 
could still be lower.  In economic terms, the influence of  Michigan on the change in the 
supply curve is less than the other states that have a higher percent of production. 
       The comparatively negative revenue variations for Michigan compared to the national 
average make it more difficult for land used in grain production to compete with other land 
use alternatives.  It also makes it more difficult for the standard of living for grain producers 
to compete with other employment opportunities, and this in a state that has higher wage 
opportunities than surrounding states (Table 10). 
       Weak farm balance sheets create more income risk for those businesses in the grain 
industry that depend on grain production for their success.  Grain handlers and processors are 
critically dependent on grain volume, and therefore on the success of the producers that bring 
their grain to the facilities. 
       The trend in Michigan toward less total acres farmed, less farmers and the resultant 
overall production decline reduces competition and compounds the problem (Table 9). 
       These basic problems bring about questions that are the essence of this study:      
       1)  What can grain producers do to offset negative variability in production and price 
in corn and soybeans that are the essence of revenues?  
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       2)  Can producers reduce risk and/or create a high enough revenue/cost ratio per acre 
to reverse or slow the trend of declining farm numbers? 
       3)  How can the grain industry, which is so vitally tied to the success of the grain 
producers in the state, make changes that can help both be more successful? 
       In order to fully understand the problem and to suggest answers, the study uses the 
Industrial Organization and Strategic Management approaches to delve into the problems, 
causes and solutions for the Michigan grain producers and the grain handlers and processors.  
A comparison of the analyses provides the basis for conclusions, recommendations and 
suggestions for further research. 
 
1.3  Methods of Analysis 
 
       The two methods of analysis chosen for this study are the Industrial Organization 
approach and the Strategic Management approach.  Both methods can be used to identify and 
discuss key areas of an industry that may be developed or changed to increase societal utility.  
Here, IO analysis gives the environment that firms are operating in, and Strategic Management 
gives the strategies for adaptations to the environment that allow firms to thrive. By using 
both methods, as separate studies of the same system, the study can then compare the findings 
of each to ascertain a clearer understanding of what changes may be possible to affect the 
problem. 
       The study views each analysis as its own separate study.  There is some redundancy in 
the two studies, but that is a result of the analysis that is a part of each approach.  In an effort 
to reduce the redundancy, some parts of the study are abbreviated.  In the Industrial 
Organization analysis, the grain industry is the focus, with associations made to the producer 
situation.  In the Strategic Management analysis, emphasis is given to the analysis of the grain 
producer, with an abbreviated analysis and plan for the Michigan grain industry.  The  
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similarities found in each study give the reader a comprehensive view of the situation and help 
the reader better understand and evaluate the final conclusions and recommendations.  
Consistent problems and consistent recommended solutions mean that the problems need to 
be addressed both organizationally and strategically. If the solutions for the problems are 
similar, then they should be applicable and be more likely successful when implemented. 
 




       The Industrial Organization framework of analysis is the study of the way in which the 
organization of buyers and sellers of a particular product affect the performance of the market 
and hence the nation’s economic welfare.  In more detail, it is the study of how productive 
activities are brought into harmony with society’s demands for goods and services through 
some organizing mechanism such as the market, and how variations and imperfections in the 
organizing mechanism affect the degree of success achieved by producers in satisfying 
society’s wants.  
       The basic model set forth by Bain (Bain 1968) hypothesized that there is a causal link 
from market structure to conduct to performance.  This early work focused on the structure 
and performance linkages.  Scherer’s (Scherer 1980) contributions created a greater emphasis 
on conduct and on feedback loops (how studying reactions to conduct can lead to changes 
that can cause structural and performance changes also) .   
       The aspect of structure focuses the study on the basic conditions of the market 
environment.  These include such things as product characteristics, market share, cost 
structure, capital intensity, capacity, specialization, financial characteristics and entry and exit 
conditions.  
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       Conduct is more concerned about what competitors are doing, and each firm’s 
decision environment.  Pricing and cost behavior are important aspects. 
       Performance has been summarized as the end result: how behavior falls short of the 
best goal and how well it does what society expects.  Efficiency, market access, progress, 
product characteristics and equity are important aspects. 
       The Industrial Organization approach used in this study gives importance to structure, 
conduct and performance.  The study uses all three aspects to help understand how the 
organization of grain handlers and processors  nationally and in Michigan relates to grain 
producer situation problems.  Solutions involve the overall understanding of how grain 
handlers and processors are organized and what effects they have on producers.         For 
the purposes of this study, the Industrial Organization analysis focus is on the United States 
grain industry and more narrowly the handlers and processors, and then specifically in 
Michigan, and its relationship with grain producers.  Society’s demand for food, feed and 
industrial uses of grain are relayed to producers through the grain markets.   Grain is marketed 
from producers to end users and forward to consumers through grain handlers and processors. 
       Organization is important to study  because it brings out aspects of the system that can 
be identified as problems, and solutions can then be suggested.  This study finds that in 
general, the financial success of grain producers in Michigan is weakening. Revenues have 
been decreasing (Table 1) while expenses continue to rise (Table 3).  Larger grain handling 
and processing firms have more ability to help producers be more successful, but in the 
author’s opinion, the desire for them to do so is lacking.  The author also believes 
consolidation of the grain industry and lack of a cooperative marketing system (membership 
and number of cooperative organizations has been decreasing) has left a void in the system.  
Imperfections in the organization of the markets due to society’s need for low food costs are 
magnified by government intervention by way of farm bills that subsidize farming.  For  
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Michigan in particular, disadvantages in efficiencies compared to other grain belt states makes 
it more difficult for the state to fit into the national organizational structure of the markets.   
       By analyzing the organization of grain handlers and processors and their relationship 
with grain producers, the study can help identify problems, causes and suggest solutions to 
strengthen the success of grain producers and the grain businesses in the state. 
 
1.3.1.2 Data and Information Sources 
 
       Industrial Organization economics attempts to explain the behavior of groups (grain 
producers and firms in the grain industry in this study) by basic economic conditions and the 
competitive environment within which they operate.  It concentrates largely on factors 
external to the firm (Marion and Mueller).   
       From the beginning of the Industrial Organization era through the changes in the 
weight of the analysis from structure and performance to an added emphasis on conduct, 
articles by economists and many different agricultural viewpoints that give their insight and 
experience to theories put forward by the most prominent economists come together for 
workable suggestions for solutions. 
       From the early work of Bain (1945) and Nicholls (1948) to Clodius and Mueller 
(1961), Caves (1964) and Sosnick (1964), the Industrial Organization approach progressed 
through work again by Bain (1968), and Scherer (1980), Cotterill and Mueller (1979), 
Brandow (1977), Weiss (1971 and 1974), Goldschmid et al (1974) and Marion (1979).  
Studies by Kelly (1969), Imel and Helmberger (1971) and Rogers (1978) have added to the 
understanding and methods of analysis.  These readings provide much of the basis for this part 
of the study, and are all listed in the bibliography. 
       The study of the progression of this approach and its applications was the basis for the 
AEC 841 class at Michigan State University, taught by Dr. Kellie Raper, Dr. John Staatz and  
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Dr. Michael Webber.  The content of the course can be viewed in outline form at 
www.msu.edu/course/aec/841.  The reading list from this class is a basic source for the 
analysis in this study.  The study uses Caves, Bain, Sexton and Scherer as its main sources of  
direction, and these are referenced in the body of the text. 
  




       Strategic management is defined as the set of decisions and actions that result in the 
formulation and implementation of plans designed to achieve a company’s objectives. 
It involves the planning, directing, organizing and controlling of a company’s strategy - related 
decisions and actions (Pearce and Robinson).  The Strategic Management framework is used 
in this study to understand competition for grain producers and grain handlers and processors 
in Michigan. With that understanding, a framework for recommending decisions that will 
make grain producers and grain handlers and processors in Michigan more successful can be 
established. 
       Essentially, developing a competitive strategy is developing a broad formula for how a 
business is going to compete, what its goals should be, and what policies will be needed to 
carry out those goals. It is a combination of the ends (goals) for which the firm is striving and 
the means (policies) by which it is seeking to get there (Porter). 
       Formulating the strategy  involves the consideration of four key factors that determine 
the limits of accomplishment.  The company’s strengths and weaknesses, and personal values 
and motivations of the organization are those factors that are internal to the firm.  The 
external factors are the opportunities and threats of the competitive environment, and the 
broader societal expectations.  The goal is to find a position in the industry where the farm or 
firm can defend itself against the competitive forces or influence them in its favor (Porter).  
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       The emphasis in this study is the competitive situation in Michigan.  As a part of the 
world agricultural and food system, the state plays a small part, but the influences on 
Michigan from outside factors are significant.  This study attempts to refine the external forces 
only to those that a strategy can effectively adjust for.  The longer term trends in the world 
food system may be such that a Michigan strategy cannot offset. 
       As in the Industrial Organization analysis, this part of the study can identify problems 
and causes and suggest solutions to help grain producers and handlers and processors to be 
more successful.  By comparing both methods, the study can refine the actions to those that 
will be the most effective in achieving the goals.          
 
1.3.2.2 Data and Information Sources 
 
       Much of the information about the grain industry and grain producers in this section 
have come from experience and also the Michigan Agricultural Statistics Service and the 
National Agricultural Statistics Service, and data collected in the Census reports over the 
years. 
       The outline of the analysis and plan were influenced by the Strategic Management 
course (Peterson -AEC 857) taught in the Agricultural Economics department at Michigan 
State University by Dr. Chris Peterson. 
 
1.3.3  Conclusions - How These Methods Answer the Research Questions 
 
       The Industrial Organization method allows us to study the structure of the grain 
business and the environment in which the grain handlers, processors and producers are 
operating.  In this study, the emphasis is on grain handlers and processors, but it also relates  
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directly to producers.  This analysis allows us to understand what the sources of conflict are, 
and what structural changes can be made to address the problem in a positive manner. 
       Conduct of the firms and the producers gives us insight into societal and behavioral 
aspects of the grain system .  Recognition of how they react competitively may help us 
understand and be able to recommend changes that may help. 
       Performance analysis of the grain handlers and processors and grain producers allows 
us to see what the effects of the particular structure and conduct anomalies are.  We are then 
more able to understand their consequences and then develop recommendations that will have 
a positive impact on future performance.      
       Strategic Management analysis focuses on identifying strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats and then synthesizing possible outcomes.  Through this analysis we 
can develop a strategic plan that will focus on aspects of the industry that will come closest to 
achieving desired goals. 
       This analysis works with problems, sources and solutions too, but from a different 
angle.  By identifying core strategies that are intended to lead the firm (or  producer) in a 
progressive direction, we can make recommendations as to how that can be accomplished. 
       Summarizing the history of Michigan agriculture with an emphasis on grain gives the 
analyst a background, or setting for the two analytical frameworks used. 
       By then comparing the results of the two analysis studies, we can proceed to develop 
final recommendations that have a strong historical and analytical basis.  There are certainly 
other ways to study this system, but the completeness of discussions presented here should 
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Chapter Two 
Historic Summary of the Development of the Grain Industry in Michigan 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
  In order to analyze the organization of the production and handling of grain in 
Michigan today and recommend strategies for producers, grain handlers and processors, an 
understanding of the history of the grain industry in the state, and nationally is helpful.  
The history section will encompass many aspects of the growth of agriculture in Michigan, but 
the emphasis and understanding is intended to help the comprehension of the current grain 
industry organization and strategies that producers might pursue to increase their success, and 
industry participants might pursue to increase their performance. 
       A unique circumstance in Michigan allows it to cope with change better than most 
states, and that is its climate and soil types.  The state is more diversified in its agricultural 
production than the other states in the study.  The percent of the value of other principal crops 
(such as fruits and vegetables) in Michigan over the last five years averaged 21.38 percent, 
compared to 1.63 percent for the other states in the study (Table 17).  This diversity helps 
agricultural income as a whole for the state to be more consistent.   
  But income only from grain production has not been as consistent.  Yields have 
increased from the development of hybrids of corn, soybeans and wheat in response to the 
need for increasing revenue to keep up with rising costs.  But poor production years, due to 
climate,  have resulted in less than desired revenues, and make grain production in Michigan a 
less competitive option for land use compared to other grain belt states.  Perhaps a resurgence 
in diversity through development of specific varieties of both genetically modified and non 
genetically modified grains that grow in certain soil types in certain areas of the state, with  
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characteristics desired by consumers, will serve as a competitive advantage in the current and 
future of Michigan agriculture. 
       Michigan Agriculture In Transition 
       There are three primary transitions that have taken place in Michigan agriculture from 
the time pioneers were first coming into the area until present.  A fourth transition may be in 
process now.  The first three are historical, the fourth is more speculative. 
       The first transition came with improved transportation to the area by the opening of 
the water route from Detroit to New York via the Erie Canal, and the development of the 
railroad system.  The next came with the transition from animal and human muscle power to 
mechanization (an industrial revolution), which includes tractors and combines as well as 
locomotives.  The third was the use of science in production to increase yields and enhance 
quality characteristics.  Dramatic increases in productivity have been possible only through the 
intensive use of machinery, fertilizers, chemicals, cultivation practices and other production 
and technological advances made through science. 
           The first transition, which includes the opening of the water route to the East Coast, 
and then the development of the railroads,  not only increased trade, it allowed easier 
migration west from the East Coast and more specifically, New York.  The large number of 
people migrating forced many changes, and made the state develop much faster than western 
states that were harder to access.        
       The second transition was an industrial revolution.  It enabled much more work to be 
done with much less animal or human power.  It freed a labor force to go to factories in the 
cities, and it eventually lowered the cost of production, after the depression, when farmers 
could afford to buy the machinery.  With lower production costs came more production, and 
the transition caused grain surpluses that the market has had to contend with ever since. 
       The third transition is a scientific revolution.  It has allowed constant increases in yield 
and quality over time that has allowed the cost of food to the population to remain low.   
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Without the increases in yield, the cost of production per unit would be higher and the cost of 
food to the consumer would be higher.  Further improvements in the quality of grains through 
genetics will be an asset as consumers demand more specific characteristics and variety in 
their foods.  Genetic capabilities have also helped reduce the use of chemicals, which reduces 
environmental and health concerns.  Development of crops that are non genetically modified 
are also contributing to special consumer needs.  The capabilities of both will be very 
important to the future development of grain farming in Michigan.  
       The fourth transition, which is yet to be fully realized, will be discussed at the end of 
this chapter. 
 
2.2  History of Michigan Agriculture 
      
       Introduction 
       This section of the chapter is a chronological compilation of the development of 
Michigan agriculture.  The transition from an early frontier to a top grain producing state, the 
shift to diversification and the continuing challenges of farming as a business are discussed in 
this part of the study. 
       The most important aspects in the early development in the state were the topography 
and soils, the development of transportation and what incentives settlers had to come to 
Michigan.   
       The early development of Michigan and the transitions blend together as the state 
grows and prospers.  It has had successes and setbacks, but has forged ahead, led by 
economic circumstances that dictate what must change in order to arise from challenges and 
find new levels of success. 
       Just as the state has done through its history, it must now find ways to improve 
agricultural profitability.  Through an understanding of history and economics, solutions can  
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be found.  The study will start with the early history and how Michigan developed, and then 
relate the development of each transition.  The changes that have taken place indicate what 
possible directions grain production and grain handling and processing should take now.  The 
primary sources for this history are books located in the State of Michigan library in Lansing, 
authored by Bauer, Chase, Fuller, Lewis, Quaife, Skjaerlun, and Utley.  Other main sources, 
located at Michigan State University were Duncan, Ferris, the Michigan State University 
Department of Geography, and the Department of Agricultural Economics (see bibliography). 
 
       Settlement and Growth of Michigan to 1900 
       The early settlement of Michigan was slower than some other Western frontier states. 
Much of the land was swampy and much of it was forest, which had to be drained or cleared 
before it could be farmed.   It took longer to clear the land and get it ready for farming than 
the prairie lands, but the population (labor) and the revenue became abundant enough to make 
it happen.   
       In early surveys, the area was described as a land of  “unhealthful swamps and a sandy 
waste that was wholly unsuitable for agriculture” (History).  Michigan was also more difficult 
to get to compared to those regions accessible to the river systems.  Lack of transportation as 
compared to the Ohio River area made it more difficult to bring supplies in or to send crops 
from it.  There were only a few small settlements and the total population was less than 5,000 
in 1811 (Lewis -p151).   
       In 1818, the same year that public land was put up for sale in Michigan, the first 
steamboat on Lake Erie ran from Buffalo to Detroit.  These two actions made settlement land 
available, and also improved accessibility by water versus by land. 
       As settlers arrived, they found the region had a wide variety of terrain.  One 
description was as follows;  “The sag and swell topography establishes a great variety of soils.  
It protects areas from cold northerly winds, affects air, drainage and cloud distribution, and it  
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establishes wet, marsh and swamp lands.  There is an extraordinary variation in soil, with 
clays, sands, gravels, loams, muck and marsh lands, lakes and swamps, in some localities with 
very narrow limits, so that a description applicable to one parcel of land would be wholly 
inapplicable to an adjacent tract” (Chase -p37).  These conditions allow for diversity in 
agricultural production.  It is unlike most other states, and the diversity would later be seen as 
an advantage for growing a variety of agricultural products. 
       In 1820, the U.S. Congress passed a new land law,  making it possible for settlers to 
purchase public land at $1.25 per acre.  So, for $100, one could own 80 acres, and for $200, a 
quarter section (Lewis -p153).  Even though Michigan was more difficult to get to, it had an 
abundance of public land, so the law increased the number of settlers willing to travel to 
Michigan to settle.   
       But the remoteness of the settlers markets still kept many farmers away.   
       In 1826, the general survey of Michigan lands began.  The system of land survey used 
by the U.S. government set up the tracts in North-South and East-West squares, which 
organized land ownership.  Government land offices were opened to dispose of land.  By 
1833, federal Indian policies had removed most Native Americans to the west of the 
Mississippi River, which increased the public lands available for settlement (History). The 
organization of the territory was necessary to bring order to land titles.  In 1836, there were 4 
million acres of public land sold for settlement (Chase - p135).  Between 1820 and 1834, the 
population of the state increased ten-fold (History).  There were 36 million acres in Michigan 
passed out of public (U.S. government) into private ownership all together (Chase -p135) 
(Michigan’s total land acreage is 36,354,432 acres).    
       The Homestead Act was passed by Congress in 1862.  It gave a quarter section of 
public land, 160 acres, free to any man 21 years or older.  To receive title, they had to live on 
it for five years and show that they were improving the property.  About three million acres 
were claimed this way (Lewis -p414).  Up to this time, most of the farms had been in the four  
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southern tiers of counties, but there was now a rush to the northern counties of the lower 
peninsula. 
       After the Civil War, the population  of Michigan grew rapidly.  Between 1860 and 
1880, the population doubled.  The population in 1860 was 749,113, and it grew to 
1,184,.059 in 1870 and then to 1,636,937 in 1880 (Utley).  In 1850, there were 1,929,110 
acres of farm ground on 34,089 farms.   The amount of land cultivated and the number of 
farms grew to over six million acres on 119,769 farms by 1881 (Quaife -p250).   
       “By 1860, the southern part of the lower peninsula could be called a settled 
community.  The farms were cleared.  Steel plows had replaced the earlier wood plows.  
Threshing machines, run by horse power were beginning to replace the flail for threshing.  
Steel-toothed cultivators were beginning to be used, seeders or drills for planting as well” 
(Lewis -p206-207).  The first stages of the industrial revolution were taking place. All these 
did much to reduce the labor required in farming as well as to greatly increase the amount of 
crops that one farmer could produce. 
           Part of the expansion in homesteading was also due to high wheat prices.  In 1866, 
prices encouraged the planting of more than one million acres, resulting in a crop near 15 
million bushels, with a price in December of $1.77 per bushel, for an average return of $26.55 
per acre (Fuller -p477).  Then, from 1867 to 1869, the price of wheat dropped about 50% 
(Duncan -p51).  But farming in Michigan after 1869 continued on a very profitable basis 
continuing through the 1870’s.  In 1871, the average wheat yield was 19.15 bushels per acre, 
and the price was $1.17 per bushel for a revenue of $22.81 per acre (Quaife -p251).  The 
money from exported wheat brought more money into the state than all of the other surplus 
crops.  Michigan’s average cash value per acre of principal crops was the highest of 10 
Midwestern states from 1875 through 1880 (Quaife -p250).  The maximum acreage for wheat 
was reached in 1880-82, with 1,950,000 acres producing about 30 million bushels (Fuller -
p477).  In 1880, Michigan ranked fourth in wheat production (Lewis -p426).   
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       From the mid 1880’s on, emphasis was on raising crops on a cash basis instead of the 
almost complete self-sufficiency of the pioneer era.  Farming became a business. In 1884, the 
state census showed 157,389 farms, with a value of $38.48 per acre (Utley).  
Soil conditions, scientific selection of seed, climactic factors and marketing conditions  
entered into the calculations for increasing production and value (Quaife -p249).         
       Some of this success was attributable to the average farm size being at about 100 
acres, which required little additional farm labor.  Also, the number of mortgages was small 
with relatively few tenant farmers (Quaife -p253).  In addition, hybridization was advocated 
by authorities at Michigan State College beginning about 1877 (Fuller -p475), which helped 
yields.  The first stages of the scientific revolution were already taking place. 
       After 1880, wheat began to be less important in Michigan.  Soil exhaustion, diseases 
and pests depleted yields.  As early as 1850, there was already concern about soil fertility 
depletion, and diversification was suggested (Duncan -p23).   In the 1830’s and 40’s, yields 
ran from 30-40 bushels per acre, but by the end of the century they were half that.  It suffered 
seasons of quite complete failure in the late 1890’s (Chase -p184).   By 1888, farmers could 
no longer rely on wheat as their main money crop.  They began to diversify.  Diversification 
into other agricultural commodities in the state took advantage of its climate and varying soil 
types.  This was the first answer to a challenge for Michigan agriculture. 
       The diversity of crops raised in Michigan are due to the fact that the soils and climate 
can change radically from place to place.  This diversity allows the potential for a wide variety 
of crops to be profitably grown, such as beans, celery, onions, fruits, vegetables, mint, 
sugarbeets and potatoes. 
       There is little uniformity in the soil in the amount of elements such as minerals, lime or 
nitrogen.  Some soils are heavy clay, most of the state is glacial till, which “has little humus, 
drains too easily and thus lets the minerals, so needed by plants, to be easily carried away”.   
Some plains make good farm land, and muck lands (where the water has deposited vegetable  
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materials) are good for certain kinds of crops  (Lewis (1969) -p.206).  Because Michigan was 
a forest land, most of the soils were originally podsol, or very acidic. 
       The climate differences in the lower peninsula change growing conditions.  Frost free 
dates vary from 60 to 180 days, elevation and the effects of winds blowing onto or from the 
Great Lakes allow some crops to prosper in some parts of the state and not in others. 
       Michigan farmers were able to establish a far-reaching market for some products 
because of an emphasis on quality, especially for fruits and vegetables.  In 1895, the 
legislature passed an act “to prohibit and prevent adulteration or fraud and deception in the 
manufacture and sale of articles of food and drink”.  Michigan was the second state to pass a 
food law (Fuller -p500). 
       By 1900, almost all the farm land in the state had been taken.  The settlement aspect of 
the agricultural development of the state was done.  Important to the settlement of the state 
and the development of agriculture was the improvements made in transportation.  They 
allowed settlers to come to the state more easily and also allowed the farmers access to much 
larger market areas. 
 
       The First Transition - Improvements in Water and Rail Transportation  
       In 1825, the Erie Canal was completed.  Now settlers could travel from New York 
City to the Great Lakes by water.  To get to Michigan, “it was a short steamer run up the 
Hudson (River) from New York to Albany, 3-4 days on the canal to Buffalo, and 40 hours by 
steamer to Detroit” (Chase -p241).  The water transportation system brought settlers in, and it 
allowed goods to be shipped back east such as wheat, corn, corn meal, and flour.   
       This accomplishment represents the first transition in Michigan agriculture.  Due to 
this ease of transportation, freight rates from Buffalo to New York dropped from $100 per 
ton to $15 per ton after the canal opened (Lewis -p157).    
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           The result of better transportation, and lower freight rates was that crops grown in the 
West, like Michigan, could be shipped much easier to the growing populations of cities in the 
East.  Wheat that was grown in the Great Lakes area was sent down the canal to New York.  
It has been estimated that about one million bushels of wheat was produced in Michigan in 
1837, mostly in the Southeast portion of the state.  By 1840, it had increased to two million 
and by 1850 it had reached five million bushels (Lewis -p205).  Prices for wheat jumped from 
30 cents per bushel to $1 per bushel (Lewis -p157).  This made farming in Michigan much 
more attractive.  The markets were no longer as remote. 
       In 1825, there were seven steamboats running from Detroit to Buffalo.  In 1833, there 
were 11 steamboats and in 1845, there were 217 sailing vessels and 45 steamboats on the 
Great Lakes (Lewis -p162). 
       As the amount of settled land and agricultural production in Michigan increased, the 
need for transportation inland increased.  The first railroads in Michigan were chartered in 
1830 and the first short lines were completed in 1834 (Utley).  The first locomotive came in 
1837.  That was the same year Michigan became a state, and the new legislature voted $15 
million for building state owned railroads (Lewis -p169-171). Also by 1837, 19 other railroad 
companies had been chartered.  The state took on responsibility for internal improvements 
including the east-west canal and the railroads (Lewis). 
       By 1837,  the (passenger) rail rate in the U.S. was about 6-8 cents per mile, and a 
person could go from New York to Chicago for $74.50.  By 1851, the rate from Boston to 
Chicago was $16 (Chase -p243).  The establishment of all rail transportation between Chicago 
and the ocean, by its saving of time and money, stimulated immigration into the Northwest.  
This and reduced freight rates increased grain production in the nation.    
       In 1843, it cost 15 cents a bushels to ship from Jackson to Detroit, which was 
considered exorbitant, and it was felt that better roads were necessary (Duncan -p33-34).  
More effort was put into improving the roads to avoid paying the higher rail rates. But before  
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roads in Michigan were improved much,  increasing volume and the steam locomotives began 
to bring rail rates down. The greatest amount of railroad construction in Michigan took place 
between 1870 and 1890.  In 1860 there was 779 miles of railroad, in 1870 it had grown to 
1,638 and by 1890 it reached 7,243 miles.  The peak was in 1902, with 8200 miles (Quaife -
p243). 
       Expansion of the railroads nationally at this time played a key role in the access all 
farmers had to markets.  They provided farmers with a better means of transporting their 
produce to market.  As the railroads spread through the Midwest,  the differential Michigan 
enjoyed in freight rates versus other states further west diminished as rail rates caught up with 
the rates for water routes and allowed more productive agricultural lands in Indiana and 
Illinois to have access to the East Coast markets as well. 
       By 1890, the population of the state was 2,093,889 (Utley).  The railroads continued 
their importance for hauling people and products. There was still only about 200 miles of 
stone roads, and those were in urban areas.  The remaining roads were mud and sand.  In 
1893, the state legislature passed the county road act, which have counties authority to 
develop their own systems of roads (Lewis -p437).   
       The increase in the construction of quality roads decreased the need for the railroads, 
and also increased flexibility in transportation.  In 1905, the state highway department was 
formed as more automobiles hit the roads. By 1913, there were 60,000 automobiles registered 
(Lewis -p438).  In 1916 the federal government passed the road act to help states build roads.  
The tractor, the telephone, and the automobile were revolutionizing cultivation, 
communication and transportation. 
        
  The Second Transition - An Industrial Revolution 
       This time in Michigan agriculture was marked by many changes.  The development of 
machinery, changes in farm population and society as a whole, diversification into new  
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agricultural products, the development of factories and the labor required for them, and 
government intervention into agricultural prices and production all clashed during the period 
from the turn of the century through 1950.  The result of this period of change was that farm 
sizes increased, as well as diversification and productivity, mainly due to the improvement in 
machinery and equipment. 
       In 1890, threshing machines were available that “made threshing and winnowing of 
grain much easier and faster and saved many man hours of work” (Lewis -p419).  Around 
1900, small electric power units, driven by gasoline engines were purchased by many people 
living in small villages and farms, which made life easier.  The development of the gasoline 
engine, which was lighter than the old steam engines, allowed further development of 
machinery that could more easily be used on the farm.  Mowing machines for cutting hay and 
grain, plowing and cultivating equipment, seed drills, manure spreaders, hay loaders and the 
first harvesting machines and tractors were soon developed.  An industrial revolution was 
beginning to transform agriculture from a small, self-sufficient family art to a large, 
mechanized, scientific industry.  This marked the real beginning of the second transition in 
Michigan agriculture.    
       It also marked major changes in the farming community.  In 1894, farm values were 
less than they were in 1884 by about $4 per acre, and the number of farms had increased 
20,000, to 177,952.  The size of the average farm decreased from 76 to 68 acres (Utley).  The 
number of farms cultivated by their owners was about 82%, and it has decreased from there.  
Soon after 1900 the average acre value had dropped over $10 per acre, or 30% in just six 
years.  The number of farms increased by 24,000 in that same time period (Utley).  By 1902,  
the state population had grown by another 327,000 from 10 years previous, to 2.42 million 
people, but still only 37.3% urban (Utley).  By 1920, the population shifted to 38.9% rural 
(Chase).   
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       People were leaving the farms and resettling in the cities.  Those that remained in 
farming recognized the potential of the states’ many soil types for producing specialized 
crops.  Wheat prices were decreasing, and farmers diversified this time by growing sugar beets 
as a substitute.  They also recognized some of the lands incapabilities, as some land that had 
been cleared had serious erosion problems, and had to be returned to woodlands.      
       In 1906, the first full time plant breeder was hired at Michigan State College.  Also, 
fertilizer use began to increase, with 20,000 tons applied that year (Fuller -p482-483).  As the 
industrial mechanization was increasing, the scientific aspects of the business were gaining 
importance. Farmers began to organize to bring more technology to their businesses. 
       The first farmers cooperative elevators were established in 1912 at Ithaca and Elkton.  
By 1920 there were 90, and they federated as the Michigan Grain Growers Exchange, 
headquartered in Lansing (Fuller -p477).  The legislatures of 1899 and 1905 made it illegal to 
pool to enhance price.  Not even two farms could get together to sell their combined 
quantities at a better price.  But they could buy products together for lower prices.  By 1920, 
the Michigan Farm Bureau was very active.  Their purchasing department handled phosphate 
by the train load from the south.  Its dealings were with local cooperative associations and 
county Farm Bureaus on a contractual basis.  They took orders and arranged for the products 
to be purchased and delivered (Chase -p283). 
       The Michigan legislature of 1915 authorized the State Board of Agriculture, to 
oversee Michigan State College and be director of markets.  The director was to assist in the 
organization of cooperative and other associations for improving the relations among 
producers and consumers, and afford them such services under adequate rules and regulations 
as they relate to standardizing, grading, packing, handling, storage and sale of products within 
the state.  The director was also to provide information regarding market conditions around 
the Union, provide auction markets for disposal of farm products and monitor transportation  
 
   29
service, and restraint of trade.  This position was eventually allowed to become vacant, but the 
organization of government to help provide fair markets was evident (Chase -p262-263). 
       In 1915 to 1919, wheat again became a money crop because of demand caused by  
World War I, then prices drifted lower to a record low in 1932 (Fuller -p478). 
       Dry edible bean acres were increasing as well as hay, corn, rye, barley, oats and 
potatoes.  Fertilizer use continued to increase, with 112,000 tons applied in 1920, and 
increasing to 153,000 tons in 1929 (Fuller -p482-483).   
       In the 1920’s, tractors were beginning to come into practical use.  Soon they were 
made on assembly lines in several factories.  With a tractor, a farmer could plow faster and 
also pull many other things as well. This was important because of the lack of labor caused by 
World War I.  It changed farming and farm production in many ways.  It took fewer men and 
horses to do the same amount of work.  The horse peak was in 1917, with about 680,000 in 
the state (Lewis).  Before the general use of the tractor, about 1/3 of a farmers’ acreage was 
planted to hay and oats for the horses.  In the years following, hay acres declined, and corn 
acres increased (Lewis -p426).  In 1920, there were 5500 tractors, in 1925, 16,500, in 1930, 
33,000, in 1940, 62,000, and in 1945, 85,000 (Duncan -p50).  
       In the boom years after World War I, land values increased rapidly.  The stock market 
crash in 1929 changed the outlook.  In 1920, there were 19,000,000 farm acres.  By 1930, it 
had decreased to 17,000,000 (Fuller -p434). 
       In 1932, nearly half of the state’s total agricultural land area was delinquent on taxes 
(Skjaerlun -p2.1).  Much of the land settled in the northern lower peninsula was not well 
suited for sustained cultivation and some was returned to forest.  Unprofitable farms went 
bankrupt. Grain prices plummeted and the farms shifted back toward sustainable agriculture. 
Hay, oat and alfalfa acres continued to remain high into the 1930’s.  There were 2.5 million 
acres of hay, about 1.2 million acres of oats and almost one million acres of barley in 1933-34 
(Fuller -p478).    
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        During the depression there was a reoccupation of the land as a self-supporting 
activity.  This slowed the progress of the second transition.  The number of farms decreased, 
as well as the value, and the average number of acres, from 101.1 in 1930 to 93.9 in 1935 
(Fuller -p482-483). 
        The national government led the way in road building, primarily of a military character, 
and in Michigan it was mainly from Detroit to Chicago, the Saginaw Bay and the Grand River 
valley (Chase -p238). 
       Changes in agriculture during the late 20’s to late 30’s era were varied and large.  In 
1928, edible beans sold for $5 per bushel, and by 1932 they were 32 cents per bushel.  From 
1916 to 1935 they ranged from 2 cents to 8 cents per pound (Fuller -p480).  Sugarbeet 
acreage increased rapidly, from virtually none in 1898 to 100,000 acres the next year.  
Eighteen processing plants were built.  By 1931 only two were left open.  At that time, a 
special contract was devised, giving the growers a 50% interest in the sales of sugar pulp and 
molasses.  With that, and cheap depression labor, 11 plants were open in 1932 and 15 in 1933.  
Also in 1933 came the national sugar marketing agreement, where 26% of U.S. sugar 
consumption was allotted to beet sugar areas (Fuller -p481). 
       In 1933, Michigan farmers grew wheat under the domestic allotment plan provided in 
the agriculture adjustment act passed by Congress in that year.  This was the program “that 
implemented some ideas that have become staples of agriculture subsidy programs, including 
provisions allowing the government to control production by paying farmers to reduce the 
number of acres in cultivation, purchase surplus products; regulate the marketing of certain 
crops; guarantee minimum payments to farmers for some products, and make loans to farmers 
using only their unharvested crops as collateral” (West’s).   
       By 1930, only 1/5 of the population of the state was on the farm.   The number of 
farms in Michigan has declined every year since 1933, when there were about 200,000 farms  
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(Lewis -p426), and the average size has been increasing.  In 1940, 1/2 of the area of the state 
was for farming, and there were 187,589 farms ( Schmid). 
       During the 1930’s and 40’s electric power lines were run, which helped in many ways, 
but did not aid in the fields.  Other technological improvements after the great depression 
signaled the scientific approach that was soon to dominate farming, machinery, fertilizer and 
plant breeding. It became more evident in the 1950’s with a rapid increase in yields and a 
world food economy (Skjaerlun -p2.2-2.3). 
 
       Transition Three - A Scientific Revolution 
       The move toward larger scale, capital intensive farming has helped shift the average 
size of farms upward, while decreasing the number of farms in operation.  The third transition 
was in process.  The rapid advance of technology to improve production was beginning to 
take place.  This ranges from scientific improvements in machinery, farming practices, better 
seed, chemical use, fertilizer application, and to many other inventions.  It has allowed the 
producer to increase yields on corn from 31.2 bushels per acre in 1941 to 138.2 in 2001 and 
decrease per bushel production costs in the meantime (NCGA).  
       This reduction in cost of production created surpluses of grain and decreased price so 
that many more left the farm to find employment in the city industries.  The nation didn’t need 
as much land to be in production to feed itself or to satisfy world demand.  Marginal ground 
was taken out of production due to the expense/return ratio. Government programs were 
redesigned to reduce production.   
       The increase in highway construction during this time reduced the need for rail 
transportation and increased the amount of truck delivered goods.  It has allowed producers 
flexibility in accessing more and new markets, and has decreased the transportation expense in 
the process, helping gain better returns.  
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        From 1940 to 1974, Michigan farmland decreased by 7.5 million acres, a 41% 
reduction (Skjaerlun -p3.4).  Michigan’s farm land acreage declined 6.4 million acres, a 39% 
decrease, from 1954 to 1992.  A 25.8% reduction in farmland occurred from 1954 to 1974, 
associated with a 54% reduction in farm population (Skjaerlun -piii).   
       The number of farms then increased from 1974 to 1982 due to commodity price 
increases associated with increased demand from such countries as the Soviet Union, 
increased fertilizer use and productivity and government support programs.  Prices then 
leveled off, but costs continued to increase.  It declined again from 1982 to 1992 (Skjaerlun -
pii).   The loss in the number of farms in these ten years was due mainly to urban growth.   
       As costs for machinery, labor and land have continued to increased, the demand for 
more production has intensified.  Prices for grains have not kept pace with the increase in 
costs.  The only other alternative to generate more revenue is to increase productivity.  
Science has been able to provide large increases in yields from 1950 to present.  But, if yields 
would level off, there could be a major change in the way farming is done. 
        The capital and operating money needed to operate farms might require more than a 
family or small corporate farm can handle.  This possibility is at the crux of this study.  
Anticipation of the changes and discussion of possible strategies that might be needed to cope 
with them are needed.  By understanding the history of Michigan agriculture and what it can 
offer, the organization of the grain producers and the grain handlers and processors, the best 
possible solutions may become evident. 
 
       A Transition past Science and Michigan Agriculture in the Future 
       Once converted to another use or fragmented, land cannot usually be converted back 
to farmland.  The financial situation of many older farmers is such that they might have to sell 
their land  (much of which is sold for development) to use for retirement income.  With fewer  
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and fewer young people willing to attempt to make a living farming, the land is either sold for 
development or purchased by a larger producer. 
        The average age of today’s Michigan grain producer is in the low 50’s (Table 12).  
The importance of this issue becomes more important if scientific improvements cannot 
continue to increase productivity to match the costs increases, because it will increase the rate 
of decrease in farm acreage, number of farms and total grain production in the state.  This has 
major implications for the grain handlers and processors in the state, which are dependent on 
volume for survival.  
       The question of what will happen to the farms of those who are 60 plus years old , as 
they retire, is not a new one.  From 1982 to 1992, farmers 65 years older and older increased 
7%, while the number of beginning farmers under 35 decreased 55% (Skjaerlun -piii). This 
would indicate that the older farmers just keep farming.  They may have to because they have 
no retirement built up.  They are more likely to have their land paid for, and it might be easier 
for them to be profitable enough to survive.  They may have no other alternative. 
        In 1992, only 43% of Michigan farmers reported a profit (Skjaerlun -piv). When they 
have retired, the farms have either been split up into smaller tracts or been absorbed by those 
larger farmers that want to take on more land.  There hasn’t been a decisive change, but a 
gradual move from the medium sized farms (60 - 1000 acres), to small (under 60 acres) or 
large (over 1000 acres) farms.  Current farmland acreage is 10.4 million acres.  Projected 
farmland acreage by 2012 ranges between 8.1 to 8.6 million acres and by 2022 at 7.3 million.  
By the year 2012, a core group of 10,000 farmers could produce 90% of all agriculture sales.  
“As much as 43% of Michigan farmland could change ownership over the next 20 years as 
aging farmers sell their land to finance retirement” (Skjaerlun -pvi). 
       In order to get younger farmers to stay, there needs to be a possibility to make a living 
similar to other occupations.  The discussions about organization and strategy in the following  
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sections is intended to give those who may be interested some guidance as to what that will 
take and when that may happen.  
       The fourth transition in Michigan agriculture will arise out of these challenges.  By 
associating the history of Michigan agriculture with the present conditions, a solution will be 
found.  The next section will develop the background for the shape of the fourth transition. 
 
2.3  Associating History with Present Conditions in the Grain System 
 
       If we look back over the history of Michigan agriculture, the most profitable times for 
grain farming in Michigan has been when the state enjoyed a competitive advantage over other 
regions.  In the early years (1850 - 1870) the ease of transportation allowed there to be a 
more available supply of labor as well as a lower cost transportation into the sales markets 
than other states.  Once that temporary advantage was lost, the Michigan grain system has 
struggled to keep up with the rest of the corn belt.  Since the late 1800’s,  other states have 
had such advantages as better soils, and less costly transportation to markets.  Michigan 
agriculture’s advantage has been its diversity.  Its ability to raise fruits, vegetables, edible 
beans, sugar beets and some specialty grains have helped the agriculture industry to survive. 
 
  The Fourth Transition 
       As for grain farming, the Michigan farmer has been at a disadvantage to other states 
for many years, and that will most likely continue without a transition to production geared 
more for the consumer, which can use the diversity of Michigan’s climate and soil types to 
raise crops for specific purposes at higher prices than generic varieties of crops.  Higher 
transportation costs for both materials coming in and grain going out, tax rates, land values 
and fewer marketing alternatives all put Michigan at a disadvantage.  Until the passage in 
1994 of Proposal A,  farm property tax rates in Michigan were the highest in the nation, 
averaging 3 to 5 times higher than other states.  It still ranked in the top four states in farm tax 
rates in 1994 (Skjaerlun)(seeTable 6).    
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       There are more considerations that could improve Michigan’s competitive position 
such as making better use of water transportation and developing specialty crops that have 
certain characteristics associated with the climate.  But in order for crop farming to survive in 
the long run, the following chapters will show that the producer will need to become less 
independent, and rely on help from vertical coordination down the chain to the processors and 
grain companies. 
       The history and the organizational and strategic studies will show that a transition to 
tighter vertical coordination will be necessary, and could come in Michigan first because of its 
unique circumstances.  The other driving force behind the transition will be the increased 
importance of the domestic market as the source for a continually growing demand for food, 
feed, and industrial uses for grains, and the decreasing importance of exports as a price factor.  
This combination will make grain producers a direct beneficiary of adjusting production to 
meet consumer demand, drawing away from the commodity sense of production (substituting 
quality specifications instead of yield specifications) that has been the driving force behind 
grain production to date.  
       This fourth transition in the Michigan grain system could result in closer marketing 
coordination, or  even contract farming for crops.  Such arrangements would allow some of 
the risk and capital requirements of farming in Michigan to be shifted to companies in return 
for guaranteed volume, which would lower their per bushel costs of handling.  Larger 
companies have more financial capabilities and better expertise in handling risk situations than 
individual producers. 
        
2.4  The History of the Grain Industry on a National Basis 
  
  It is helpful at this point to be aware of the grain industry history nationally to give a 
more complete understanding of the background of Michigan agriculture.   
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           The grain industry in the United States has always been an oligopsony.  Previous to 
the westward expansion and simultaneous increase in industrialization in the 1830’s and 
1840’s, the effects of this structure were minimized by the agrarian nature of the society.  
Farms produced for their families and the excess was sold.  But as urban manufacturing 
corporations became numerous and profitable, the structure of the industry changed. 
       Labor began to organize, and wages improved, creating even more desire to work in 
the cities.  This change created the need for more foods to be sold into the non-farm 
population centers and trade for grain expanded. 
       The expansion of settlements into the prairies of the Midwest created surpluses of 
grain there.  Transportation systems via railroads were developed and grain began to move 
from surplus areas of the Midwest to deficit areas in the East. 
       This time in the 1830’s and 40’s was also the time of the repeal of the “Corn Laws” in 
Britain, which created much more demand for U.S. grains to Britain (Morgan). 
       Further west, in Minnesota, wheat mills were built by Pillsbury, Cargill and Peavey 
families, and their success concentrated the wheat milling industry.  
       Grain marketing firms were engaged in two primary types of operations: physical 
handling of product from time of production to ultimate consumption (processing), and 
pricing of the product at various stages in the marketing process. 
       But there were difficulties as a whole in the marketing of grain.  Those difficulties are 
similar to those experienced in developing countries today, such as 1) varying grades and size 
of shipments, 2) varying terms of payment, 3) secret prices, 4) reliability of buyers and sellers, 
5) damaged goods (or wrong quality) on arrival, and 6) difficulty in finding new buyers 
(Gold). 
       In the early 1850’s the volume of grain shipped to Chicago was so heavy that many 
streets became completely congested with wagons.  Farmers were forced to sell for whatever 
prices they could get (Kroll).   
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       Contracts began to be offered to deliver a specified quantity at a designated place 
within a given number of days.  These to-arrive contracts were a major advance in the field of 
marketing in the United States, providing flexibility.  The burden of price risk had been shifted 
from the producer to the buyer.  But the risk and lack of credit for buyers to hold grain 
inhibited the expansion and development of the industry. 
       The to-arrive contract become more refined and was called a futures contract.  
Varying grade and quality, payment terms and lack of contract compliance were standardized 
with the development of the futures contract. 
       The commodity exchanges are an effective mechanism for setting prices and so 
facilitate grain movement through all stages of production and distribution. 
       Grain marketers reduce price fluctuations risk by hedging, enabling the industry to 
operate on lower profit margins.  Market prices are kept at more competitive levels, less risk 
enables better bank credit, and price information is spread efficiently to large numbers by the 
open outcry method. 
       The transportation system of rail lines and the river systems can move large quantities 
of grain around the country and to the export ports with unrivaled efficiency.  This ability has 
enabled the U.S. to be the worlds’ residual supplier of grain for the last 150 years.  But this 
advantage may not be enough to overcome the low cost of production in other parts of the 
developing world. 
       As other countries around the world develop their own grain industries, the U.S. has 
lost market share of world trade (Table 15).  This trend will likely continue, and will force the 
U.S. grain companies and producers to concentrate more on domestic use of grains.  This will 
provide new opportunities and challenges for grain producers, handlers and processors.   
       Analyzing the organization and strategies of producers and the grain industry and 
planning and implementing sound economic strategies will be of key importance as we move  
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toward changes in the world marketing of grains and the increase in consumer driven 
production of grains. 
       The combination of closer vertical coordination between grain producers and grain 
handlers and processors, and an increase in the importance of domestic consumption for 
grains, along with the subsequent decrease in the importance of exports will be the fourth 
transition for the Michigan grain system.  This transition could make Michigan more 
competitive as a grain state.   
       The challenge for Michigan grain producers and grain handlers and processors is to 
find ways to improve the viability of the grain produced and marketed.  The relationship with 
the history of the grain industry nationally is that the development of organized contracts and 
transfer of risk to the buyers that have served the industry well over the last 150 years are the 
same key elements that the producers and handlers could endorse to face this challenge.   
 
       Conclusion 
       The historical background of Michigan and of the grain industry nationally provides an 
understanding of the challenges that have been present in grain production and handling since 
early development of the West, and what solutions have been enacted to improve the 
economics.  The study will now proceed to the economic analysis of the current challenges in 
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Chapter Three 
Industrial Organization Framework of Analysis 
 
3.1  Introduction to Industrial Organization of Grain Handlers and Processors 
      
  The Industrial Organization framework was chosen for this study because the 
emphasis is mainly on understanding behavior of groups (in this case, grain handlers and 
processors and grain producers) that either act as competitors or interact as suppliers and 
customers (Marion and Mueller) in imperfectly competitive markets, and the impact of their 
behavior on performance.   
       The grain system is made up of groups of grain handlers and processors, and groups of 
grain producers.  The producers deliver the grain to the handlers, who then pass it down the 
chain as grain, or as a processed item.  The grain handlers and processors act as competitors, 
and the grain producers interact with them as suppliers and customers.  The consolidation of 
both groups has decreased competition and so created further imperfections in the market. 
       Organizational theory deals with matters mostly internal to the firm (Cyert and 
March).   Industrial Organization (IO) theory attempts to explain behavior by economic 
conditions and the competitive environment, and is mostly external.  Both internal and 
external analysis are used in this study in order to come to conclusions about  the structure 
and conduct of the grain system, and what solutions may bring about positive change for 
future.  Positive change would be an increase in the welfare of both producers and the grain 
industry.  The study uses the IO analysis of the grain industry to relate directly to problems 
and solutions for producers.  Because the industry is so closely linked with the producers, the 
solutions that improve the welfare of the producers will improve the performance of the 
industry. 
    The goal of grain handlers and processors is to maintain or increase bushel volume, 
particularly in off-peak seasons, in order to gain better per bushel cost efficiencies during  
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those times, and meet profitability goals for the location and the company.  The goal of grain 
producers is to increase and stabilize profitability in order to stay in business, while 
maintaining or improving their standard of living and lifestyle.  
       The basic IO paradigm holds that the structure of a market strongly influences the 
competitive conduct of firms within the market, which in turn strongly influences 
performance.  It provides the only well-developed framework for examining behavior of 
imperfectly competitive markets (Marion and Mueller). 
       The concentration (CR4 = 47% of total U.S. off farm storage capacity) of both the 
grain industry and also grain producers as they have become larger has caused concerns about 
competition.  Fewer grain companies, fewer numbers of elevators and fewer numbers of 
producers move the market from more perfectly competitive to less.  The roots of the IO 
framework deal with the debate about the effects of monopolies, tight oligopolies and what 
market power problems they cause.  Market power at high levels was found to have positive 
effects on profits of firms, but negative effects on innovation (Marion and Mueller).  There are 
signs of this in the grain industry and it has also become evident in farming as they have 
become less diversified, as will be evidenced in the study. 
       Most of the early work in the IO field considered mainly structure and performance.  
The conduct portion of the framework has been less developed.  This study shows that 
conduct has a important role, since conduct reveals the effects of management’s personalities 
and emotion in the decision making process.  While good business decisions may not include 
these attributes as part of the process, the admission that they do play a role, and at times may 
override economic decision rules, proves that they are important to study and should be an 
integral part of the IO framework.  As companies pare back on the number of employees 
through concentration (firm managers responsible for more facilities and producers farming 
larger farms), the effects of management’s personalities, experience and emotion become more 
evident in marketing decisions and performance outcomes.  
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       As the concentration increases, larger firms may be less likely to innovate.  The 
attributes of those facilities that remain after consolidation have advantages that increase 
barriers to entry because of their competitiveness, but that also reduces incentives for those 
remaining facilities (and firms) to innovate.  This study recognizes this assumption and 
suggests that the system participants should move toward innovation even as market share 
and power are increasing.  This is necessary in Michigan in particular due to the facts (shown 
elsewhere in the study) that show that the Michigan grain system is at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to other major grain belt states, and needs to differentiate.   
       The Michigan grain system is concentrating, and exhibits those characteristics 
associated with a tighter oligopoly.  Yet, as part of the U.S. and world grain system, Michigan 
is a small participant, and finds itself needing to differentiate in order to compete.  The 
differentiation falls mainly on the producer as a problem, but the grain industry, by 
understanding the complexities of the structure, can help itself by joining with the producer to 
find ways to innovate.  Failure of the producer to be successful will eventually reduce the need 
for the grain handlers and processors in Michigan.  An  X-inefficiency (the tendency for costs 
to rise more relative to margins in non-competitive markets including excess capacity and 
operating with suboptimal scale plants (Leibenstien)) could be the result, and the number of 
grain facilities would continue to decrease.  This study attempts to show how that is possible, 
and that understanding it shows that strategies to deal with this problem are those that are 
successful in more competitive markets. 
       Understanding the structure, conduct and performance, as the IO framework provides, 
allows the economic analyst to suggest solutions that can help participants become more 
successful.  Understanding the signs of increases in market power by studying the structure 
and conduct can help improve performance.  Studying the performance of a group of firms 
will allow the economist to suggest changes in conduct and/or structure that may improve 
long term profitability for grain producers as well as handlers and processors.  Understanding  
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each of the three parts of the IO framework individually can lead to suggestions for change 
that will lead to improved performance.  A study such as this can bring to light the state of the 
grain system (grain producers and handlers and processors in this case) that may otherwise be 
overlooked or unrecognized.   
       This part of the study will begin with an analysis of the grain industry nationally, using 
an Industrial Organization approach.  This study will consider concentration as well as 
differentiation, barriers to entry and exit, growth rate of market demand and imports as key 
components of the structure.  Pricing policies, quality and non-price product policies, 
promotion, strategic advantages, deterrents to entry and how the firms react to each other will 
be included in the analysis of the firm conduct.  Performance analysis of technical, economic 
and pricing efficiency, innovation, research,  profitability and income and market power 
distribution will be presented. 
       This format of analysis will also then be applied to the Michigan grain industry, with 
similarities and differences noted, compared to the national level. 
       With a full understanding of grain industry organization both nationally and specifically 
in Michigan, the stage is set for the discussion of the producer’s plight and how the 
organization of the grain industry affects them. 
       The study of producers will not be done in the IO framework, as the grain industry 
was, simply because each producer and  farm is a business in itself, and there are so many and 
they are so varied.  But the study does take the information from the IO analysis and directly 
relate it to how it shapes the system as a whole, and what producers can do to improve their 
standing in the system.  
       This analysis can be used to provide justification to the idea that vertical coordination 
between the firms and the producer would increase the welfare of the grain industry and the 
grain producers by reducing transaction costs, and may become one of the steps in the next 
transition in the Michigan grain system.  
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  Transaction costs are the costs of running the system; including the costs of 
coordinating and of motivating.  Its fundamental argument as originally put forward by 
Williamson (Williamson) is that economic activity and organizations are arranged so as to 
minimize transaction costs.  It is sometimes difficult to separate production costs from 
transaction costs.  Also, just minimizing transaction costs for the firm may not create the most 
welfare for the firm (Milgrom and Roberts) because other costs could be too high or revenues 
may not be high enough. 
    In the grain system, if the industry or a firm can find ways to reduce transaction costs, 
they will increase transactions with producers.  Producers and the firm will benefit by the 
reduction, which should improve profitability and encourage competitors to do the same.  The 
system will be more efficient and be able to compete more effectively with external 
competition such as land for development. 
  The IO framework is used because by studying and understanding the structure and 
conduct of the grain industry,  suggestions can be made to increase the welfare of the 
producer, which in turn will increase the efficiencies and profitability of the grain industry 
participants.  The grain handlers and processors reliance on bushel volume means that if they 
can help producers be more profitable, they will keep more of the land employed as farms than 
it would be otherwise.  By changing the nature of the vertical links between the grain industry 
and the grain producer, both can become more successful.   
 
 3.2  Industrial Organization Analysis of the Grain Industry Nationally 
 
        The grain industry will be defined as grain handlers and processors in this study and  
we will define grain as the major grains - corn, soybeans and wheat - because they are the 
three largest grain crops produced in the U.S. 
       Although bulk grain production is generally still homogeneous, there is some 
specialization now into specific varieties that require special handling.  However, if the volume  
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of a specialty crop is high, it will usually be handled from the farm through the same system 
(modifying the system with more identity preservation) that non-specialty grains are handled.  
If the volume is low, as for very specific varieties or for very specific uses or specifications, it 
is more likely to be bagged and sent by container than by bulk through the grain handling 
system. 
       Because of the volume and the area that grain is handled in the U.S. and around the 
world, firm behavior, information, barriers to entry and exit and pricing are inconsistent over 
time.  What is logical under one set of circumstances may not be at other times.  Information 
may be incomplete because of the complexity of the grain markets around the world, and so 
are imperfect.  The grain market is especially imperfect because of the uncertainty of 
production, its seasonality, perishability, and its integration with unstable international markets 
and changing public policies. 
       Industrial Organization analysis will give us a greater understanding of the current 
system and its imperfections. That knowledge can be applied to suggest the direction of 
change in the industry in the coming years and used to discuss how coordination between the 




       In the IO framework, structure consists of the relatively stable, economically 
significant features of the market environment that influence the rivalry (behavior) among the 
buyers and sellers (firms) operating with it (the industry) (Caves).   
       These structural elements set the parameters for conduct and ultimately impact market 
performance. Those elements of structure are examined below.   
 
   45
       Concentration      
       Economic theory tells us that concentrated industries are likely to perform poorly, 
employing too few factors of production (Caves).     
       When market demand is growing slowly, individual firms may expand via  
consolidation, leading to increased concentration (USDA-ERS-Structures).  This appears to 
be the case with the U.S. grain industry.  Growing world production has slowed expansion of 




U.S. Export Market Share 
 
 Crop  Year  Wheat   Corn   Soybeans  Total 
      1993  29.75%  60.49%    70.77%  44.80% 
      1995  29.15    76.48      70.99   51.29 
      1997  21.75    62.20      64.94   41.12 
      1999  23.07    67.03      56.63   42.50 
      2001  24.27    63.67      54.25   43.62 
      2002  22.30    51.78      44.71   37.47 
  Source: USDA - World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates - World 
 Outlook  Board 
 
  Domestic demand has grown, but at a slow, steady rate. In an effort to reduce costs 
and maintain or improve margins, the grain industry has experienced an increase in 
concentration by merger, acquisition and partnerships, particularly over the past ten years.  A 
brief review of grain storage facility numbers and capacity reveals this (Figure 3-b).  
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Figure 3-b 
 
U. S. Off - Farm Storage Facilities 
and Capacities 
 
  Year    Number of Facilities    Storage Capacity (1,000 bu) 
            Michigan               U.S.          Michigan                 U.S. 
 1993   300   11,866   147   8,486,500 
 1994   295   11,592   143   8,374,110 
 1995   293   11,295   146   8,301,060 
 1996   292   10,884   146   8,072,330 
 1997   289   10,605   146   7,961,340 
 1998   286   10,272   143   8,003,190 
 1999   270       9,995   141   8,087,250 
 2000   250       9,830   141   8,348,996 
 2001   245       9,697   146   8,424,395 
 2002   235       9,521   148   8,506,131 
 
  Source: USDA - National Agricultural Statistics Service December 31 Stock 
 Reports.   
 
  The four largest firms in grain storage capacity, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), 
Cargill, Conagra and Bunge, operated 47% of the commercial storage capacity of those 
companies with at least 6 million bushels of storage in 2002, for a total of 1.943 billion 
bushels out of 4.172 billion total capacity.  The total number of companies in that category 
has gone from 103 in 1990 to 89 this year (Grain and Milling Annual 2002).  The top five 
grain companies in international trading had 85% of the trade in 1998 (Multinational 
Monitor).  As an example of the velocity of change, Con Agra acquired 11 different 
companies or product lines in 1998 and 1999 (FRB-Minn 1/00). 
  As of 1995, the four largest firms in flour milling, grain storage capacity, brewing and 
minor oilseed processing held 70% of sales in those markets (FRB-Minn 1/00), and that has 
grown over the past 7 years.  
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       The market environment in trading cash grain is changing from a competitive open 
trading market with many participants to one of trading outside the firms’ own vertically 
integrated system only out of necessity.  All four of the major firms have a presence in 
processing, milling and exports.  The top four firms accounted for 81% of corn exports and 
65% of soybean exports (Successful Farming).  They use their origination capabilities 
(handling facilities that purchase from producers) to feed their own systems.  Much of this 
integration has taken place in the last 10 years, through mergers, acquisitions and 
partnerships.  They have used their market power and financial abilities to increase market 
share by integrating and coordinating vertically and horizontally.   
       Most grain companies without ties to one of the major grain handling or processing 
companies are finding it increasingly difficult to compete with the margins needed to support 
themselves. Even an international grain company like Continental Grain did not feel it could 
compete because of its limited domestic processing and trading capabilities in the U.S. and 
merged with Cargill.  Some of the hardest hit grain businesses have been cooperatives.  In the 
period from 1993-97, 367 cooperatives merged or were acquired (USDA-rurdev).  In 1997 
alone, 96 grain cooperatives were merged or acquired.  Growmark, Countrymark and 
Farmland, all cooperatives, have worked agreements with ADM (a stock company) to manage 
or own their grain facilities (USDA-grain transportation).       
       As the concentration grows, tighter vertical coordination up the chain to the producer 
may be the next logical step toward reducing costs and maintaining or increasing market 
power.  The leading firms must beware of the tendency for performance (volume and 
profitability) to suffer (as competition decreases) with an increase in concentration (Caves).  
For this study, this is because volume is such an integral part of the grain handling industry.  If  
welfare losses at the producer level are great enough, the volume of production will decrease, 
which hurts the grain handlers in turn.  A change in structure that would assure that bushel  
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volume for handlers and processors may help to enhance grain producer welfare and  improve 
industry performance and offset this tendency. 
 
       Differentiation 
       Differentiation occurs when consumers have a basis for forming preferences between 
one brand (or firm) and another.  It can occur by the good’s physical appearance, by its 
physical properties, the conditions of sale, service levels, or the location (of the handler or the 
grain). 
       Products whose physical units are not distinguishable will tend to be largely 
undifferentiated in the market place (Caves).  That is the case in the U.S. grain industry for the 
most part.  There are some subtle differences in buying techniques, and certain non genetically 
modified grain varieties may be marketed by some companies and not others.      There is 
some contracting of production taking place in specialty grains, for specific varieties of seed, 
but contract production is a limited to a total of about 2.4% of  total grain production 
(USDA-ERS-#768).  Overall, the appraisal  of the economic characteristics reflects little 
differentiation.   The differences can be considered as part of the conduct of the firms, but 
structure is still applicable because of the more specific roles that the leading firms take in the 
market.  They can differentiate by using their size to try new buying programs, for example. 
       The differentiation in grain companies and how they access grain is associated with the 
end use for the grain.  ADM, Cargill, Con Agra, and Bunge need grain to furnish their 
processing and milling and export businesses, and they are more active in some parts of the 
country than others.  ConAgra has interests in corn and wheat milling, exports, poultry 
processing and many other consumer food items. Each company may need or want grain from 
different parts of the country to meet its short term (two or three months supply) production 
or export objectives.  
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       The marketing alternatives offered to producers in general do not vary substantially, 
although some firms differentiate by being more aggressive in their buying practices in some 
locations than in others.  They have become more protective of the geographic areas that 
work well to their own processing or exporting facilities so that they do not have to enter the 
marketplace outside their own facilities to access grain. 
       Pricing differentiation is by location, transportation capabilities and facility operating 
costs.  Generally, price is determined by the ability of facilities and a company to access 
different sales markets with various modes and capacities of transportation. 
       Reluctance of concentrated industries to innovate precludes the desire for the large 
grain firms to differentiate beyond traditional price or marketing option considerations.  A 
structural change into full service facilities that would include banking, futures trading, lending 
or retirement programs by larger firms, for example, may come about in order to help 
producers simplify their businesses, and as an additional way to tighten vertical coordination 
up the chain to the producers.  These additional businesses would bring the producers closer 
to the firms by becoming more full service organizations. 
 
       Barriers to Entry and Exit 
       Entry into the grain business even on a small scale (one elevator) requires a substantial 
capital outlay.  Typical annual net income, depending on costs of running the facility, and 
volume, is only approximately 10-15% of the asset value.  After the facility is built, the ability 
to buy and sell effectively, to access information, and to provide a variety of services with the 
expertise and economies of scale is needed to compete with the large companies. 
       Once the facility is built, it is a sunk cost.  The structures exhibit high asset specificity, 
and unless another company would want it, there may not be a buyer for the facility, and the 
investment could be lost.  The risk of investing in assets that have few other uses is that little  
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of the capital cost may be recovered if the company goes out of business.  This high sunk cost 
increases both barriers to entry and barriers to exit. 
       Today’s grain companies own and have access to more storage capacity, with the 
Grain 100 (Grain and Milling Annual 2002) averaging an ownership of  47 million bushels of  
capacity in 2002 versus 32.5 million bushels in 1987.  Building a new facility can cost $2 to $3 
per bushel of storage, and it needs to be in a location with sufficient potential bushel volume 
(large enough production area) to generate enough revenues to cover costs.  It must also 
utilize as many modes of transportation as possible in order to be competitive in sales values.  
The top four grain companies have approximately $4 billion in grain storage assets if they 
were built new today. 
       The size of the top four to six companies is such that their economies of scale is a 
significant factor.  They can spread out their administrative, operating and transaction costs 
over many facilities, reducing the cost per bushel handled  for the company.  New firms 
entering the business will have a hard time matching all of the cost efficiencies of the large 
firms.  There is a high minimum efficient scale relative to market size. 
       Structure in terms of the form of vertical linkages depends not only on economies of 
size and scope, but also on costs incurred in completing transactions using various governance 
mechanisms (Boehlje).  If there is an alternative institutional arrangement that will reduce the 
transaction cost of an exchange, then the new market structure is more efficient (Davidson 
and Weersink).   
       Older facilities may cost more to upgrade to meet Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration standards than it costs to build new.  Standards for safety and environment are 
becoming more stringent, and are expensive to adhere to in older facilities because equipment 
may be outdated. 
       Most of the new building is in the area of niche processing of grains by smaller 
cooperatives and ethanol plants. Smaller facilities that can produce a specific product can  
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compete in that particular market on a more level plane with the larger companies.  They can 
provide specialized processing and services that the larger plants and companies may find 
difficult to manage effectively.  Nontraditional cooperatives, called “new generation” or 
“value-added” co-ops, are growing in number and are being watched with interest by 
agriculture industry experts (FRB-Minn 3/02).  In 2002 there were as many as 60 new ethanol 
plants being constructed or in process, which may lead to overcapacity quickly, particularly if 
prices for ingredients (mainly corn) would escalate.   
       With barriers to entry and exit substantial, there are not many grain handling firms 
entering the industry.   Most of the growth is currently in processing, and mainly in ethanol 
production, where barriers to entry are lower because they are operating in a niche segment of 
the industry. 
      
       Growth 
       Growth in the grain industry has been slow. Compared to the 1989-90 crop year, corn, 
soybean and wheat exports combined, are projected to be 304 million bushels lower in the 
2002 marketing year, and domestic use has increased 2.3 billion bushels for a combined 
increase of 2.0 billion bushels out of a total projected crop size in 2002 of 14.4 billion bushels 
(figures 3-c and 3-d). The growth rate of usage has increased about 14%, or a little over 1% 
each year on the average (USDA-WASDE).  Slow growth leads to more concentration, and 
that has been the case. 
        The growth of grain origination is defined by the amount of grain grown in the area 
the elevator buys from, what market demand is for grains grown there, and what the capability 
is of the elevators to get the grain to the highest demand market. 
       If the facilities have several modes of transportation available then they are in a better 
position to create growth in their origination by being able to take advantage of changes in   
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marketing patterns.  Those facilities that are, for example, only truck, could not access 
markets far away as easily as a train loading facility with end users on the same railroad. 
       Growth is limited by the ability of the elevator and company to access markets.  It is 
also limited by the services it can provide to customers.  Price, services (drying, storage, 
accounting), information (marketing options, market news and analysis) and operational 
capabilities (how fast unloading and loading occurs, and other efficiencies) will also determine 
the ability of the facilities to compete. 
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  Those companies that can access better markets and provide the needs of the 
producers at the lowest cost will gain local market share at the expense of others. 
       The growth of some facilities and companies may be affected by externalities such as 
urban growth or railroad abandonment.  Larger companies (grain conglomerates) may be able 
to change (buy the railroad) or absorb the loss of business (operate seasonally) easier than 
local smaller grain companies that might have a higher debt to equity ratio. 
       Growth affects the structure because generally fast growth brings more profits 
(Caves), the playing field is more level, and the industry participants are more eager to expand 
market share.  In the grain industry, growth has been slow, so new participants are slow to 
enter the market, particularly considering the cost of entry, and large firms are capturing 
market share by reducing costs through scale economies in an effort to make more profit. 
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       Imports 
       The growth of production in some areas of the world, along with the changes in 
production areas in the U.S. mean that imports will be more prevalent in coming years.  
Countries that may have lower costs of production may be able to export to the U.S.  This has 
been most evident with Brazilian soybeans and meal being imported to the East coast and 
wheat from Canada imported into the U.S. millers.  This may become more prevalent as 
urbanization reduces production in coastal areas of the U.S.  Another factor may be the 
increase of trade agreements that prohibit quotas and tariffs. 
       Imports will become even more evident if government subsidies are reduced.  This 
might mean that more farm land goes out of production, and abandonment would most likely 
be concentrated on the higher priced land on the East coast, raising prices and forcing more 
imports to that part of the country. 
       Structure of the industry is affected by imports because the more competitive imports 
are, the less need there is for domestic plant expansion, and the more need there is more 
international trading experience.  The focus of the companies can shift from being a leading 
capital intensive domestic grain handler and processor to a international trading company.   
      
       Summary of Structural Characteristics 
       The overall conclusion about the structure of the U.S. grain handling and processing 
industry is that it has slow growth, is capital intensive, has little differentiation and has a large 
concentration in order to gain efficiencies of scale in order to maintain profits. With growth 
slow, profitability and bushel volume can be improved most by processing and transaction 
cost reductions.  It is difficult for entry except for smaller specialty processors that can 
provide service or specific products on a small scale.  
        Profitability and bushel volume for the firms can be enhanced by understanding that 
the structure of the industry can be changed by coordinating more closely with the grain  
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producer.  This would allow for the possibility of more bushel volume for the firms, and in 
turn, could increase the profitability of the producer, by decreasing transaction costs. 
       The structure of the industry shapes the conduct of the firms.  Rivalries among the 
large companies are strong, and their behavior is influenced by efficiencies of scale advantages 
that can be gained.  Increasing volume is the main source for these scale efficiencies, and some 
of the gains in volume are a result of conduct of the firms. By understanding the structure, the 
IO framework  in this study will help firms distinguish what conduct changes could be made to 
enhance performance.  
  A summary of the structural characteristics of the grain industry is presented at the end 




       Market conduct in the IO framework consists of the policies that participants adopt 
toward the market (and their rivals in it) with regard to their price, the characteristics of their 
product, and other terms that influence market transactions (Caves).  Conduct links an 
industry’s structure to the quality of its performance. It is the behavior patterns that firms in 
an industry exhibit in the market where they sell their product, and it arises within the 
environment of an industry’s market structure (Caves).  Those behavioral patterns for the 
grain industry are described below. 
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 Pricing  Policies 
       Pricing policies in the grain business are based on competition, storage capability, 
logistical capability, available output markets for the elevator to sell to, and the cost structure 
of the company and the location.  There is little price leadership based on any other reasons, 
except if a company is in a position that is contrary to the market trend. In this situation a 
company may have either too much ownership (more owned in inventory or purchased than 
sold) in a downtrending market, or not enough ownership (little or no inventory and/or more 
sales than inventory or purchases) in an uptrending market,  which would force a company to 
lead prices lower or higher in order to correct its position in the market.  But these are more 
merchandising problems that need to be corrected, and the policy is to reduce market risk.  If 
this conduct is frequent, however, as a result of poor management, the author’s experience is 
that  the conduct becomes part of the market and the competitive environment, and will 
influence the conduct of the other firms. 
       Critics point out that agribusiness concentration has drastically reduced sales outlets 
for farm commodities, amplifying the potential for these companies to abuse their 
(monopsony/oligopsony) market power and keep commodity prices artificially low (FRB -
Minn 1/00).  This is not as true in the grain industry as others as a whole, but is in some 
regions of the country.  Regions with less transportation alternatives may not be able to 
support as many competitors especially if market entry costs are high (such as train loading 
stations in the Western cornbelt).  Less competition will allow the location to take a little 
more margin (bid less for grain with no change in costs or sales values).  Too much margin, 
however, might encourage farm storage direct movement from the farm to the next terminal 
market or processor, or increase feed demand. It could cause large producers to look for ways 
to increase their market power.  Each company and location needs to assess their competition 
and their origination capabilities and use price to maximize volume and margin.  
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       The storage capability of a company or location will allow more hours of operation in 
harvest if competitors are full.  This could also mean more margin if the velocity of the 
movement of  grain to the market at harvest is more than the system as a whole in the region 
can handle.  There can be so much grain coming to market in a short time period that if any 
elevator is able to stay open (not fill to capacity before transportation for shipping arrives), 
they can increase margins (bid less for the grain) because they are the only option for the 
producer at that time.  It is a temporary differentiation.  At other times of the year, more 
storage may mean that a company may take less margin than competitors (raise their bid for 
grain) in the near term in order to fill storage space to take advantage of longer term carries 
(grain values being worth more in the future than they are now) in the market.  
       Companies are looking for ways to differentiate in order to gain market share.  But 
strategic (long term) differentiation is transparent because producers may deal with several 
different companies, and the information is soon public, so the conduct of the other companies 
is to follow quickly as long as they have the financial capability and the knowledge to do so, 
and so the differentiation is short-lived.   Prices change quickly, and can change from 
customer to customer, depending on what the company and location’s needs are at that 
particular time.  So price is the quickest and least transparent way to differentiate day to day.  
Firms may or may not follow the pricing conduct of others on a day to day basis.  Patterns in 
pricing conduct by one firm may be copied by the other firms and their pricing conduct 
affected if the conduct is obvious or consistent enough.  But merchandiser’s interpretations of 
the market trend may differ and so in this case it may not be obvious or consistent. 
        Pricing policies are arguably the best representative of a firm’s conduct.  The ability of 
a  firm to effectively manage its pricing policies can determine whether it is a leader or 
follower in the market.   
        Location, combined with the logistical capabilities of companies means that they may 
be able to take advantage of market opportunities only available by certain modes and/or  
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quantities of transportation.  The facilities that have this kind of advantage may be able to 
exploit competitors by bidding aggressively at only certain times, when it can make a sale that 
others are incapable of.   If a facility can buy grain from the farm into its grain facility, load a 
65 car train shipped to an export elevator 600 miles away, sell the grain direct to an end user 
in Japan, and the same company owns the elevators, rail cars and boats, they are at a distinct 
advantage to a competitor that can only load trucks, and has only one facility. The sales price 
advantage can be substantial.  This kind of integration can also allow for substantial 
capabilities in identity preserving grain, which can lead to more margin if competitors can not 
match it, and affects the pricing conduct of the firms involved.   
       In more risky markets, a firm with more margin can be less aggressive to reduce 
temporary market risk.  This may make them less competitive in the near term, but more 
profitable in the long run. 
       Pricing conduct can be influenced by their ability to outbid competitors if they need to.  
In competitive market areas, which are the regions of the country with the most production, 
all companies may have similar capabilities.  In that case, the company with the lowest cost 
structure will likely be the most profitable when they are bidding the same.  The ability of a 
company to use the most advanced technology in assets can lower operating costs and give an 
important edge in profit margins. The fixed and variable costs of operating in the grain 
industry are of utmost importance.   A larger firm can allocate improvements in asset 
technology to those areas where competition is the toughest. 
       Pricing conduct is the most important tool a grain facility has to quickly influence 
margins, volume and profits.  A merchandisers’ decisions about how to bid for grain at any 
particular time can quickly differentiate a facility and then can be abandoned after the goal is 
accomplished.  How the grain industry uses the pricing mechanism when buying grain is an 
important link to further insight into the structure of companies and their performance. 
  
 
   59
       Quality and Non-Price Policies   
      The actions and reactions to the promotion of non-price policies are a part of the study 
of the market conduct.      
       There are other forms of differentiation besides price, such as marketing advice, 
storage, internet services, personal relationships to help solve problems or to give extra 
service, or the ability and willingness to handle specialty crops or other farming products and 
services.  As a low margin business,  the grain industry is always looking for new 
opportunities to increase revenues.  If they can be innovators, they can create more margins, 
even if it is for a limited time.   
       To differentiate and capture more margin, grain industry companies of all sizes are 
looking for niche markets.  Quality and/or unique characteristics of a certain grain can be 
handled separately for specific customers for specific uses.  The companies are watching for 
opportunities to gain profits by serving those customers.  Some facilities may be able to 
segregate and identity preserve certain quality characteristics better than others.  This is where 
smaller companies can compete more effectively, (due to more willingness to innovate) as the 
market has seen with the increase in the “value-added” cooperatives. 
           Other non-price policies such as more advanced producer marketing programs and 
advisory services and other personalized services may enable a company or location to gain 
market share by taking advantage of knowledge, information, or physical asset capabilities in 
order to increase volumes and margins. 
       If a smaller company cannot compete on a global scale, it may be able to be successful 
by promoting its differential advantages and quality and non-price policies to a specific group 
of customers.  This can be done by more aggressive telephone or internet contact, or by on 
farm visits or meetings. 
       Some companies promote more personalized service, better accounting capabilities 
(computer systems), or to offer non-grain services like savings accounts, credit, futures  
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brokerage or discounts for doing business in another division like seed, chemicals or fertilizer 
that the company may also deal in. 
       The type of promotion needs to be analyzed thoroughly before implementing. 
Some of the strongest promotion in the grain business was the hybrid Hedged To Arrive 
contracts several years ago.  In return for service charges, companies carried futures and 
options positions for producers positions on grain contracts.  Some of the marketing actions 
also resulted in more contracts for grain to be delivered to the company.  These contracts 
were very popular for a while with farmers and did enable some companies to gain market 
share by promoting the flexible contracts.  Market conditions in 1995 and 1996 created 
unforeseen losses in these of type contracts and actually had some severe negative effects on 
some companies.  Producers were stuck in a trading situation that they did not react to or 
understand.   
       As opposed to pricing policies, promotion can be centered more on products, where 
the uniqueness of the firm can be presented and strategies can be implemented that may not 
necessarily be met by rivals.  Larger companies, for example, generally have more expertise 
and a wider array of knowledge in different areas of operations, merchandising, accounting, 
policies and other services that they can draw on to promote an overall image of 
professionalism.  But large firms in concentrated markets may be less willing to use this 
expertise to innovate.  Smaller firms may be more willing to innovate, but may not have the 
expertise.  The author’s experience is that if the more competitive the market area is, the more 
the larger companies are willing to promote and innovate.  Where there is less competition, 
the larger companies promote and innovate less, and smaller firms attempt to innovate into 
niche markets.     
       Strategic Advantages  
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       Strategic advantages can come from several different aspects.  Facility location is one 
important aspect.  Three keys for successful locations of facilities are that they are in areas 
with less competition, are in a high volume production area, and have several types of 
transportation access.  Conduct can be a result of how a firm chooses to manage these 
strategic advantages. 
       Another important advantage is the control of grain flow from the producer to the end 
user.  This is the ability to be the first purchaser of the grain from the producer and then move 
it through the market in its own logistics system (owning the trucks, rail cars, barges or boats) 
to the final destination.  It is particularly important as the market shifts more towards quality 
specific attributes, because control of blending for identity preservation is of major 
importance. 
       Having the ability to process grains into specific use products by being vertically 
coordinated (by integration or some alliance) is also an  advantage, and all four of the top 
grain storage companies have this ability (NFU).  Those companies that are not vertically 
coordinated have less of a chance to spread out their risk, and have less consistent earnings.  
It is harder for them to compete long term. If a company just operates grain elevators and 
there is a poor crop, and volume is down, they don’t have another business to spread out the 
revenue risk.  This vertical capability down the chain also allows those companies to make use 
of the origination capability to ensure a consistent flow of supply to the processing and export 
businesses.  These vertical (market channels) activities by integration down the food industry 
chain reduce transaction costs and ensure a demand for the grain purchased.  
        Many new uses for corn and soybeans have been developed by the checkoff programs 
that deduct a small amount from each bushel from first time purchases.  These programs are 
sponsored by associations for corn and soybeans (National Corn Growers Association and the 
American Soybean Association).  These new grains and processed products are handled and 
processed by the industry, and the more of these new markets a company can be part of, the  
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more opportunity they have to have a competitive, strategic advantage.  Innovation in product 
uses through integration is advantageous to firms that can fill the requirements for handling 
and processing these new products. How aggressive a firm wants to be in handling and 
processing innovative products is part of their market conduct. 
       If firms own other agricultural input businesses, they can tie their grain purchases to 
selling fertilizer, seed and chemicals, for example.  This diversification allows a strategic 
advantage to firms that are not diversified in the same businesses.. 
       The knowledge of the people that a company can hire and keep, in addition to the 
culture of the company personnel, can be a significant strategic advantage.  The grain industry 
is made up of many transactions and many movements of the grain to different markets around 
the world.  Making sure the grain in each facility is purchased at the most competitive price 
for both the producer and the facility, and that it is in turn stored for the amount of time up to 
when the marginal revenue equals the marginal cost of storage (carry), and then sold to the 
market that generates the greatest revenue, is a complex merchandising spreadsheet.  Market 
knowledge is key to making an extra 1/2 to 1% margin in a low margin business (2-5% of 
value). 
       Firms can gain strategic advantages by their location, integrating vertically and 
horizontally, processing special use products, and by human resource capabilities. 
These strategies are further ways to differentiate, and the conduct of the firms is influenced by 
how successful their strategies are. 
 
  Deterrents to Entry and Exit 
        The conduct of incumbent firms influences actual entry.  The price and product 
policies of the going firms determine whether entrant can expect to make a profit, or whether 
the going firms may raise the entry barriers directly (Caves). 
       Since the grain industry is so complex, transaction costs are reduced by pooling  
resources.  A large firm may concentrate expertise in a home office, then distributing that  
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expertise to facilities as needed.  A new entrant may have to hire people or pay for services in 
aspects such as finance, law, taxes, payroll, etc.  By keeping costs down, the firm may be 
more profitable, but it also is a conduct that deters new entrants.   
       To enter into the industry takes a substantial outlay of either assets (if building an 
elevator) and/or knowledge and time (if trading from the farm to a destination or brokering 
transactions), both of which are deterrents.  An existing firm may choose conduct that  
protects an asset or a market from a new entrant by changing pricing or other business 
policies. 
       Risk due to weather (production), or changes in regional demand can be reduced if the 
firm has elevators or processing plants in different regions of the country.  A firm may not 
necessarily have to allow the weather to affect their decisions if the risk can be absorbed by all 
the other locations. This conduct allows for arbitrages on a scale that a new entry might have 
difficulty competing with. 
       The conduct of the larger grain firms is signaling to the new entrants that profitability 
could be a problem.  Grain merchandising margins are remaining steady, as consolidation 
reduces costs per unit by scale efficiencies.  As a result, most of the newer business are 
smaller, finding niches to provide a limited quantity of a certain quality of grain or providing a 
service like brokering, market information or producer marketing management.  Some smaller 
cooperative ventures have been successful providing certain processed products to the 
market, and are growing in number (FRB-Minn 3/02). Marketing management and advice has 
grown in demand as the size of the producer has grown.  The large producer may not have the 
time or the expertise to market large amounts of grain to the best markets at the best price and 
would rather have an advisor with experience helping them with their marketing.  Larger 
companies have the knowledge to perform this function in more varieties of ways than smaller 
companies or individual enterprises.  This expertise and experience level must be considered 
when deciding to enter the industry.  
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       Market conduct requires that a distinction is made about whether a strategic move is 
reversible or not (Caves).  Sunk costs are commitments of capital that are irreversible. Once a 
new elevator or processing plant is built, that organization is committed to making it 
profitable.  Existing firms can use the threat of the cost exiting as a tool in keeping new 
entrants out, by using price and non-price policies and other strategic advantages to 
discourage them. The irreversability of a commitment  “has potentially important implications 
for market structures and the performance levels that they deliver (Caves).   
       Day to day pricing decisions allow uncommitted conduct.  Merchandisers can change 
their pricing rapidly depending on market forces.  This is more pronounced if the firm does 
not have committed policies (guidelines) for their merchandisers to price grain.  Commitment 
will determine whether the conduct of the long run firm may take on a preemptive, protective 
posture, while the uncommitted firm may look for short term opportunities and back out of 
the market if profitability is less that the goal.  Service businesses have less commitment, and 
with no assets, can exit more easily. A quick exit may leave the producer having to develop a 
new relationship for help in marketing their grain.  
       The level of commitment leaves room for the oligopoly group (such as the major grain 
companies) to elevate the entry barriers that protect it from new competitors.  This conduct is 
necessary to understand before a new competitor decides to enter.  The decreasing number of  
large grain companies and the increasing number of new entrants into niche markets suggest 
this is the conduct that is being exhibited.  
       The barriers to entry and to exit are high if competing directly with the large grain 
firms.  The conduct of the current industry participants results in the appearance that there is 
more profit opportunity in smaller, specialized niche markets in processing.  
 
           How Competitors React to Each Other  
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       The flow of information via producers about the conduct of  grain industry firms is 
frequent and free flowing.  Finding out what competitors are paying for grain and what 
services they are offering is relatively transparent.  Differences in services can be seen in some 
marketing options, and price differences are mainly determined by the facility locations and the 
vertical integration of the company from origin to final destination (particular needs further 
downstream). 
       Large companies use their market power over smaller companies that do not have 
vertical capabilities by bidding more for grain and by cutting margins by bidding more for 
grain.   
       No one company has the capability or power to force the value of grain up or down 
substantially because of the ease of transportation.  If price differences between two regions 
are more than the cost of transportation,  the grain will flow to the market that offers the best 
net price.  In order to increase volume, price and/or margins  must be changed to make up the 
difference if desired.  The market tends to find equilibrium in most regions easily due to the 
number of facilities and for fear of losing market share and the associated profits if the 
location is uncompetitive. 
       As already mentioned, the transparency of marketing strategies to producers makes it 
easy for competitors to react to each other to reduce strategic advantages but only if they 
have the financial, operational, merchandising or service capability to do so. 
       In an oligopoly such as the grain industry, independent price action will depend on 
how other firms react to price changes and non-price competition.  Statistical studies confirm 
that the more rivalrous the oligopoly, the higher the incidence of nonprice competition 
(Caves).  In the grain business this varies by region, based on the differential advantages a 
facility in that region may have on competitors. 
    
  Summary of Conduct Characteristics  
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       Conduct arises within the environment of an industry’s market structure and it links 
the structure to the quality of its performance. 
       By understanding the structure of the industry, we can better understand how it 
influences the behavior (conduct) of the participants.  The conduct of the firms in an industry 
links the structure to quality of its performance. 
       The grain industry exhibits conduct characteristics of an oligopoly.  The competitors 
are aware of each others actions in pricing and quality and non price policies.  They 
understand the advantages each firm may have.  They act to protect trade areas by blocking 
entry and making market exit costly.  The study will next link structure and conduct to the 
understanding of performance. 





       Market performance is an evaluation of the results of the firms’ behavior.  Caves 
defines market performance as the appraisal of how closely the economic results of an 
industry’s behavior match the best possible contribution it could make to achieve these goals.  
It is an industry’s  actual contribution relative to its potential to achieve its goals. The 
economy should achieve four goals if it is to provide the maximum economic welfare for its 
citizens. It should be efficient in the use of resources, progressive in enlarging and improving 
the flow of goods and services, provide stability of prices and employment, and be equitable in 
its treatment of individuals (Caves).  This background is what brings us to this part of the IO 
analysis for the grain industry. 
  Performance is what we are ultimately interested in. Performance is the social 
valuation of systems outcomes.  Structure and conduct are instruments by which performance  
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is influenced (MSU-AEC 841).  It is for these reasons that the study now evaluates the 
performance of the grain handling and processing industry. 
 
  Efficiencies 
       The primary problem of economic efficiency is how to allocate productive resources 
among the various types of goods and services produced in the economy (Caves).  Showing 
what conditions will produce a consistent level of profit rates, reflecting optimal distribution 
of resources, is a principle concern of industrial organization (Caves). 
       The system of moving grain from the field to its final destination in the U.S. is possibly 
the most operationally efficient in the world.  The logistical capabilities are extensive, with a 
superior complex of roads, railroads and water transportation.  Prices to producers are 
transmitted openly and freely.  The Chicago Board of Trade open outcry futures trading is the 
base price used, with transportation differences applied to local facilities.  Grain terminals 
have become quicker and larger to handle the rush of grain coming in at harvest and to reduce 
the waiting time of transportation equipment. 
       Exchange efficiency is how well the quantity available leaves the hands of persons who 
value the commodity least and ends up in the hands of persons who value it most.  This 
involves the lowest possible transportation costs, facility costs, pricing costs, information 
costs, inventory costs, and maximum possible trading gains (Sosnick).   The exchange 
efficiency of the grain handling system is excellent.  Grain is purchased, graded, weighed, 
unloaded and paid for quickly and with few problems.  It is a system that has been refined and 
regulated since the mid 1800’s to work efficiently.  The result is that grain moves quickly and 
easily to end users at only a small percent of the total consumer price for finished products.  It 
performs the functions that society demand very well. 
       Progressiveness exploits every available technological change which would reduce 
cost (Bain).  Technical, or operational efficiencies for the grain industry are the ability of the  
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facilities to handle grain with small amounts of shrink (.5% or less), their ability to store grain 
with no detrimental change in its condition, to be able to blend the grain to take advantage of 
being able to discount grain coming in and not be discounted when loading out, to account for 
it accurately and to be able to buy it and sell it at consistent, profitable margins.  If the 
company is involved in processing of some kind then it should be able to do all those things 
and also produce a product that the end consumer likes and wants.   The successful grain 
handlers and processors perform these functions well.  It gives them an advantage in cost that 
allows them to bid more competitively.  
       The inefficient use of resources by firms and industries can take the form of being 
inefficiently small, so that they are unable to make use of available economies of scale, 
carrying a large margin of excess capacity at times, because this is wasted capital, or laziness 
or inefficiency to burden firms with costs higher than the minimum for their outputs (Caves).  
The main inefficiency with grain elevators is the amount of unused capacity most of the year.  
The facilities have been built and upgraded to handle the volume of grain at peak periods, and 
so they have excess capacity the rest of the year.  This raises the fixed cost expense per 
bushel.  If there is a major area of improvement that could be made, it would be to increase 
volume during slow seasons. 
       The economic efficiencies would be the overall ability of the facilities to generate their 
goal profit to asset ratios considering the market conditions.  Depending on the efficiencies of 
the facilities, these goals do differ.  If the facility cannot generate enough income, and other 
uses for the asset dollars are available at a greater level, then the company should consider 
making changes to maximize potential owner/management goals, or at least allocating 
improvement dollars elsewhere. 
       Setting the bids for grain and selling the grain requires efficiencies in merchandising.  
The goal is to maximize the margin by buying grain at as low a basis price (basis - the 
difference between the local elevator price and the Chicago Board of Trade price) as possible,  
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and selling it at the highest basis price possible.  This requires maximizing the use of (carrying) 
the inventory space and predicting the trends of the basis price as much as two years ahead.  
These efforts depend on competition and volume on the origination side, and the available 
outlets on the sale side.  If there is not enough difference between the two to maintain 
profitable margins, then ways of improving the margins should be considered by reevaluating 
the merchandisers, the facility and the local trading strategies.  Total costs of operating the 
facility and the administration would also certainly be part of the margin evaluation process. 
       The norm for production efficiency is that it is desirable, measured by how closely 
firms in the industry approximate the lower attainable (real) costs for the outputs they produce 
and distribute (Bain).  The grain industry, with little differentiation in products, operates on 
low (2-5%) per bushel margins, and so must operate at as low a cost as possible in order to 
compete effectively.  Efficiency that can be gained in any aspect of the firms operation may 
make the difference in survival during lower production years.  A manager should be looking 
at every part of the operation for improvement. 
 
       Innovation 
       Innovation in this market may be new technology, such as quicker accounting 
programs or fast access to customer databases, dissemination of information (web pages), or 
operational equipment that can eliminate errors and labor.  It also may be considering a capital 
project (changing or improving the assets of the facility) to improve customer service or 
expand into different markets (more specialized).  Knowledge of processes that have worked 
in other facilities that might be applied and new, practical ideas that can cause volume and 
margins to increase can also improve performance, particularly if costs can be better 
controlled. 
       New ways of improving old processes and also creating new ideas to generate income 
come from the knowledge and skill level of the people working for each facility and each  
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company.  Management needs to create an atmosphere and culture where new ideas are 
welcomed and seriously considered for ways to improve business.  In such a competitive 
homogeneous market, companies are always looking for new ways to cut costs or generate 
revenue.   
       High concentration in an industry is apt to retard progress by restricting the number of 
independent sources of initiative (Scherer).  In the grain handling and processing industry, 
which is becoming highly concentrated, smaller firms are more known for their innovative 
approach, and the larger companies are not .  The differentiation in culture influences 
performance in the long run by the degree of freedom and the incentives employees have to 
find innovative ways to improve handling and processing of grain.   
      Innovation can be an important aspect of the grain industry because it can be used to 
find more effective ways to perform different functions of the business. 
 
       Research 
       Ways of improving performance sometimes need a more general overview - a 
perspective of the business that might not be considered by the day to day operators in the 
company.  Research into the overall economic trends, and ways to improve the performance 
of the company in the long run should be beneficial.  A separate staff that considers new 
possibilities, examines current operations and understands the historical background of the 
business can be the source of planning, innovation, expansion and future organization of the 
company. 
       Research from a grain marketing aspect is also very important.  Understanding world 
supply and demand trends and results helps the company decide what commodities to market, 
where and when, and that information is conveyed to producers by price through the system.  
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       Without leadership in envisioning the possible outcomes of different industry trends or 
developing strategies that can lead the company to long term success, a company can lose its 
focus, which results in lost market power and profitability. 
       Higher concentration levels dampen firms’ incentives to gain market position through 
accelerated research and development (Scherer).  The author has observed evidence of this in 
the grain industry as we see more niche cooperatives and companies handling and processing 
specialty products, while the larger firms concentrate more on developing ways to become 
more cost efficient in existing operations.   
      The grain industry exhibits limited innovation by the large companies, who concentrate 
more on limiting nearby costs.  This follows the standard evaluation for industry 
progressiveness that an ideal rate of innovation through time is one that promptly exploits 
every available technological change which would reduce cost but that foregoes or delays 
technological changes which, if made currently, would increase production costs over time 
(Bain).  If a niche becomes very profitable, the large firms may just be able to buy that 
company and absorb the innovation.   
       The author’s experience is that larger firms display a conduct of waiting to see if an 
innovative idea is successful by smaller firms, and then buying that company or idea and 
absorbing the innovation.  This allows the larger company to be more cost effective by limiting 
research costs, and using their size to incorporate new ideas only after the performance has 
been evaluated. 
 
           Profitability 
       Bain asserts that “a basic return equal to the normal interest rate is necessary on the 
average and in the long-run, for the maintenance of production by any group of firms” or for 
“the enterprise system to work well in the long-run” (Bain 1959).  
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       At the heart of performance analysis is proper resource allocation.  The equity capital 
that entrepreneurs supply to the firms in different industries does the job of balancing business 
costs and revenues.  Optimal resource allocation requires a normal rate of return on equity to 
prevail in each industry.  Equity capital comes from the general pool of savings in the 
economy., and it could be allotted to any sort of long - term investment (Caves).  If firms do 
not perform, they are not returning enough to invested capital to compete with other firms or 
industries, and could lose investment value.  
       Measurements of profitability among the grain industry leaders varies.  The four major 
firms have many other businesses, and a definition of specific profits made in their grain 
divisions is difficult to identify.  Cargill is a semi-private company and ADM, Bunge and Con 
Agra are publicly owned, but have many divisions.  This is important to understand because 
identifying performance can be difficult with these large conglomerates. 
           Profits among these leading companies vary with the volume of grain produced in the 
United States and also in developing agricultural countries such as Brazil and the former 
Soviet Union.  Competing world values of substitutes such as palm oil, rice and tapioca for 
instance, and the general farm economy are also influential.    
       In 2001, ADM’s net earnings were 1.9% of sales, Cargill’s was .72% (Cargill) and 
Con Agra’s (Con Agra) operating profit was 6.8%.  These are not excessive, but are not sub-
normal for the industry. The author’s experience is that in strictly grain industry handling, 
normal earnings are 1-2% of sales, and in processing, they can be 1 - 20%.  Performance 
varies depending on how the company is affected by the overall agricultural market economy.  
Overall company profits for the three companies have improved some the last two years, but 
have not been good compared to earlier years.  It highlights that these companies need to try 
and find ways to reduce costs as well as increase revenues. 
       It is difficult to determine how just the grain merchandising portions of these large 
companies are performing because of the many agricultural businesses these companies are in.   
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ADM does break out their figures into an agricultural services division, which includes grain 
merchandising separate from processing, and its operating profit for 1999, 2000 and 2001 was 
2.16%, 2.10% and 1.64% of sales respectively.  But sales dollars depends on the price of 
grain, and income should really be measured in cents per bushel handled and return to assets, 
neither of which are not broken out (ADM). 
       Cargill, ADM and ConAgra have all faced challenging financial results in the last 
several years.  In 1999, a spokesperson for Cargill said that there has been a “retrenchment 
through the industry”, after indicating that they had the worst year in probably a hundred 
(FRB-Minn 1/00).   
       Cooperatives have had a difficult time recently also.  Several cooperatives in the grain 
business in the last ten years have either given up management control to larger private 
companies, or have sold out.  Since 1990, the number of cooperatives has dropped by 28% 
and membership by 25% (FRB-Minn 3/02).  The costs of running those grain divisions was 
too high, and they chose to enter into management agreements or sold out. 
       Fluctuations in profits means that the industry is still competitive and that the 
integration and coordination level is healthy for the industry as a whole.  Chronic excess 
profits represent a failure of the market system because too few resources are flowing into the 
industry, the industry is concentrated and entry to barriers are high.  Sub-normal profits may 
indicate a sick or declining industry.  Periods of high and low profits indicate that the market 
is working well. It means that changes in allocation of resources is necessary, and innovation 
and risk taking are rewarded.  Profits should be at levels just sufficient to reward investment, 
efficiency and innovation (MSU-AEC 841).   
       The grain industry appears to be between a healthy industry and a sick or declining 
industry because profitability is fluctuating, but profits have been sub-normal recently. 
    
       Diversification  
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       Diversification through integration, both horizontal and vertical, allows the larger 
companies to avoid risk.  Horizontal integration in the grain industry spreads out the 
ownership of facilities over a larger geographic area.  If one region has a drought, another 
may have record yields, and that can even out revenues, costs and income.  Vertical 
integration, as mentioned, can smooth out income if a few sectors do not do as well as others.  
A firm that handles grain, processes it, owns transportation equipment, and exports several 
commodities can spread risk over varying sectors of the industry.  Smaller companies without 
any diversification might get caught with a bad year and not recover, and this goes for the new 
innovative cooperative and private niche businesses.  If they lose their differential advantage 
or their market, they could lose all of their investment. 
       Diversification allows the firms to spread risk, which is important particularly in a low 
margin business such as the grain industry.  Under conditions of risk aversion, firm managers 
may prefer strategies that are on average less profitable but also less risky.  In this case, the 
industry is low margin, and so the managers do tend to be risk averse, and diversification 
helps reduce risk and help performance. 
 
       Market Power  
       Studies of market power and its relationship to performance  indicate that in highly 
concentrated industries, a negative correlation between concentration and purchasing price 
exists (Sexton).  In the case of the grain industry, this would indicate that the concentration 
will mean lower prices for producers at the elevators and processors, and a positive 
performance result (more margin) for grain handlers and processors if costs can also be 
controlled. The negative correlation is due to market power and not the markets themselves. 
           The motivation for the number of mergers, acquisitions and other restructuring is  to 
increase efficiency or market power, since their ultimate performance will rest on the balance 
between these two effects (Caswell and Cotterill).   
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       Producers and consumers on balance have been harmed by the increasing 
concentration in the food marketing sector.  The gains from enhanced efficiency of marketing 
have not offset the distributional losses (for the grain producer) from market power. 
Producers have, then, been harmed by  increasing concentration in the food sector (Sexton).  
So as the grain industry has become more concentrated, and their efficiencies have improved, 
these forces should be detrimental to the grain producer.   
       In this study, however, we show that in the long run, the grain industry is tied closely 
with the success of the grain producer.  Efficiencies gained in the grain industry have not 
offset the effects of the loss of market power from the producer.  The grain producer, as will 
be shown later in the study, has found it more difficult to be profitable without government 
assistance, and this has negatively influenced the grain industry by loss of volume (particularly 
in Michigan), offsetting the gains the industry has had in efficiencies and market power. 
       The grain industry, therefore, needs to work on gaining efficiencies, in order to allow 
themselves more profitability.  They could then pass some of those savings on to producers so 
that they, in turn , can be more competitive with other uses for land and with other world 
competitors for grains.      
       The four major grain companies could be viewed as conglomerates, meaning firms that 
operate in two or more distinct product/geographic markets.  By this definition, the theory is 
that such firms are able to engage in competitive strategies unavailable to specialized single 
market firms (Marion and Mueller).  Conduct of the firms with and without the power is 
certainly a factor of performance, as well as the structure of the industry as market power 
shifts.  
        The links of market power to performance are seen through the structure and conduct 
of the firms in the grain industry.  Market power in the grain industry is gained over a period 
of time by wearing down the competition in an area.  The larger companies are continually 
finding ways to cut costs, by using leverage to get better deals out of suppliers (conduct) and  
 
   76
spreading the costs of doing business over more facilities (structure) which lowers the overall 
costs per bushel marketed.  The smaller competitors end up facing a competitor that can pay 
more for the grain, and maintain income levels.  Expenses for smaller companies are a larger 
percent of sales, and as they continue to rise with inflation, and they should widen margins to 
compensate.  But that would be hard for them to do because it would put them at a 
competitive disadvantage, and performance would likely suffer. 
        Market power through conduct is used to enhance performance by attempting to 
reduce competition in some areas.  But that is difficult to accomplish as a strategy by itself.  
The company that has the most facilities in the locations that offer the greatest profit potential 
(through structure) as previously mentioned has the most market power.  A strategy of trying 
to create market power only through conduct (regardless of recognition of the capabilities of 
their assets) could backfire in those locations that don’t have a true marketing advantage over 
other competitors.  A larger company that has the ability to perform (strong asset base) may 
use the conduct of exerting market power to continually lose money in an effort to oust a 
competitor from a certain market and still not complete the objective.  The author’s 
experience is that this type of performance characteristics by smaller companies will cause 
unacceptable performance results and even in large companies it may cause the eventual 
closing of locations.  
       Distribution of market power varies in different regions of the country.  More power is 
achieved by companies that need origination to support other parts of their business, such as 
processing plants or export programs.  They have the advantage of passing down profits from 
downstream operations directly to upstream assets if they desire.  If too much power is gained 
by merger, as in the Cargill/Continental merger, then the Department of Justice may force 
liquidation of some facilities to reduce monopolistic (or monopsonistic) tendencies and 
increase competition (Hayenga).  
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     .    How each firm decides to conduct itself within the structural parameters (of its 
capabilities to perform) will influence the structure and ultimately the performance of the firms 
and facilities in that region.  Ultimately, it may also impact and change the structure of the 
market in which it operates. 
  A summary of the performance characteristics is presented at the end of section 3.2 
(Page 83) 
 
3.2.4  Conclusions and Implications  
 
       The popular framework for the Industrial Organization approach uses market 
structure, market conduct and market performance to set up the key causal hypothesis of 
economic theory.  Theory tells us that market structure determines market conduct and 
thereby sets the level of market performance (Caves).  This concept includes the ability to link 
each element in varying order to determine the other elements in an industry study.  The 
importance of each element can vary depending on the market.  Parts of the structure of an 
industry may affect performance more than others.  Structure sets the parameters that 
determine the possible conduct choices for the firm.  Some conduct aspects may be more 
important to performance than some structural aspects.  
       The links between the elements of the IO framework are a powerful tool for analysis.   
If the aspects of structure and conduct that are most important to performance can be 
discovered, then we can analyze changes that can have desired effects on performance.   
        Performance by the firms in the grain industry stem from the need to handle a volume 
of grain that can allow them to attain a level of net income in total dollars and in percent of 
sales that is equal to or better than returns the company can make long term in other lines of 
its business.  Performance is made more crucial by the fact that they have heavy investments in 
assets that can be a sunk cost depending on the location.     
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       The structure of the grain industry is becoming more tightly concentrated in an effort 
to reduce costs and maintain or improve margins.  Large companies have used their financial 
abilities to increase market share by integrating and coordinating vertically (down the chain, 
but not as much up the chain to the producer) and horizontally.  But this type of structure may 
create welfare losses for the grain producer, and reduce incentives for further reductions in 
costs because of less competition.  The structure should be altered to one of being more 
tightly coordinated with the grain producer, which would help increase producer welfare and 
improve firm performance.  Both the producer and the firms should recognize this need and 
work closer together. This transition may be necessary sooner in Michigan than nationally 
because of less comparative profitability in grain production in the state.   
       The return on assets may be improved by more and guaranteed volume.  Scale 
economies could be enhanced and per bushel costs could be decreased further by spreading 
costs out over the larger amount of bushel volume.  The greatest inefficiency is when the 
elevator is operating at low capacity, so increased volume particularly in the off season, at 
profitable margin levels is the desired improvement.   If the cost per bushel was decreased, 
and margins were kept the same (little increase in fixed costs), they could more easily achieve 
their profit goals by being able to be more competitive on price and other services and gain 
market share. 
       One of the most direct ways to assure volume (maybe not an increase, but at least no 
decrease) would be contract farming.  But if the methods involved the acceptance of too much 
market price risk from the producer, it would mean that the grain industry may have to pay 
more through contracting, and it may offset the increased efficiencies created by reduced costs 
in operating facilities with higher volume. 
       The amount that a facility will be able to pay a producer to grow grain (contract 
production) will depend on how much extra income the facility can generate with the 
stabilized volume (higher marginal revenue).  Handling volume allows the elevators to add  
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profit in some additional ways, by being more cost effective (lower marginal cost), and 
increasing chances for other plant efficiencies such as blending, and taking advantage of 
trading opportunities that may require certain volumes of grain to be moved at certain times.  
The facilities may have more control over the timing of the movement of the grain from the 
farm.  They could tell the producer when to move the grain from the farm to the elevator or 
processor, so there would have to be arranged coordination in the storage and delivery of the 
grain from the field to the grain facilities. They also would be in a better position to be able to 
identity preserve certain more specialized production if desired. 
       Other ways to assure volume are by developing more marketing alternatives with more 
personalized service to individual needs, diversifying by developing specialty grain (identity 
preserved) programs, developing convenience products such as financial, banking or credit 
businesses, aggressively pursuing fob farm purchases and overall, developing and maintaining 
closer communications with grain producers. 
  A summary of the characteristics of structure, conduct and performance of the national 
grain industry with a comparison for the Michigan grain industry is presented on the next 
three pages.  The chapter then proceeds to the IO analysis for the Michigan grain industry in 
section 3.3.   
 
   80
Structural Characteristics 
of the Grain Industry 
 
Factor     National    Michigan 
Concentration   The four largest firms have  Fewer handlers per bushel, less 
      47% of the grain storage  of a presence of multi-national 
      capacity and 70% of sales  companies 
 
Differentiation   Small differences by firm  Transportation capabilities,    
      size, location, transportation  marketing and service expertise 
   capabilities  and  facility  matter  the  most 
   operating  costs   
 
Barriers to Entry  Relatively high barriers due  Higher due to declining  
and Exit    to substantial capital outlay  production and the effects of 
      and asset specificity    negative income variability  
          of  producers  to  national  average 
       and  its  effects  on  the  industry 
 
Growth    Slow - few new participants  Limited due to reduction in 
       production  volume  and  competition 
 
Imports    Increasing trend due to  Canadian white wheat has been  
      comparatively lower     flowing into the wheat mills 
   production  costs  from   
   foreign  competitors  
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Conduct Characteristics  
of the Grain Industry 
 
Factor     National    Michigan 
Pricing Policies  Leadership based on     Less elevators, larger draw areas, 
      competition, storage and  less aggressive pricing 
   logistical  capabilities  and  the 
      cost structure of the company 
   and  location 
Quality and Non  Niche markets, personalized  Medium sized firms providing the 
Price Policies    services and innovative  marketing alternative leadership. 
      marketing  provide     Smaller facilities competitive in 
   added  revenues  niche  markets 
Strategic Advantages  Facility location, control of   Transportation alternatives and 
grain flow through the system,    storage and segregation    
    processing capabilities and  capabilities are key 
   vertical  integration  are  keys   
Deterrents to Entry  Larger firms have advantages More land being lost to urbanization 
and Exit    of lower transaction costs,   and higher cost/revenue ratios  
      more asset strength and   causing less production, lowering 
      facilities spread over larger  revenue potential for industry 
      areas.  Small firms can 
   compete  in  niche  markets 
How Competitors  Information is transparent,  Less promotion with less competition 
react to each other  frequent and free flowing  
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Performance Characteristics 
 Of the Grain Industry 
Factor     National    Michigan 
Efficiencies  Logistical capabilities are extensive,  Higher transportation charges 
    exchange efficiencies are excellent.  are a disadvantage 
    Unused capacity is largest 
  inefficiency 
Innovation  High concentration has slowed it,  Innovation/niche opportunities 
    more so in large firms than small  are higher due to higher 
       production  costs  and  lower  yields 
Research  High concentration has slowed   Harder to justify research money 
    incentives in large companies, specifically for Michigan because 
    more niche opportunities for    of smaller market - less possible 
  small  companies    returns 
Profitability  Driven by resource allocation.    Same as national 
    large companies have advantage, 
    but smaller niche-driven companies 
    have opportunities to profit 
Diversification  Horizontal and vertical integration  More niche market opportunities 
allows larger companies to    are available to help reduce risk and  
 reduce  risk     increase  profitability 
Market Power More concentration correlates with  Larger firms have more ability to 
    lower prices.  Enhanced efficiencies  provide services that customers 
    from higher concentration do not   desire 
    offset the distributional losses 
  for  producers  
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3.3  Industrial Organization of the Michigan Grain Industry 
 
       The study will now apply an Industrial Organization approach to the grain handlers 
and processors in Michigan.  There are a few changes that need to be made that pertain to the 
specifics of this market compared to the national analysis.  But Michigan is a part of the 
national and world grain industry, so the analysis done in the previous section will serve as the 




       There are more grain facilities in Michigan per bushel of production of the three major 
commodities than the other states in this study.  The total commercial storage capacity for the 
number of bushels produced, compared to the other states, however, is average.  This tells us 
that there are more elevators, but the average size is smaller (Figures 3-e and 3-f and Table 
16).   
       The conclusion might be drawn that Michigan is less concentrated and that there is 
more competition in Michigan than the other states.  But a closer analysis shows that the five 
largest grain companies, ADM, Michigan Agricultural Commodities, Star of the West Milling, 
The Andersons and Con Agra(Peavey/UAP) own about 45.3% of the storage capacity (Figure 
3-g).  At an average of 2 turns (number of times a facitlity is filled and emptied in a year) per 
bushel of storage, these companies handle 39% of the production in the state.  This means that 
the remaining handlers that are higher in number, but smaller in size in comparison, and may 
provide little direct competition to the large companies and facilities.  Concentration from this 
perspective indicates a ratio in Michigan near the national storage capacity concentration rate 
(CR5) of 47%. 
       The structural characteristics of high concentration adds to the lower level of 
competition.  It creates an environment that is less competitive than other states.  It enhances  
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the capabilities of the large companies to be profitable, and creates difficulties for bushel 
volume and profitability for smaller companies.  The state industry is similarly as oligopolistic 
as at the national level.   
       The following analysis of structure illustrates the differences.  Concentration, 
differentiation and growth in the Michigan grain industry are more unique than at the national 
level, while barriers to entry and exit are higher, and imports and other components are 
similar. 
Grain Industry Capacity and Handling
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     (Source: National Agricultural Statistics Service, Agricultural Statistic Board, USDA) 
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Grain Industry Capacity and Handling
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(Source: National Agricultural Statistics Service, Agricultural Statistic Board, USDA) 
 
 Concentration 
       Concentration has increased, but with less of a presence of multi-national companies 
than in other states.  Con Agra owns Peavey grain facilities in Carrollton and Bay City, with 
eleven other branch facilities under the U.A.P. Great Lakes name that combine grain with 
chemical, fertilizer, seed and other production services.  Most of these facilities are truck 
houses (receive and ship only by truck).  ADM Grain Company has seven facilities in the state 
that handle grain, and their Agri-Sales division has 18 other locations in the state that handle 
some grains, but mostly edible beans and production supplies, and many have been closed 
(MABA). 
       There are two medium sized grain handlers in the state that handle a significant 
amount of bushel volume, the Andersons and Michigan Agricultural Commodities.  The rest 
of the market is splintered into smaller processors, millers, local cooperatives, and small  
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privately owned companies and broker business buying at the farm bin and then trucking to 
export facilities at Toledo or into the Canadian feed and processor markets. 




Concentration of Commercial Grain Storage 
in Michigan - 2002 
 
  Company    Licensed  Storage  Capacity 
 
  Archer  Daniels  Midland   24.305  million bushels 
 
  Michigan  Agricultural  Commodities  19.265   “ 
 
    Star of the West Milling    8.125   “ 
 
  Con  Agra  Companies    7.943   “ 
 
    The Andersons/ Citizens Grain  7.224    “ 
 
  Total  Capacity     66.862   “ 
 
    Source:  Michigan Department of Agriculture - Licensed Grain Dealers 
 
  The number of grain elevators and the amount of storage available commercially has 
been declining.  The number of grain facilities in Michigan decreased from 292 in 1996 to 250 
in 2000, a decrease of 14.5%.  The rated capacity only decreased 5 million bushels, from 146 
to 141 million bushels or 3.5%.  This points to less of a need for the smaller elevators as the 
size of farms grow.  Some farm storage facilities may be larger than the smaller grain elevators 
built many years ago.  Those elevators that have remained are mostly those with more storage 
capability and some of those may have added storage.  These facilities are more likely to be 
located on rail lines that provide a value for the grain that producers cannot access such as 65 
car train loading capabilities. 
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       Growth      
       Growth potential for grain elevators in Michigan is limited.  The consolidation has 
allowed the grain handled by elevators to maintain volume as the surviving facilities absorb 
some of the market share from the grain handled by the exiting facilities.  But the overall trend 
of larger farms that may market their grain direct to larger markets (such as Toledo or truck 
into Canada) will mean that there is less of a need for commercial storage at harvest.  This 
trend is due to the increase in the trucking capabilities of larger producers who can gain 
transportation efficiencies by arranging backhauls (such as taking grain to market and bringing 
back bulk fertilizer to the farm).  It could also mean that there may be more of a demand for 
services of many types all during the year, such as marketing programs, financial services, 
brokerage, advisory and information.  The remaining elevators may find it necessary to 
compete in these areas just in order to be competitive and to maintain their current market 
share. 
       Overall bushel production in Michigan may have peaked.  Lower farm incomes are 
forcing land to be sold off for residential use, or production switched to more diversified 
crops, such as beets, beans, fruits and vegetables.  The amount of land planted to the three 
main grain crops may not grow, and one has to wonder whether yield growth is close to 
leveling off. 
       The number of grain elevators will most likely have to continue to decline because of 
the necessity of the facilities to maintain or increase volume in order to control per bushel 
costs.  As total grain production in the state levels off or declines, the least efficient elevators 
will find it harder to generate acceptable income levels in order to stay in business. 
 
       Differentiation 
       Differentiation can help improve market share, and is a large factor in determining long 
term survival.  As mentioned in the national structure analysis, larger companies, including  
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those in Michigan, have more capability to provide various marketing programs and other 
services through market  knowledge and financial capabilities.  In Michigan, differentiation 
advantages that will matter most are transportation (good rail and the possibility of water), 
marketing and service expertise (a shrinking cooperative system and shrinking role of MSU 
extension) to producers and possibly to smaller private or cooperative processors, and 
providing links to other markets such as specific varieties of grains that may have premium 
values. 
      
  Barriers to Entry and Exit 
       The barriers to entry and exit in Michigan are intensified from the national level.  Due 
to the declining grain production and larger negative variability of grain income for farmers 
and correspondingly for grain handlers because of lower bushel volumes, there is inherently 
more risk in starting a grain business in Michigan.  As grain volume declines and concentration 
increases, a new entrant will have a difficult task in acquiring market share.  With more risk 
comes more expense.  With a market that is in decline, creating a new facility to handle grain 
would be riskier than other parts of the nation. 
       The risks for exiting this industry is that the market may not be able to absorb another 
facility, and a grain elevator is too asset specific to be used for many other things.  The entire 




       With a more oligopolistic structure in Michigan, the conduct of the firms is slightly 
different than at the national level.  The interaction between firms is more direct and personal.  
This mutual interdependence is recognized more easily because there are less competitors, and  
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changes in conduct are more noticed by rivals.  This is even true of the behavior of handlers of 
national firms because of the regional nature of the markets 
 
       Pricing Policies    
       The reduction in the number of grain elevators has increased the size of the area that 
the elevators draw from.  From this factor alone, less competition means that the elevators can 
exercise more market power and take more margin.   Producers simply do not have as many 
marketing alternatives 
       Counteracting the decrease in the number of elevators is the decrease in the number of 
farms, the increase in the number of large farms, and the reduction of total farm acres (Figure 
3-h). 
    Figure 3-h
     Farm Numbers and Acre Trends
Big Farms Med Farms Total Farm Total Farm
Year # Farms $100,000 + $10 - $100 Acres Acres
1990 54,000  8,000  18,000 10,800,000 
1995 55,000  8,000  17,000 10,700,000 
1996 54,000  7,200  17,000 10,600,000 
1997 53,000  7,500  17,000 10,400,000 
1998 52,000  8,000  17,000 10,400,000 
1999 53,000  8,000  16,500 10,400,000 
2000 52,000  8,000  16,500 10,400,000 
2001 52,000  8,000  15,500 10,400,000 
2002 52,000  8,000  15,500 10,400,000 
2012 projected  (Skjaerlun) 8,300,000 
2022 projected  (Skjaerlun) 7,300,000 
Sources: National Agricultural Statistics Service, Skjaerlum  
    
  Less total farms and less production acres mean that even though the size of the draw 
area may have increased in one area as competitors go out of business, over time there may 
not be many more farms to buy from, or more production to buy in the total draw area. 
       Larger farms mean that these operations have gained some market power as they have 
more quantity to sell, and may be more likely to shop for prices and use more alternatives for  
 
   90
transportation (such as hiring truckers, selling fob the farm (letting the buyer supply the trucks 
to the farm) or even finding small rail loading capability) than smaller farmers who drive their 
own farm truck to the elevator to sell. 
       The result is that the elevators may be able to take more margin (drop prices relative 
to competition) for a short time, as competing elevators disappear, but in the long run the 
decrease in total grain produced in that draw area and the size of the farmer bring margins 
back in so that volume can be maintained, because they have to draw from a larger area to 
maintain volume. 
      
       Strategic Advantages 
       The elevators that have alternatives in transportation that allow them to bid more for 
grain than competitors are more likely to maintain volume.  In Michigan, these are the 
facilities that have train loading capabilities.  If the railroad that the elevator is on is one of the 
major railroads, which are the CSX and the Norfolk Southern and to a lesser degree the 
Canadian National, then they have less shipping cost and more alternatives for size of 
shipments and destinations.  Much of the exported corn in the state is shipped out by trains to 
the poultry and hog operations in the Southeast (West Virginia, Virginia, and North Carolina) 
or to an east coast export facility by trainload (65 cars on the CSX and 50 to 100 on the NS).  
An elevator that can only ship three cars at a time and is on a short line railroad must pay a 
short haul rate to get to the main line of a major railroad, and the freight charges are higher 
for smaller car shipments too.  There could be as much as a 10-15 cents a bushel difference in 
value in such a case compared to train quantities.  This difference can be as much as the 
elevator’s margin, and certainly puts the smaller, off line elevator at a disadvantage in price.   
 
       Facility Capabilities 
       The physical capabilities of the facilities in Michigan can lead to conduct that takes 
advantage of storage space, rail loading capabilities or segregation capabilities.  
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       As on the national level, the amount of storage at the facilities is an important tool, 
particularly at harvest in order to absorb the influx of harvested grain, and additionally in 
storage income if the grain can be sold at a higher value for future delivery periods.  Wheat 
storage income from 1998 - 2001 were as much as 70-80 cents per bushel gross per year, 
which a company with a larger amount of storage could take advantage of by keeping the 
grain on hand while continuing to handle corn and soybeans during the year.  These carry 
margins provided an income that allowed those elevators to be more aggressive bidding 
because of the income being generated from the stored grain. 
       As has been mentioned, rail loading ability can mean higher selling prices.  Segregation 
of specialty crops can also be used to enhance a facilities’ competitive position by promoting 
the differentiation. 
 
      Quality and Non-Price Policies 
       Pertaining to quality and non-price policies, in Michigan, the two medium sized 
companies have been more aggressive in providing marketing services than the two multi-
national companies. 
       They promote marketing programs, more flexibility in marketing plans, buying grain 
from bigger farmers, fob the farm and away from other competitors.  They are more 
innovative in their approach (the Andersons were the first to offer Price Later Agreements in 
Michigan in the 1950’s) (Bauer).  The larger companies tend to be more conservative by 
offering more basic pricing programs with less variations in their marketing approach, but 
offer better pricing.  
   There are several companies in Michigan that handle specialty grains, but few that can 
handle them from the producer to the importer directly.  Coordination to this extent requires 
the ability to purchase the grain directly from the producer, transport it to an export facility, 
arrange the export sale and also arrange the vessel transportation to the importing country.   
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This unbroken chain can help promote sales by being able to better control the preservation of 
the varieties.  Specific varieties, specific grades and special shipment terms can differentiate 
buyers.  There can be more margin for handlers of specialty grains because of the small 
number of buyers and smaller quantities they want to buy.   
  Smaller companies can specialize in smaller quantities possibly better than large 
companies in some specialty markets.  What the large companies can do for connections to 
volume specialty markets, the small ones can make up for in quality by taking special care to 
handle smaller lots with tighter specifications. 
  There is opportunity for coordination between the larger companies in Michigan that 
have the capacity to export, and those smaller companies that specialize in specific varieties. 
        
 Promotion      
       The promotion of these differential advantages are the same in Michigan as nationally.  
My experience is that there is less promotion in Michigan than other states because the 
elevators are not in as close proximity as in more productive areas of the corn belt.  Seldom 
are there two elevators in the same town, and at times there is 30 or more miles between 
terminals even in the more productive grain areas. 
 
       Deterrents to Entry and Exit 
       Deterrents to entry specific to Michigan is the amount of land being absorbed by 
urbanization, and the high cost/revenue ratios compared to other states (Table 1). Revenues 
are more volatile in Michigan and so it is riskier in the long run to operate a grain elevator that 
may also see volumes of grain vary more year to year than major Midwest production states 
such as Illinois and Iowa, and even Indiana, Ohio, Nebraska,  or Minnesota. 
       Reactions to competitors are similar in Michigan except that as the number of 
elevators diminish, the flow of communication between competitors is reduced and the  
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information becomes less transparent between them.  It is easier for producers to compare 
bids because they do not have as many to consider.  It is easier for the media to report prices 
for the same reason.  This ease of information can be thought of as a signal to competitors 
who may want to enter the business that it may be hard to compete profitably.  The elevators 
that have continued operations usually have an advantage that could be used to keep 




       In the early development of the grain handling industry in Michigan, there was a high 
concentration of elevators in the higher production areas in the Central part of the state and 
the Thumb area.  Many were diversified in that they handled edible beans as well as grain.  
This horizontal diversification enabled companies to supplement profits between the two 
businesses. 
       Many of those facilities have become too inefficient (and unsafe) now, but the larger 
and more efficient facilities today might be able to use this operating philosophy to handle 
different varieties of grains to supplement profits similar to past years.  
 
       Diversification 
           The companies that run grain facilities continually look for ways to cut costs as much 
as possible.  Diversification into other businesses can allow the reallocation of some costs into 
other businesses, but it requires management to allocate expertise  from one business into 
another as needed.  This reallocation of personnel may cause costly mistakes and hurt 
performance, though, if not managed effectively. 
       Diversification through innovation in the grain business may be an additional way to 
increase volume. New marketing programs, handling specialty grains or providing financial  
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services, for example may improve performance through increased volume and service fee 
opportunities.  Innovation may be used to increase revenues to improve profits, instead of 
cutting costs. 
 
       Efficiencies 
       All of the efficiencies of performance in the analysis of the national grain industry hold 
true to Michigan as well.  The percent decrease in the number of elevators has been greater in 
Michigan because of the lack of production in grains to justify capital improvements that 
would have kept the smaller elevators in business longer as feeder elevators into the bigger 
terminal markets.   
  From a transportation perspective, the railroads have consolidated and concentrated 
their efforts in parts of the Midwest that handle more volume on a steady basis going to 
similar destinations.  Because Michigan does not have as large of volume as competing states, 
is has a more difficult time obtaining as low of freight rates as competing states. The elevators 
that are on branch rail lines that may be struggling to make profits and to keep their lines in 
operating condition may have higher rail rates, which makes it more difficult for these 
elevators to compete with truck transportation. 
 
       Innovation 
       Innovation in the grain industry in Michigan is probably needed more than any other 
main crop producing state.  Because of the nature of higher costs and lower yields, grain 
farmers and elevators are subject to more variations in income than other states (Table 1). 
       Innovation has come in the way of diversity in production, and some marketing ideas, 
but it still needs to find ways to reduce risk.  The organizational analysis and possible 
strategies suggest contract farming as a way to counter some of these effects.  It is a possible 
solution to a similar problem the poultry producers were having in the Southeast before  
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contract production took hold there.  There, technology increased the rates of production and 
decreased price, so that cost reductions were necessary to be profitable.  The contract with 
incentive approach became popular instead of vertical integration because it reduced the costs 
of contracting.  The contracts adjust automatically for common shocks to productivity among 
growers (such as high temperatures and disease) and reduce opportunism (by rewarding the 
most successful growers).  The popularity of this type of organizational form in the broiler 
industry may be due to the large number of growers relative to the number of integrators 
(broiler industry firms that purchase breeding stock, hatch the chicks and operate feed mills to 
feed them, but contracts with growers to raise the chicks) (Knoeber).  This is similar to the 
numbers of grain producers compared to the number of  grain handlers.   There is also a 
similarity in the risks of production, in the case of the grain producer, weather and large 
supplies or slow demand that would decrease prices for grains. 
       In addition, innovation in services such as banking, financial services, credit, 
brokerage, etc., could enhance a company’s ability to capture business.  It would increase 
traffic through the elevators, guarantee volume by committing grain as collateral for financial 
flexibility, and create additional income in fees while saving costs in grain handling by 
increasing volume.   
    
       Market Power 
       The large grain companies have the ability to use centralized  personnel and so have 
more ability to be able to provide the services that are in demand.  They will have the ability to 
have people that are capable of managing a variety of businesses, have the research 
capabilities to design programs that can benefit producers as well as enhance their own 
profitability, and have the financial ability to put together these new businesses just as a food 
manufacturer might design and market new consumer products at the grocery store.  
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       They will be able to provide a choice for grain producers in how to market their crops, 
insure them, finance production, provide capital, and provide farm management.  A variety of 
programs will be needed to meet the different types of farmers’ needs. 
        If the competition from other uses of land increases, as it appears is the trend in 
Michigan, the options mentioned above will be needed in order for grain handlers and 
processors to maintain the volume they need to meet their performance standards.  If these 
options can not change the trend, then societies’ needs will prove to be more heavily weighted 
and grain production in Michigan will continue to decline.        
        Grain companies will need to find ways to maintain and improve profits. 
Diversification, controlling costs through operations, coordination and even integration will be 
necessary for them to maintain their market power and for long term survival. 
 
3.3.4  Conclusions for the Michigan Grain Industry 
      
       The IO analysis of the grain industry nationally and specifically for Michigan gives 
understanding to the industry side of the system.  It is important to have a full understanding 
of how the industry is organized, both nationally and in Michigan in order to be able to apply 
solutions both for the industry and producers. 
       The industry is finding it more difficult to get adequate returns on assets considering 
the declining acreage, resulting in less production, and the increased market power of larger 
producers, which tends to decrease margins for the industry. 
       Concentration has led to economies of scale from administrative expenditures, but this 
also has led to a decrease in the human resources that would be needed to increase the amount 
of service that would increase volume through personalized service and marketing programs. 
       With just a few large grain companies left, the industry will find it more difficult to 
consolidate further.  The advantages of scale efficiencies, depth of human resources, financial  
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capabilities, and other competitive comparisons become less as the size of each of the 
remaining competitors increases. The next step in consolidation may be in the farm sector, 
with larger farms becoming larger and fewer. 
       The industry needs to find ways to capture more volume or suffer the consequences of 
lower returns to assets.  In the following section, the study will explore some of the problems 
brought out by the organizational analysis, and their effects on producers.  It will also suggest 
solutions that may work for both parties.  
     
3.4  Implications of Change for Michigan Grain Producers 
 
       Rather than use the IO approach for Michigan grain producers, the study will use the 
background generated by the IO analysis of the grain industry to discuss the implications of 
the problem and possible solutions for Michigan grain producers. 
       The study will first summarize the trends of the grain producers situation nationally.  
Many of the national trends are also true in Michigan, and the study will take an in-depth view 
of Michigan grain production in the strategic management section. 
       The problems affecting both the grain industry and grain producers will then be 
presented, followed by possible solutions that can benefit both parties. 
 
3.4.1  Grain Producer Situation Summary 
 
       Since 1940, the number of  farms in the U.S. has declined and the average number of 
acres per farm has been increasing.  The number of farms has dropped from 30 million to 1.9 
million in 1988, without a corresponding decline in acreage production.  The rise of mass 
production agriculture involves a shift from small-scale, broad-based family farming to large-
scale, more industrial type units (Sofranko), but which are still mainly family owned.  
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       Farm income is expected to decline in 2002, particularly subtracting out government 
payments (Table 7).  A University of Illinois study showed that average farm income in 2000 
would have been negative in a study of farms in Illinois without government payments (Farm 
Progress).  This has also been true in other states (Table 7).  
       The costs of farming continue to rise with inflation, putting more pressure on making 
revenues.  To increase revenues, the most common solutions are  for producers to capture 
economies of scale by farming more land and by lowering production costs (by watching 
expenses closely), but the question is whether this can be done at a rate fast enough to offset 
the increase in input and other production costs.  Some will be able to, but of those, the older 
limited-resource group of producers may not want to try and keep up, and may just want to 
make enough to get to retirement (USDA -ERS #768).   
       The younger farmers may be more highly leveraged, and risk of failure when farming 
leveraged is high.  Errors in marketing have more substantial results. If the producer could 
lower the risk, he could get financing more easily (CAST), which would allow more time to 
pay off debt. 
       Due to these two situations, less land may be in grain production, which will reduce 
the volume of grain produced, and it will be more susceptible to other uses if there are fewer 
farmers available to purchase or farm more ground. 
       If the government would lean toward a reduction in farm payments, the net farm 
income will decrease with it.  “Perhaps the biggest challenge for some farmers will be to learn 
to manage risk as the government’s safety net shrinks” (Kleckner).  This could also lead to 
less production.   
       If bushel volume decreases,  grain industry companies will have more of an incentive 
to develop programs that will increase market share. The industry will be more proactive in 
helping producers make sound marketing decisions and increase revenues by selling at higher 
prices.  Handling commodities is a low margin, high volume business. Volume is a necessity  
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for survival.  Producers should expect more attempts to coordinate from the grain industry if a 
decreased role of the government negatively affects production. 
       If producers could stabilize income, they could plan for their families better and 
maintain their standard of living and lifestyle.  If the producer could do both of those things 
and continue to own land and farm it, the result would be a higher utility for them from 
farming. 
 
3.4.2  Grain Producer Situation Problems and Solutions 
 
        How can producers find ways to become more successful?  The problems of lack of 
sufficient revenue, particularly without government subsidies, rising costs for inputs, land, 
machinery, taxes, and other costs, and the combination of these factors with risks in 
marketing, need solutions. 
        One of the best opportunities for grain producers to become more successful can be 
found in the solutions of grain industry performance problems.  It is in the industry’s best 
interest to find solutions that also fit the needs of the producers.  Helping producers gain 
revenue and lower risk would accomplish part of the task. 
  
       Producer Coordination with Grain Handlers 
       Being proactive in recognizing problems and causes and understanding that the grain 
industry and grain producers need to coordinate in order to solve mutual problems is the main 
thrust of increasing performance for both participants in the system.  The solutions that are 
more economically feasible than others may come simply from better communication with 
handlers and processors.  Beginning coordination there, the individual needs of the producer 
may be further developed and met by the handler in an effort to maintain volume.    
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       In order to match the needs of the handlers with those of the producers, the producers 
should take an active role in discussing issues with grain industry personnel in order to solve 
problems.  From the handlers perspective, they may want to start focus groups in order to find 
innovations that can help both the producers and industry be more successful.  For handlers 
and producers, being a part of this type of group may help gain insight into ways that more 
profits can be gained from the marketing side of their businesses.   
       A review of the performance problems of the grain industry will give insight into the 
solutions that will work best for both.   
 
       Relating Producer Problems to Industry Performance Problems   
       The grain industry performance problems are reiterated here because it is important for 
grain producers to understand that if grain handlers cannot find a way to succeed in 
maintaining or increasing volume (including help for producers by attempting to find some 
growth areas), then  producers will have less choices for grain marketing.  More consolidation 
and concentration would occur in this case in order to improve performance and in the 
process, more grain handling facilities might be closed. The changes that are taking place with 
the grain industry and the grain producers are most likely going to force more coordination 
between the grain industry and the producer. 
       Grain industry performance problems, as illustrated in the national grain industry 
performance section, are mainly due to lack of efficiencies of scale (because of the amount of 
storage and handling capacity that is unused except during harvest seasons) which are 
identified in profit to asset ratios.  These results are caused by not utilizing the facilities to a 
fuller extent (unused capacity).  They are caused by less volume, due to fewer farms and 
direct marketing to processors or terminals down the chain.  Also causing problems are  
increasing costs of operation, and slow innovations.   
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         The grain industry can improve its efficiencies of scale by utilizing its assets more fully.  
The solution would be to find ways to increase volume put through the facilities.  This could 
be done by introducing marketing programs and services, narrowing margins to be more 
competitive, contracting for production or handling different grains such as specialty grains in 
addition to generic corn, soybeans and wheat.  An increase in volume associated with such 
programs would help economies of scale and might allow the industry to cover costs on a per 
bushel basis more easily.   
       A solution to the problem of losing volume to larger farmers that are marketing direct 
to processors or terminals down the chain might be to provide services that the producers 
cannot obtain from those competitors.  This might be products such as banking or financial 
programs,  personalized marketing services and information, personal farm calls to help set up 
marketing plans, or possibly buying the grain on the farm and controlling the destination from 
there.  Grain producers should be looking for these services from their local grain facilities.  
An aggressive program of asking questions and finding alternatives that the industry wants to 
pursue might be fruitful. 
   
       Maintaining the Chain 
       The large grain producers will have more sophisticated facilities and more storage that 
may enable them to go direct to processors or feed or export markets, bypassing the terminal 
elevators.  Companies with assets in grain elevators will need to look for a way to ensure 
volume in the face of tougher competition.  The sheer velocity of grain coming off the farm at 
harvest in the past has enabled some facilities to fill storage space at wider margins (basis) 
because the producers don’t have time to search for the highest grain price around a large area 
or to spend the time hauling grain.  If the producer has storage, and does not have to bring 
grain to the local elevator at harvest, those bushels may fall into a competitors hands by going 
direct to processing or export markets later in the year if they are accessible.  The grain  
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handlers will want to keep the grain coming to their elevators because of their investment in 
them.  There is also more income to be made on blending, separating, identity preserving 
specialty crops, or shipping large quantities (trains or boats) to markets that cannot be 
accessed locally (from Michigan to Southeast feed mills or Atlantic export markets for 
example).  The trend of more farm storage will likely continue, but bypassing the grain 
terminals may progress very slowly because the grain industry will try and keep grain coming 
to the terminals until they are obsolete or unprofitable. 
     
       Cost Control 
       Lower transaction costs will be needed by the producer to offset leverage costs.  
Spreading costs out over more acres can lower per acre costs through economies of scale.  
Income versus costs and the risks, capital and credit that are associated with farming more 
land changes the dimension of the farm from a family operation to more like a corporation.  
Producers have to be prepared to change their management practices, including marketing 
strategies, to align with their size.  Allowing grain handlers to manage marketing by contract 
production or volume guarantees would reduce transaction costs with marketing grain for the 
producer and the handler. 
       Rising costs for facility operations has challenged the grain industry for years.  They 
have consistently found ways to cut costs in order to remain as competitive as possible.  In the 
twenty five years the author has been in the grain business, the margins per bushel have 
remained about the same.  The only real difference is that the costs per bushel handled have 
been reduced to match inflation on uncontrollable expenses.   
       Grain producers should be looking at ways that they can help themselves and also save 
the elevator extra expense.  If the producer and the elevator can work together on delivery 
times, including days and hours of operation, the types of commodities that could be delivered 
at certain times for example, the elevator can become more efficient by allocating resources  
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accordingly.  If the industry can save on expenses by allocating resources to needs on a timely 
basis, they may reward the producer for their effort by keeping margins down and providing 
more services. 
    
 Innovations   
       Innovations for larger companies can take longer.  The consolidation in companies has 
also meant a decrease in the number of employees.  They may no longer have field personnel 
that have the expertise to make decisions.  The grain companies may not understand local 
situations or solutions to producer problems if their most experienced people are in a home 
office away from the daily activity and communication with producers.  This also lends to a 
lack of commitment to diversifying physical assets or finding innovative ways to handle more 
identity preserved crops, which takes some opportunity away from both handlers and 
producers to find new sources for income.    
      
       Increased Coordination and Family Farming 
       As more coordination takes place, concerns about the independence of the family 
farm, terms of contracts, and competitive pricing of grain will be major obstacles. 
       Independence of the family farm has been discussed greatly, and is a major concern 
with the coordination and integration that has taken place already.  Farm advocates have used 
ballooning farm size as evidence of food production consolidation, but a small percent of 
farmers have always produced about half of the production; 17% in 1900 and 4% in 1999 
(FRB-Minn 10/99, 1/00).  Family farm size is growing, and the larger farms are recognizing 
the importance of coordination with grain companies more than the smaller farms.  Farming 
has become more complex, as adjustments to changes in market conditions, government 
programs and other economic factors have been necessary.  Generally, farms with sales less 
than $100,000 generate losses, and do not cover the full economic costs of production  
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(USDA-ERS-#768).  Contract production would help keep the family farm entity by reducing 
risks and allowing for a steady income.  The trend has been toward more families forming 
corporations and expanding beyond the scope of  a single family’s ability to farm without 
outside labor and other services. 
 
       Contract Production 
       Contract production is the concept of a grain producer growing a number of acres at a 
contracted dollar value fee, in this case, for a grain handler or processor.  The successful 
contract will need components that can keep the process simple while attaining the goals of 
both parties.  Those conditions that are optimal at the inception of the contract, however, 
could be detrimental to one or both of the parties later if it is not flexible enough. 
      A contract between the grain marketer and the grain producer would have to 
necessitate that the producer keep ownership of the farm (no integration), and many states 
have laws to that effect.   
       They would also need to have some kind of ability to change the contract if events 
took place that changed the makeup of the farm, such as changes in ownership, size, or other 
significant changes in value (land sold for development), without being able to take advantage 
of the grain company. 
       Production contracts may become more prevalent in order for the grain companies to 
ensure the volume they need and for the producer to ensure they get the income they need.  
The possibility of a grain company contracting with producers on a per acre basis in return for 
production of grains may be the way this is accomplished. In this type of  contracting, there 
will be a transfer of risk from the producer to the grain industry.  
       There are significant risks in grain farming, with weather and price uncertainty, 
seasonality of the production requiring capital for inputs early in the year and production  
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income four to five months later, perishability, unstable international markets in grain and in 
the economy in general, and public policy changes.        
       Production contracts take decision-making away from the producer, but also take risk 
away from the producer, and some producers see contracting as a means for remaining viable 
given today’s low commodity prices.  Some producers see it (contracting) as a risk 
management tool (FRB-Minn 10/99). 
        The transfer of risk will make it easier for the producer to concentrate on production 
and not worry so much about marketing.  With a contract for production, the banks will be 
more likely to extend credit to the farms.  Grain facilities would be able to increase volume 
and lower per unit fixed costs, which would have to make up the difference in the costs 
involved in absorbing risk from the producer. 
       Another key issue of contracted production at a set dollar amount per acre would be if 
the prices of grain would increase rapidly.  There could be a problem with post contract 
opportunism or moral hazards.  The long term advantages of using production contracts has 
to be great enough to the producer to keep that from happening.  If grain prices would go up 
beyond government payment levels and above costs, then the producer would want to make 
that extra income, and would not need the contract in order to be profitable, and might want 
out of the contract.  The contract would have to enable the producer to have a steady long 
term income, but they would have to be willing to give up some opportunity for that. 
       The grain industry may have to absorb some of the risk of losses in producing grain in 
low price years.  If so, then it must feel that it will have the opportunity to profit if the market 
turns higher.  Since the grain industry usually hedges, it doesn’t normally care about price as 
much as it would about the increases in volume that would be associated with the contracts.   
       There would be some opportunity for the company not to hedge purchases or sales if 
the grain was  moving through the system, being processed and sold to an end user. The 
advantage of buying raw product for manufacturing would provide a great opportunity if  
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prices rose, because the raw material would have been purchased at a lower price and the 
products could be sold at the higher price, creating more margin. This would be a higher risk 
decision and out of normal operating procedure, for the grain handlers and processors, but 
could create large gains, and could provide some incentive to absorb risk in low price years.  
If they had the expense of the production per acre locked in, and prices moved up, they could 
just sell the production at the higher price.   
       As an alternative, to help alleviate some of the shirking problems (opportunistic 
behavior) with the producer, the contracts could have a pricing formula that would adjust acre 
income up with increases in price, with the standard contract term based on a minimum price, 
which might make the contract more feasible for the long term and more viable for both the 
producer and grain company. 
       A contract for production would take more grain out of the open marketplace, and 
would tend to disrupt the competitive pricing of grain to some degree, by making it a thinner 
market.  But if the producer is happy with this income, the issue would not be with those 
under contract, but those who are not.  If the grain company was able to lock in volume that 
enabled it to run close to where marginal cost equaled marginal revenue, it may widen margins 
(be less competitive by lowering prices paid relative to the sales price) to open market grain 
that it buys.  Depending on the handling and storage capacity of a facility, it may take a large 
amount of contracted volume in order to reach this point.  It could even be that there would 
not be enough production with the competitive draw area for this to be possible.  
       As long as the facility is not running at full capacity, more volume should help keep 
costs down, and the conduct of the facility probably would be not to change its market pricing 
policy (margins).  They may even choose to cut margins to be even more competitive for extra 
bushels. They could arrange to have the facilities open longer if volume was guaranteed, and 
with costs per bushel reduced,  the grain facilities may also be able to offer more services to 
others than before, and gain differential advantages.  
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       There could be concern about the competitive pricing of grains in the U.S. if more 
consolidation would occur.  Government regulations could interfere with any further increases 
in the rate of consolidation.  The Nussle-Thune bill in the house currently under consideration 
would require “large agribusinesses” proposing mergers to file a public notice with the 
Secretary of Agriculture simultaneously with the notice already required to be filed with the 
Justice Department (NGFA-3/4/02).  But as the grain industry becomes more international, 
the prices of grain will be determined more and more in a world sense. As long as information 
flow and transportation capabilities are good, it will be more difficult for  locations or 
companies to widen margins or be less competitive for any extended period of time.  Since 
grain businesses operate on volume, there will almost always be a need for grain to particular 
markets, and the market price at any location will be the value at any destination minus 
transportation costs.  The prices of grain tend to change in order to get it to go where and 
when it needs to, and so the price as a whole in any part of the country should not vary 
significantly from the way it is determined now.  If grain was priced where marginal cost is 
less than marginal revenue, the elevator should keep buying as long as it can coordinate the 
operational aspects and cover expenses. 
           Contract production would be more likely to happen if producers could attain 
acceptable income levels and continue to farm.  The grain industry could then continue to 
lower costs and better provide the consumers of grain and grain products what they want. 
       In the end, the producers and marketers of grains should attain their goals and the 
system should attempt to maximize the performance of all parties, from the input supplier to 
the final consumer.  This will be done by lowering transaction costs for both grain producers 
and grain handlers and processors, and allowing more control over the movement of grain to 
specific uses and users.    
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 Specialty  Grains 
       If the local facility is able to handle more specialty grains, but needs a commitment by 
producers in order to get the program off the ground, the producers should be willing to 
pursue trying to produce that particular grain if the premium provides better return potential.  
Specialty grains can be a way to increase margins for the producer and the grain industry. 
Margins could be higher for the producer by providing a grain that is in demand and has a 
higher value, and for the grain industry by increasing volume. 
  Added value grains such as non genetically modified soybeans, specific varieties of 
corn capable of producing certain characteristics such as high oil, or wheat varieties specific to 
mill demand  could be a partial solution to some of the industry and producer problems.        
       These grains take more time and effort to raise, may have lower yields than more 
conventional crops, and may result in expenditures that are not recovered immediately.  But 
the key is to be innovative, just as the grain industry must be in finding ways to coordinate 
production and handling of these products.   
       The seamless origination of specialty grains from the farm to the end users through 
one grain company creates value by being able to ensure quality from the field to the end user.  
There is less chance for contamination, and so is more consistent, making it more desirable, 
particularly as a food item.  Producers that are actively searching for markets for these 
products may find premiums of two to four percent of the value for this effort.  If returns are 
currently $200 per acre, an extra $4 to $8 per acre may be possible. 
 
       Marketing Alternatives and Advisors 
       The grain industry as a whole has the ability to understand and market grain using 
many more tools and much more expertise than a single grain producer.  There may be 
marketing alternatives that could be used, but are not because it is not standard procedure.  
Ideas from producers can generate thoughts about contract flexibility, and could lead to giving  
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marketing alternatives that were not there before.  A lot of these opportunities may not be 
general marketing programs, but could be possible if the question is asked.   
       If the producer has regular contact with a grain industry representative about the needs 
of the farm, the industry participant may search for ways to help the producer achieve the goal 
, whatever it is.  It is to the advantage of both to try and make marketing programs work that 
will get the producer more returns and the grain facility more volume.  Closer relationships 
can help achieve these goals. 
       Grain producers should be looking at all marketing alternatives to help in marketing 
grain.  This might be done by contracting acres for marketing or production, or a volume 
guarantee.  These programs might enable a producer to gain better access to market 
information and also a better value for the grain than grain that is sold “over the scale”. 
       The larger producers in particular will need more help in marketing grain as they 
become larger and are marketing more directly down the chain. Grain marketing advisors 
could fill more of the void between the producer and the grain industry buyers in order to get 
the expertise needed to market more effectively.   This could be a more utilized tool for 
producers to help decipher the complicated aspects of marketing grain.   But lack of 
commitment by advisors (easy exit) may leave producers having to reestablish relations with 
the grain handler if the advisor exits.  The producer may be better off coordinating with the 
grain handlers directly in the long run. 
 
       Using Farm Storage 
       Size does create more potential market power, and the producer can use it in those 
cases where the grain industry needs more volume and is willing to find more innovative ways 
to move the grain from producers through their facilities.  Producers can sell their grain fob 
(free on board) the farm, and allow the elevator the flexibility of selling the grain to different  
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markets.  Many times they may pay a higher price for the ability to market the grain in 
different directions. 
       Being flexible on delivery times and the quality of grain brought in at certain times may 
allow the elevator to run more efficiently, and they may reward this flexibility with  a higher 
price. 
 
3.5   Summary and Conclusions 
 
       With a background of the history of Michigan agriculture and a sense for the history of 
the national grain industry, we proceeded to describe the way the current grain industry is 
organized nationally and particularly in Michigan. 
       The study took the organizational analysis and then summarized its effects on grain 
producers, identifying problems and suggesting solutions for producers. 
       There are many other aspects of the situation that could be discussed.  Some will come 
out in the Strategic Analysis and Plans for the grain industry and grain producers, and some 
would be the subject of more research. 
        The overall conclusion from the Industrial Organization analysis suggests that the 
degree of coordination between the grain industry and grain producers needs to be enhanced, 
and services increased in order to achieve the goals, as stated in the introduction of the 
chapter, that both of these participants have in the overall food system. 
       Using this information, we can now proceed to investigate the strategies that the grain 
industry and grain producers can use to increase their performance.    
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Chapter Four 
  STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS AND PLAN  
    For the Grain Producers and the Grain Industry in Michigan      
 
4.1     Introduction       
 
       Strategic Management can be described as the process of crafting and implementing an 
organizational “game plan” for creating customer value (increasing  utility), sustaining 
competitive advantages and achieving performance targets (Peterson - Thinking Strategically). 
       The Strategic Management Analysis approach moves beyond these more general 
observations to an analysis and plan relevant either to a specific firm, or in this study, a 
specific collection of firms in an industry.  This chapter of the study will consider a strategic 
analysis and plan first for grain producers as a class and then the grain handlers and processors 
in Michigan.  It will aim to determine specifically what strategies producers and commercial 
grain handling and processing companies in Michigan should take to achieve their goals. 
    The strategic analysis for the grain producer is more extensive in this chapter, as it 
brings out parts of their situation that the Industrial Organization analysis may have 
overlooked.  The strategic analysis for the grain firms in Michigan is less comprehensive,  
because of the more extensive analysis done for grain firms in the Industrial Organization 
chapter.  With the historical background from chapter two, the analysis done in chapters three 
and four  prepare the reader for the summary and conclusions in chapter five. 
      The process is to first recognize what assumptions and beliefs there are about 
producers and handlers of grain, then develop a strategy, implement it, and check performance 
to see if the perceptions of the assumptions were correct or if there are ways the plan and/or 
implementation can be changed to improve results (Peterson - Thinking Strategically).    
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       A strategy is a set of actions designed to achieve a firm’s goals.  It has a long run 
focus, it can be intended or emergent (evolved from operations) and it directs daily 
operations.  An effective strategy delivers value to customers, builds on strengths, captures 
opportunities, is sustainable across time and can fit any level of the firm (Peterson - Business 
Strategy).   
        The long run focus for the grain system in Michigan is to survive.  The assumption is 
that without a change in strategy, the grain system in Michigan will continue a trend of decline 
in farms due to lack of profitability, a decline in the number of elevators due to competition 
from other grain producing states, and a decline in production as agriculture gives way to 
other uses for the land.  The study will investigate the internal and external forces acting on 
the grain system that threaten its very viability in the long run. 
       In the author’s years of experience in the grain industry, the actions taken by grain 
producers reflect an emergent strategy while the grain industry has a more intended strategy.  
The strategy developed by the handlers and processors, being intended, is more proactive, and 
will tend to force the producers to adopt the handler’s strategy initially.  From there, it is 
modified by the producers to adapt to their goals.  The overall success of the strategy is 
limited to how well the producers are able to be successful using that strategy.  If they are not, 
then the grain industry will evaluate and adjust their strategy to enhance customer value, and 
begin the loop again.  
       The development of a strategic plan will focus on long-term operations of both grain 
producers and grain firms.  It should develop a broad plan for how a business is going to 
compete, what its goals should be and what policies will be needed to carry out those goals 
(Porter) at any level of the firm. 
       Value to customers is a relationship between perceived benefits and price (Peterson - 
Value Added).  The perceived benefits to consumers of corn, soybeans and wheat have been 
difficult to enhance because of the homogeneity from two aspects.  The product grown by  
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producers has been homogenous, and the great number of producers are themselves 
homogenous to the grain handlers.  But that is changing with biotechnology, as grains can be 
grown with certain attributes that create additional value to the consumer.  There are also 
changes for the grain firms, as concentration of producers is forcing a more customer specific 
approach for handlers as producer numbers become fewer and their size larger.  The shift in 
strategies for both is from a commodity strategy, centered on cost reduction, to a value added 
strategy that identifies specifically what the consumer wants and works to deliver that desired 
value (Peterson - Value Added).         
       The strategy needs to identify strengths so that they can be built upon, and understand 
weaknesses so that they can be compensated for or overcome.  By recognizing the 
environment that the firm (grain producers as well as handlers and processors) is operating in, 
the opportunities can be discovered, developed and captured, and threats can be avoided. 
       With this framework for understanding what the long run goals should be, the specifics 
of the strategic plan can be developed.  The actions, strategy and evaluation can be 
implemented to achieve the best possible desired end result. 
         The outline for each strategic analysis will include a description of the firms or sector, 
internal analysis (strengths and weaknesses), external analysis (opportunities and threats), and 
strategic issues.  The strategic plan for each, will then include a strategic mission/vision, 
strategic objectives, core strategy, action strategy, and an evaluation system. 
       When the strategic analysis and plans for both producers and the grain firms are 
complete, they will be brought together to discuss how the two sectors benefit from each 
other.  A summary of the analysis with recommendations and conclusions will end this 
chapter. 
4.2     Strategic Analysis and Plan for Michigan Grain Producers  
 
4.2.1    Introduction  
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           The strategic analysis and plan will look at grain producers as one business.  Farms of 
different sizes may have some differing issues, but the applications of economics can answer 
questions about how size matters.  The emphasis will be on medium and large sized farms 
(over 60 acres).  The study is intended to be mainly concerned with providing direction to 
those producers who can provide enough possible income to expand to the point where the 
majority of the income is made from the farm, and not from outside income. 
       The strategy of grain producers from the author’s experience is mostly emergent. It is 
a strategy that develops from experience and comparison to other area producers.  Most 
producers are more informed and more interested in what crops they grow where, when and 
how.  They are very adept at producing crops that yield as much as possible.  But the strategic 
intention is usually based on how to maximize yields, not an intended strategy of how to 
maximize income by diversification or other changes that are an adaptation to a consumer 
market. 
       Perhaps their marketing analysis and plan is emergent because of the time required in 
this aspect of the operation.  The many factors involved in commodity markets and the 
continued changes that determine price require time for analysis. Many producers avoid this 
aspect of their operation because of their basic interest and strength in operational aspects. 
They prefer to spend their time on operations and not market analysis. 
       What are the producer’s alternatives?  How can producers change the trend of poor 
performance?  These questions will be addressed in this section of the study.  A strategic 
analysis and a strategic plan will be formulated to help determine what grain farmers in 
Michigan should do to improve profitability or even to survive. 
4.2.2  Description of Michigan Grain Farming 
     
 
   115
       There were 52,000 farms in Michigan at the end of 2001, the same as in 2000. 
(MASS-Farm Numbers).  A breakdown of the size of farms in Michigan over the past 15 
years shows that the number of farms under 50 acres and the farms over 1,000 acres is 
growing.  The number of farms in every other category is decreasing (MASS-Michigan 
Census).  The size of the farms by economic class also illustrates this fact (Figure 4-a). 
 
        Figure 4-a
             Number of Michigan Farms and Land in Farms 
                by Economic Sales Class 1996 - 2000
Number of Farms (1,000 farms)
Year $1,000 - $9,999 $10,000 - $99,999 $100,000 and over Total
1996 29.8  17.0  7.2  54 
1997 28.5  17.0  7.5  53 
1998 27.0  17.0  8.0  52 
1999 28.5  16.5  8.0  53 
2000 27.5  16.5  8.0  52 
Million Acres
1996 2.2  3.1  5.3  10.6 
1997 2.0  2.9  5.5  10.4 
1998 1.9  2.8  5.7  10.4 
1999 1.9  2.8  5.7  10.4 
2000 1.9  2.8  5.7  10.4 
Source: Michigan Agricultural Statistical Service 2001 Yearbook  
 
           The dispersion of products shows that grains are mainly produced from the thumb area 
diagonally toward the southwest corner of the state and also south to the Indiana and Ohio 
borders (Skjaerlun Map1). 
       Grain production in the state shifts slightly depending on competition from sugar beets 
and edible beans (Table 11).  There is also fluctuation between the three major grains due to 
price and government programs.  The 1996 farm bill favored soybean planting when prices of 
corn and soybeans dropped below loan rates because the loan rate ratio was greater than the 
cost of production on a per bushel ratio.  A 2.27:1 ratio is the average per bushel yield to cost 
equivalent ratio (USDA-ERS-Cost).  The 1996 farm bill loan rate ratio was 2.8:1 , with the  
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national loan rate for soybeans at $5.26 per bushel and corn at $1.89.         
The reaction to the 2002 farm bill is inconclusive, but it appears that it will favor a shift back 
to more corn acres with the loan rate ratio now at 2.5:1, with the national loan rate for 
soybeans at $5.00 and corn at $2.00.   
  The average age of the Michigan grain farmer is in the early 50’s (NASS-State 
Profile).  From the author’s experience with many mid-Michigan producers,  the older farmers 
may own more of their land and machinery than someone entering the business or producers 
that are expanding.  Even though they may only farm 500 acres, for example, they may be 
more profitable per acre than larger farmers who are more highly leveraged.  But the author 
has observed that they are also more likely to retire with the same farm, rather than trying to 
expand. Younger farmers may be more in debt and may be more likely to need an off farm job 
to make ends meet.   They are likely to be in the small to medium sized farm range.   
       Larger farms (over 1,000 acres) are expanding.  These producers are buying or renting 
more land in order to lower per unit costs of production, probably to support more family 
members that are also involved in the business. 
  
4.2.3  Strategic Analysis of Michigan Grain Producers 
  
  The analysis begins with an assessment of grain producer performance in three areas- 





  Michigan farms have become more specialized.  Less are raising livestock, shifting 
more production emphasis to field crop production (Table 8).  But with less diversification,  
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comes more risk.  If prices for a grain decrease, and/or yields decrease, there are then few 
other sources for income on the farm.  The income alternative now usually comes from jobs 
off the farm (Table 13). 
       The trend in Michigan agriculture is that less farms are providing the majority of the 
income (Table 9).  This is due in part to higher costs and lower production and the need for 
size.   
  The same soils and climates that afford diversification also help cause more variability 
in income if planted to commodities that do not yield as well in those soils.  This variability 
means that in order to assure constant income, farmers have been finding supplementary 
employment off the farm (Table 13) (Mishra and Goodwin, 1997, and Mishra 1996).  It also 
means that the land may be better used for things other than agriculture that have a higher 
future value, such as, development.   
       As the number of acres and the number of producers decreases, the importance of 
agriculture in the state will continue to decline.  Some projections indicate that within 15 years 
there will be a core group of 10,000 farmers that may produce 90% of all agricultural sales in 
the state, with a loss of an additional 600,000 acres in farm land, resulting in a loss of $120 to 
$240 million annually in local farm income (Skjaerlun). 
 
           Costs for inputs in Michigan are higher (Table 3), taxes are higher than other major 
grain producing states Table 6), and net cash return per farm unit is lower per acre than other 
states (Table 4). 
       
           Without government payments in some years, net income was negative for many  
Michigan grain producers (Table 7).   
       To obtain a net cash return of $30,000, it would take about 500 acres (Table 4).  If the 
typical grain producer is in this range and also earns some (but less than $30,000) income at 
another job, they may be more likely to be oriented to staying on the farm.  Under this level,  
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the producer is farming for other reasons than as a means of making a living farming.  The net 
farm income level that the government has been trying to help achieve through their subsidies 
is about this level (Womak). 
 
  Competitiveness 
  Comparing Michigan to seven other Midwestern states, Michigan had the lowest 
percent of farms with sales dollars in the $100,000 - $250,000 range and the $250,000 - 
$500,000 range, but the most in the $1 million plus range.  This is an indication that sales need 
to be higher in Michigan in order to find efficiency scales that allow acceptable profit.  In 
other states, most of the producers are between $100,000 to $500,000 (Figure 4-b). 
 
                   Figure 4-b
        Percent of Sales by Class
Total           Dollars of Sales
Sales $25,000 $25,000 $50,000 $100,000 $250,000  $500,000  $1  mil.
 State Dollars or less $50,000  $100,000  $250,000  $500,000  $1 mil. or more
Michigan $4,018 4.90% 4.40% 6.00% 14.00% 15.90% 16.50% 38.30%
Ohio $4,054  8.10  6.90  10.80 29.30 18.70 14.10  12.00 
Indiana $4,658  4.20  7.50 8.30  24.40 21.50 19.50  14.50 
Illinois $8,082  3.80  4.20 6.90  24.80 29.50 18.40  12.30 
Iowa $10,974  2.80  5.10 8.30  24.70 22.10 15.20  21.70 
Minnesota $8,844  2.80  3.70 7.10  21.40 21.80 14.20  28.80 
Nebraska $10,034  1.70  2.70 5.60  20.60 16.30  8.00  45.00 
Source: Agricultural Census of 1997 - Volume 3, Special Studies - Ag Economics
 
  The trend in the number of farms shows the greatest losses in the medium sized (60 - 
1,000 acres) farms as well (MASS- Census County Summary).  This also indicates the need to 
expand.  In a full time Michigan grain farming operation, sales may need to be $500,000 or  
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more to obtain the scale of efficiencies needed to be at an acceptable profit level and be 
competitive if that is why Michigan has so many farms in the higher sales range compared to 
other states.  Sales of $500,000 equates to about 2,000 acres of corn at $2 per bushel with an 
average yield of 125 bushels per acre. 
 
 Productivity 
  The increase in the number of farms under 60 acres can be attributed to urbanization 
and the definition of a farm.  In most cases, sales of farm produce over $1,000 constitutes a 
farm.  Farms these small can be managed much more easily by one person, even with a full 
time job, and more likely with less capital invested, and with lower overall debt. 
            Seventy one percent of the farms in Michigan in 1997 had sales of less than $25,000, 
and represented only 4.9% of the total sales.  Farms with over $500,000 in sales numbered 
1,606 or only 3% of the total, yet generated 54.8% of the sales, and farms that had sales 
between $25,000 and $500,000 represented 26% of the farms and 40.3% of the sales (MASS- 
U.S. Census, Market Value). 
  Most producers concentrate on growing crops and little time on marketing 
alternatives.  Keeping up with technological innovations in machinery, inputs and marketing 
can require time for study that can be too burdensome.  Knowledge about marketing and 
developing an overall strategy for survival in this competitive and difficult farming 
environment should require more expertise in almost every field to increase profits.  But, the 
weakness of having to work off the farm is a toll on expanding the knowledge of the 
producers in general.   
   In summary, performance in profitability, competitiveness and productivity is low 
versus producer goals.  These performance problems are strategic because major shifts in 
long-term firm-level behavior are needed to create solutions. 
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4.2.3.1 Strategic Strengths for Michigan Grain Producers 
 
       One strength is the increasing value of the land.  Borrowing capacity for investing in 
property or machinery is helped by the increasing value of the land (Table 14).  It also helps 
producers be able to borrow capital for innovation.  If a producer wants to change strategies 
to new grains or specific varieties, there may be some changes in equipment or extra up front 
costs that would require initial capital.  But caution should be used in borrowing against the 
value of the land.  If the capital expenditure cannot show future values that are high enough to 
recoup the costs plus interest, then the expansion should not take place in that way.   
       Another strength for producers is the variation in soils.  This could allow all or parts of 
the farm to be dedicated to raising specialty crops on those soils that are best suited for 
specific varieties or crops.  As production and marketing knowledge and marketing 
opportunities expand for specialty crops, more of the farm may be used for them.  Smaller lots 
on smaller farms may be managed easier, making production of particular varieties of grain a 
niche opportunity.   
      Strength from the larger size of the farms brings advantages by their ability to bypass 
the elevators (an extra margin) and take grain direct to processors and/or to exert market 
power to sell at higher prices.  Larger farms may also have more storage, so they don’t have 
to sell as much at the harvest lows. 
      A strength in Michigan producers compared to other states is their experience in 
managing adverse conditions. Because of the competitive nature and the disadvantages of the 
production of grain in Michigan, those that have been successful have a good understanding 
of what it takes to be profitable.  It may be that this acquired management skill is more 
practiced than producers in other states.              
        The strengths of the grain producers in Michigan are limited.  The grain industry needs 
to help producers develop strengths in finding more margin for their crops and to reduce risk.   
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Working to develop specialty grains and coordinating marketing more closely can work 
toward reducing weaknesses.     
 
4.2.3.2 Strategic Weaknesses of Michigan Grain Producers 
 
       Michigan farmers are at a comparative disadvantage in commodity grain production 
and marketing because they are subject to a shorter growing season, varying soil types, higher 
transportation charges which contributes to higher prices for inputs and lower prices for 
grains, and yields that are below the major grain production states.  Land values compared to 
yield potential and tax rates are high compared to other states as well (MASS-Ag Stats 2002). 
       In general, the returns are not as high as other states (Figure 4-c), which makes the 
land more susceptible to be used for other things. For example, in addition to expanding  
urban areas from Detroit and Chicago, Michigan also has the highest number of second homes 
and second highest number of golf courses in the nation (Skjaerlun). 
       Yields for corn and soybeans over time are less than the national average and even 
further behind the main production states (Table 1).  This is due to a combination of factors 
such as length of the growing seasons and a necessity for shorter day hybrids, and soil types.  
The lower yields reduce the revenue potential for the land.  
 
   122
      Figure  4-c 
                 State Average Crop Revenues Compared to the National Average 1990 - 2001 
  
                            Michigan      Ohio  Indiana     Illinois     Iowa     Minnesota     Nebraska 
  CORN 
  Yield (bu/acre)      -12.96          1.54     5.46     10.21           8.13        1.29  5.63 
  Price (cents/bu)    - 0.05           0.05     0.06        0.07         -0.06       -0.17  -0.02 
  Revenue ($/acre) -32.89         8.86     18.37     31.71         -0.64     -19.53  10.73 
  
  SOYBEANS 
  Yield                     -0.74           2.63     5.68       5.05           6.38        0.43  3.05 
  Price                    -0.07          0.06     0.06       0.13          -0.07      -0.17    -0.15 
  Revenue               -5.96          17.03   33.76     33.49         32.84      -4.56  10.77 
  
  WINTER WHEAT 
  Yield                   14.23          17.64   14.23     9.31           -0.53     -8.03  -3.94 
  Price                   - 0.19         -0.22    -0.20       -0.22          -0.23     -0.04  0.01 
  Revenue              31.80         39.28     31.44     17.68        -10.01      -24.18  -11.25 
       
  Source: National Agricultural Statistical Service   
 
       Costs per acre are higher or similar to other Midwestern grain growing states that also 
have higher yields (Table 3).  Input costs, land values, taxes, transportation all contribute to 
the dilemma of the lower cost to return situation.  When comparing Michigan to the same 
Midwestern farm states in our earlier example, Michigan has the lowest net cash return per 
farm of the states (Table 3). 
  In grain farming, many times the producer and a few close family members can do 
most of the farming.  Expansion into other production crops, or in size, may require hiring 
outside labor to get things done on time.  Hiring seasonal labor with the expertise in handling 
modern equipment may be difficult, and having hired help all year round is too costly.  There 
is also more competition in Michigan for labor at higher wages.  The average wage of the 
hourly worker is higher versus the other Midwestern farm states in this study (Table 10). To 
hire labor for agriculture is more difficult because of cost,  and those with an agricultural 
background are decreasing.  The population of the state involved in farming is less compared 
to the other states in this study (Table 12).  
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       Since Michigan is further away from major use areas for corn, it costs more to 
transport the grain to those destinations than states south of us.  The price for Michigan grain 
is less to cover the transportation costs.  Some areas of the state are more competitive than 
others, but some of the areas with the highest prices are also in the highest suburban growth 
areas.  The southeast corner of the state has access to the Toledo market, which can load lake 
vessels for export from May to November, and sometimes can provide higher prices to the 
area than other destinations.  The southwest corner of the state has a similar situation with 
Burns Harbor and Chicago, but is also a rapid urban expansion area. 
       Individually most farmers do not have the financial capability to change farming 
systems to crops that might require new equipment. The best chance for producers in 
Michigan to increase profit potential may be in crops that use the same equipment that the 
farm already has, but specialize into different varieties or other specifications that require 
more production and marketing skills and not much more capital inflow.    
           The author’s experience is that the producers have a general lack of marketing 
knowledge.  This limits their ability to generate revenues, and increases risk.  Given the 
adverse conditions of operating a grain farm in Michigan, the producer can ill afford to limit 
revenue opportunities or decrease revenues due to unnecessary risk.  They generally do not 
have solid marketing plans for the grain they produce.   
 
4.2.3.3 Strategic Opportunities for Michigan Grain Producers 
 
       Market Direct to Terminal or Processor Markets - The increasing size of the Michigan 
grain farmer means that they have more storage capacity and probably more transportation 
capacity.  This would allow them to hold grain in the fall when prices are low, and create the 
opportunity to gain some of the carry in the market by selling for January or later delivery in 
the crop year.  Many years there is a 15 - 20 cent per bushel higher price for delivery in  
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January versus November.  In addition, most of the larger farms have their own tractor trailers 
and so have the ability to go more distance in marketing their crops, particularly in the off 
season when farm activity is slow.  This allows them to sell direct to larger terminal or to 
processors at a higher fob farm price than the local elevators may be able to offer. 
       Specialty Crops - As demand for non-genetically modified (gmo) and specific varieties 
of grains increases, there is more opportunity in price to adhere to the specific techniques 
required to produce them.  Through the desire of some consumers to eat foods that are 
healthier (or pose a perceived reduced health risk), a market for non-gmo grains has become 
large enough to support a premium for crops grown, that fit the specifications for various 
uses.   
       Alliances - As the number of farms decreases, and the amount of land farmed does 
also, grain handlers and users are more likely to want to bond with the larger farmers in order 
to ensure supplies.  Farmers can take advantage of this need by aligning themselves with a 
grain company or processor that can help them market their grain.  It could be a marketing 
agreement, volume guarantees, contract farming or other combinations that can help them 
enhance the prices of their grain.  The agreements could be with grain handlers, processors or 
even a cooperative.  There is an opportunity for some to form their own cooperatives for 
manufacturing certain products, possibly not even in their own state. 
       Water Transportation - Saginaw River - Michigan does have the ability to ship by 
vessel, which is usually the lowest cost form of transportation available.  There has been more 
extensive use of this system in past years.  During the 1970’s and 1980’s boats were loaded 
out of the Saginaw area.  The flood of 1986 silted in some of this capacity and that, coupled 
with the reduction of the Russian grain purchases about the same time halted most shipments.  
A rejuvenation of this access to water transportation could alleviate some of the problems 
with higher truck and rail transportation rates that put Michigan at a competitive disadvantage 
to other states.  This is a function that could be done privately or by the Army Corps of  
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Engineers.  Dredging a private dock could cost several hundred thousand dollars, and to keep 
the entire river dredged to Saginaw could be millions.  But an extra five cents a bushel on five 
million bushels would be $250,000 returned to Michigan, both of which are reasonable 
expectations in the author’s opinion. 
     
4.2.3.4 Strategic Threats to Michigan Grain Producers  
 
       Threats to Michigan grain production come mainly from competition for the land, and 
Michigan’s geographic location.  Urbanization and associated environmental problems, cost 
factors and resultant volume reductions could result in fewer markets and less transportation 
flexibility. 
      Urbanization -  Development is spreading out from Detroit, Grand Rapids and the 
Chicago area across the main southern production areas for grain.  The Thumb area is less 
affected by the trend currently, but this area of the state is also the most diversified and has 
little advantage for businesses other than those that are agriculturally related (due to its 
remoteness).  The effect of the cities expanding out to the countryside in many areas is that 
land values along the country roads have increased to the point that lots are being sold to add 
cash back into the farming operation.  The current value is higher than the expected future 
value of the land if it continued to be used for agriculture, or is the result of the inability of a 
producer to pay back debt in a timely manner.  The higher property values also increase the 
taxable value of the land, adding more cost to the farming business. 
       Volume Reduction - As the amount of grain produced in certain parts of the state is 
reduced, agricultural businesses will have a more difficult time making enough revenue and 
margin to cover costs.  If businesses pull out of certain areas, the grain producers are likely to 
find that they must haul their grain further, and acquire inputs from suppliers that are farther  
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away.  Both of these will cause transportation charges to increase, which will negatively 
impact the bottom line. 
       Cost versus Revenue - As costs as a whole continue to increase, the grain producer 
must find ways to cut costs or increase revenues in order to maintain net income levels.  
Biotechnology has increased yields and quality while helping cut costs.  It has reduced the 
amount of chemicals needed to destroy weeds and pests, and global imaging is reducing waste 
in fertilizer.  Yield enhancements and cost reduction through technology has made the grain 
producer more profitable than he would have been without these capabilities.   The producer 
needs to continue to find ways to control costs and increase production, as well as improve 
marketing skills. This need to maintain a standard of living is forcing more farmers to get 
work at a non-farm occupation.  If there is no way to reverse the trend, the producer must 
increase the percent of non-farm revenue through time working in an occupation off the farm, 
which means less time will be spent farming.  This eventually causes productivity to decrease, 
and the farm income falls further until it is sold or leased to another producer or another use.  
Competition of other states and Canada with  a lower cost/higher revenue structure may cause 
production of agricultural commodities to these competing areas. 
       Rail Access - As volume decreases, the possibility of losing rail access becomes a 
possibility.  The state has been very supportive of helping to maintain the viability of the 
railroads, not only for agricultural uses but for others as well.  But if the railroads are not 
used, abandonment is certainly a possibility.  This is another case where the costs of 
transportation could increase, which will cause a net decline in net farm and business income. 
      Competition for the Land - The expanding economy, population and growth of urban 
areas create situations where the land cannot compete with the other uses in the long run.  
There are programs such as the American Farmland Trust (AFT) that work out solutions for 
specific areas to keep urbanization away, but on a large scale it is difficult to accomplish.  
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       Loss of Export Business - For grain producers, the world commodity environment is 
one that has seen rapid expansion of production in other parts of the world.  This production 
is causing the U.S. to lose some of its advantages for exports.  If other countries can raise 
crops cheaper, and/or are closer to a destination (less transportation costs), they may sell grain 
cheaper than the U.S. can.  As we lose export business, producers may rely more on domestic 
use to provide a market for our grains.   
       Slow Domestic Growth - If costs continue to go up, and/or the government would 
decide to reduce agricultural price supports, there will need to be enough demand 
domestically to keep income up, or there would likely be a faster reduction in the number of 
farms.  Domestic uses for grains such as ethanol for corn and hundreds of uses of the soybean 
are providing new markets that could eventually raise the price enough to make farming 
profitable without assistance, but this could be many years off, and once ground has found a 
use for something besides farming, it will be difficult to get it back into production.  It would 
then have the cost of reclamation.   
       Increasing Imports - There is also the issue of imports.  As other countries around the 
world increase grain production, and at less cost than the U.S. producer, it could be that at 
some point the prices of grains in the U.S. are such that we begin to import more grain. We 
have seen some of this already with soybean meal into the East coast, oats up the river 
systems into the interior, and wheat, mainly from Canada, but also from countries overseas.  
This could be just the beginning of the trend.  Some time in the future, the U.S. may no longer 
be the residual supplier of grains to the world, but an importer of grains to be used in our 
growing domestic markets.   
       Environmental - Problems increase with the expansion of houses in a farming areas.  
Chemicals, fertilizers, dust and other forms of pollution are more apt to cause confrontations 
as non-farming populations move into farming areas.  This could cause a change in zoning  
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around residential areas or restrict certain applications that may be considered a threat to the 
health of the residents.   
  The 2002 farm bill is moving toward setting aside more marginal ground for 
conservation and environmental reasons (Batie). This land will be more difficult to bring back 
into production later if necessary.  If the government could support grain producers until the 
time comes that production cannot meet demand, this land might be needed and brought back 
into production, but at a cost to the environment.  The public will have to decide at that time 
whether low food costs and food security is worth more than environmental concerns.  At that 
time, grain farming should be more profitable, because domestic demand will be more 
consistent, and the government may not have to play as large of a role.  But it could be many 
years before this type of scenario plays out.  Until then, the government is willing to support 
farming. 
        Economies of Scale - Grain farming is not a profitable business on its own unless the 
size of the farm can generate about $150,000 per family member in sales (Table 3).  The 
government is playing a major role, supporting it in order to support local economies and for 
food security reasons.   
 
4.3.2.5 Summary of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats 
 
  The grain producers in Michigan have limited strengths.  The value of the land is 
appreciating, variation in soils allows the opportunity for diversified production, the farms are 
becoming larger, which provides opportunities to sell at higher prices and may create scale 
economies, and the producers have learned to manage through diverse growing and marketing 
conditions. 
      The weaknesses of the Michigan grain producer illustrate the adverse conditions that 
must be overcome to be profitable.  Compared to national averages, and specifically for the  
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other main grain producing states in the study, Michigan has lower returns, caused by lower 
yields, and higher costs.  Most grain producers also have a lack of grain marketing knowledge 
that limits their ability to maximize income. 
     The increasing size of the farms provides opportunities for marketing grain direct to 
terminals or processors, and they have more storage and transportation capability, all of which 
can result in higher prices for the grain.   Also providing the possibility for higher returns are 
specialty grain production, alliances with grain handlers and processors.  There is some 
unrealized opportunity in water transportation in the state that could help reduce 
transportation costs and provide higher prices. 
       The threats to the viability of grain production in Michigan are many.  The producer is 
faced with urbanization, environmental restrictions, increasing costs of production with limited 
increases in revenues due to stagnant or depressed grain prices, competition from grain 
imports,  and reduced rail access. 
  The transition to coordination with the grain handlers and processors brought out in 
the history of Michigan grain production could provide help to the producer in reducing 
weakness and working around the threats, while enhancing strengths and capturing 
opportunities.  The analysis tells us that the current situation of the grain producer in 
Michigan is dominated by weaknesses and threats, and that strategies need to be developed 
that will pull them toward developing strengths and capturing opportunities.  
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Figure 4-d 
SWOT Summary Table for Producers 
 
Strengths       Weaknesses 
Increasing value of the land         Shorter growing season/lower yields 
Variation in soils           Inconsistent soil types 
Larger  farm  size        Higher  transportation 
Management  ability        Higher  tax  rates 
       H i g h   w a g e   s t r u c t u r e  
       Lack  of  marketing  knowledge 
 
Opportunities     Threats      
Market direct to terminal/processor markets    Urbanization 
Specialty  crops     Volume  reduction     
Alliances         Cost  versus  revenue     
Water  transportation        Rail  access 
Competition for the land    
      Loss  of  export  business     
      S l o w   d o m e s t i c   g r o w t h      
      I n c r e a s i n g   i m p o r t s       
      E n v i r o n m e n t a l      
      E c o n o m i e s   o f   s c a l e       
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4.2.3.6 Strategic Issues Analysis 
 
       Core Competencies  
       The core competency of the Michigan grain producers is their production and 
management skills.   
  Their production skill is reflected in their ability to produce grain at the lowest possible 
cost with a high yield, faced with the adversity of soil types, climate, and a generally higher 
cost of production than competing states, and be profitable. 
       Another core competency is the management ability of the Michigan producer, who 
has been faced with revenue adversity, which allows them to manage costs and redistribute 
income efficiently.          
  The adversity in soil types and climate allows for a cost or production advantage by 
location.  The challenge is to differentiate by finding a crop that can provide margin and that is 
unique to Michigan soil types and climate. 
  The producer’s skill in the production of grain makes them cost effective.  They could 
apply these skills to the production of new products, along with developing storage and 
separating techniques, adapting them for specific end user demands, and become more 
profitable. 
               
       Competitive Advantages  
       The key competitive advantage is the state’s ability to utilize its climate and soil types.  
By focusing on developing a crop that can build a strong advantage in a market niche, the 
producers can increase profitability.  By working hard on developing production and 
searching for demand for specialty grains, differentiation can occur.   Producers need to focus 
on what the consumer market is demanding.    
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       A market focus lets a business “learn” it’s target customers -- their needs, special 
considerations they want accommodated -- and establishes relationships in ways that 
“differentiate” the product (Pearce and Robinson). 
       To develop an advantage, the development of a niche needs to shape the industry’s 
structure. An ideal situation would be if an emerging demand for quality grains that had 
special characteristics that could only be grown in the Michigan climate would develop.  If it 
developed a price premium that would pay for research and production, Michigan would have 
a competitive advantage.  Michigan’s cooler climate may help in developing some crop 
varieties that are resistant to disease problems such as soybean leaf rust, which is becoming 
more prevalent in Brazil and could possibly spread to the U. S.   
      Another competitive advantage the state has is the ability to ship commodities by 
vessel,  which many other Midwestern states do not have.  Some have the ability to ship by 
barge, but vessel to the East Coast can be an advantage that other states cannot access.  The 
use of cheaper water transportation can also be used within the state to counter higher truck 
and rail costs due to the peninsula effect.   
            
  Scenarios for the Future of Michigan Grain Producers   
       The scenarios that could develop over time are as follows: 
       Scenario One - Urbanization - Urbanization continues to expand, at a faster rate, and 
farm land continues to be turned into non-agricultural uses in those areas where those returns 
are higher.  As total grain production  decreases, the grain industry will  find it more difficult 
to be profitable and may close plants and/or will not continue to expand capacity or update 
facilities. 
       Farmers may have to go a farther distance to market their grain. Eventually, 
transportation costs may become higher due to less volume.  Short line railroads may be  
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abandoned, and if rates even on the main line railroad elevators are increased due to 
inefficiencies, interior prices for grain would decrease compared to other parts of the country. 
       Producers may become less profitable and land sold to non-agricultural uses may then 
increase at an increasing rate.  Agriculture’s importance to the state may continue to decline 
and become unable to lobby for legislation to support itself.  Some small properties, mostly 
used for large lots for single family homes, sell some extra produce, qualify as farms, and 
increase rapidly, and there become very few large grain farmers left in the state.   
       Scenario Two - Low Net Income - If the profitability of grain farming cannot 
compete with other farm products within the state, or with profitability of grain farming in 
other states, then it will eventually give way to a use that is more profitable. 
       This scenario is like having a diversified business.  If it is profitable, you put earnings 
back into the business whether it has the most profitability now, or it has a greater future 
value than other segments of the business.  If a segment is not profitable, then it will be 
neglected, and eventually be sold off when the cost of repairs are too high to continue to 
operate it. 
       If yields cannot be improved, if grain prices are low and costs continue to rise, then 
profitability of Michigan grain farming will fall into the neglected category. 
       It will lead to more farms being lost to urban growth and a decline in acres per farm.  
There will be the few large farms over 1000 or more acres, fewer between 1,000 and 60, and 
many that are under 60 acres. 
       Scenario Three - Specialization - In this scenario,  Michigan grain farmers become 
more specialized in their approach to grain farming, finding ways to grow crops that are in 
demand and that may have unique qualities specific to Michigan and that are worth a premium 
over generic corn, soybeans and wheat. 
       If low net income prohibits current medium sized producers from expanding, they will 
probably supplement their income by working off the farm.  But by farming smaller plots, the  
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producer may be able to concentrate on specialized crops with certain characteristics for 
specific uses.  The small to medium sized producer may have the time and ability to raise 
identity preserved or organic crops better than larger farmers.  If they are specialized, they 
may be able to capture more margin and continue to farm. 
       Specialization of crops could also be a way to increase incomes on large farms.  These 
producers may have the ability and resources to segregate and grow crops on a larger scale.  
The result would be the same as for small and medium sized farms - more revenues and net 
income. 
           Scenario Four -  Alliances -  Farmers are usually quite good at recognizing and 
solving problems with production.  Solutions to fertilizer, seed, chemical and mechanization 
problems are usually dealt with efficiently.  But the average producer may not spend the time 
marketing grain that would allow it to be sold at even the average price for the year.  A 
marketing alliance could help improve the price of grain received, and help with some of the 
other problems such as income, cash flow and storage decisions.  An alliance could be 
arranged by forming a marketing cooperative, hiring an advisor, selling with the help of a 
broker or contract farming with a large grain company. 
       In this scenario, the producer gives up some or all pricing decision independence in 
return for more value in the grain.  The amount of control each producer is willing to give up 
will vary.  But the fact is that larger grain companies have information and financial 
capabilities that can help farmers market grain at higher prices.  These alliances would help the 
farmer by raising revenues and net income, reducing risk and allowing the producer to 
concentrate on production opportunities, in specialties or in other ways that could increase 
yields.  
  These four scenarios suggest that producers will likely find that competition for land 
use from urbanization and low net income from the combination of flat revenues and 
increasing production expenses can be partially offset by shifting toward crops that are more  
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specialized and higher in value, and forming alliances with grain companies to help market 
grain at higher prices. 
 
  The Change Grid 
       The analysis of the strengths, weaknesses opportunities and threats was summarized  
earlier in this chapter.  If that summary is placed in a grid, the producers would be represented 
in the weak and threatened quadrant.  The analysis and plan should provide direction for 
producers to be able to initially be pulled up into the weak, but with opportunity quadrant, and 
with continued success, into the strength and opportunity quadrant (Figure 4-d).  
               F i g u r e  4 - e  
            The Producer Change Grid 
 
            
Opportunities




  Critical Issues  
       Urbanization, low net income, specialization and alliances are the critical issues facing 
today’s grain producers.  The opportunities and threats confronting the Michigan grain farmer 
are not new, but have evolved over time, and now some of the issues are approaching a 
critical point.  
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       Urbanization / Population Growth - The spread of urbanization will increase land 
values, and taxes and cause environmental problems.  The issue here is the need to develop a 
strategy that will allow grain production to compete on a dollar per acre return with 
competition for land uses in Michigan and for grain production from other states. 
      Low Net Income - If yield increases are slower to materialize, prices stay low and 
input costs continue to rise, lower net real income may force more farmers out of the grain 
business in Michigan.  The producers will soon need to find a way to increase net income. 
       Specialization - The changing soils and unique climate offer the chance for producers 
to specialize in grains that may have unique, valuable characteristics that can allow more 
income.  How producers can work toward raising crops that may be unique in quality to other 
Midwestern grain states is critical. 
       Alliances - Aligning with grain companies in order to enhance marketing alternatives 
may mean a higher average sales price and other benefits in return for guaranteed volume.  
Producers need to find a way to increase profitability, and coordination with the grain 
elevators, the next link down the food industry chain should be helpful. 
  Grain producing land in Michigan will be lost to urbanization.  But for those areas that 
can provide the most competitive grain prices, the land value for farming may be able to 
compete longer, slowing the urbanization rate, and allowing producers and grain companies to 
benefit. 
 
4.2.4  Strategic Plan for Michigan Grain Producers 
 
       Introduction 
       A strategic plan is needed to guide grain producers to realize their objectives.  The 
author has observed, over many years of experience working in the industry and with 
producers, the lack of grain marketing planning and the negative results that occur from its  
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associated complacency.  These observations are the basis for the general statements and 
conclusions in this introduction to the planning stage of the strategic management approach.   
       To maintain grain farming in Michigan, the farmers will need to follow a strategic plan 
that can allow them to compete with increasing land values in Michigan caused by 
urbanization, with other grain producing areas of the country that can get more net income 
from grain production, and with other commercial or agricultural uses for the land such as 
producing fruits and vegetables, for example.  A strategic plan will need to be developed that 
can be realistically implemented and that will be effective in its results. 
       For a producer of grain in Michigan, profitability and survival are the key concerns.  In 
order to be profitable, they need to be knowledgeable about agronomic, mechanical, financial, 
marketing, legal, accounting, government policy and many other minor subjects. 
       The producer is an independent business person who must seek help in acquiring  
knowledge about various business subjects on their own.  We all have bounded rationality, 
and so it is difficult for these people to make good decisions and run their businesses 
profitably without help.   
       There are alternatives to farming, and those who are not profitable for one reason or 
another, and possibly unavoidably, have found supplemental income necessary.  Many 
producers now have jobs in businesses in addition to farming (MASS-Michigan Census).  
Once that split of income sources is made, it becomes more difficult for that producer to 
spend enough time gaining knowledge in those areas of farming necessary to increase 
profitability.  Depending on the necessities of keeping the farm, that land is more subject to 
use for development or to be sold to another producer who needs more land to become more 
cost efficient, because the producers may not have enough time to manage effectively. 
       A grain producing farm in Michigan is an independent business that must acquire, use 
and benefit from knowledge gained in many agricultural and non-agricultural areas to 
maximize revenues and reduce costs in order to maintain a life style until those responsibilities  
 
   138
can be passed to another family member or until retirement.  They must be committed to 
profitable long term farming.  
       With the necessary commitment to strategy, all areas of the operation should be 
analyzed to improve and maximize the revenue opportunities available.  Without this strong 
commitment, the long term viability of the farm is questionable.  The producer may be able to 
use cash flow to roll expenses forward and delay selling out, but it will happen sooner or later, 
and the farm will not be available for future generations of that family.  It may be purchased 
by a bigger producer, or sold off to other non-agricultural uses. 
        The three main grains grown in Michigan are corn, soybeans and wheat.  There are 
specific varieties of each that can be grown for a premium price.  There are also other 
commodities that may be grown in limited quantities that from year to year can be more 
profitable than grains.  Producers need to plan what crops will give them the greatest return 
for their operation.  All aspects of the farm must be considered.  It may be possible that 
producing a specialty crop is not economically feasible for some operations.  For others, 
reluctance must be met with the willingness to increase farm prosperity.  The possibilities need 
to be considered for many different types of commodities. 
       The main problem with expanding into production of new commodities are knowledge 
and the equipment to grow the crops with good production results.  A plan should be in 
effect.  Research should be done into the varieties that can best be produced on the farm.  
There must also be a market for the products.  Depending on the crop, many of the 
production and marketing basics may already be part of crops that are currently being 
produced.  Non-gmo soybeans, and specific varieties of corn, soybeans and wheat may only 
require special handling in order to keep the identity of the grain preserved.  Many marketing 
functions are the same as the generic commodity.  But the producer should recognize the 
differences and plan for those differences in production and marketing techniques.  
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       The mission and vision of the farm can give the producer a focus and a general goal to 
work towards.  From it, the producer can develop a strategic plan in order to attain the goals 
of profitability and survival. 
 
4.2.4.1 Strategic Mission/Vision       
 
  The Mission 
  The mission of the Michigan grain producer is to increase revenues and/or decrease 
costs in order to become profitable enough to continue farming full time, by taking advantage 
of differences in production and marketing that the states’ location and climate provides. 
       The basic products for the Michigan grain producer are corn, soybeans and wheat.  
Demand is developing for specific varieties of these grains that may be best grown in the 
climate and with the soil types that are specific to Michigan.  These varieties can help 
producers differentiate and garner more revenue than generic varieties.   
       The primary market for the grains will be for those uses that have the need for specific 
characteristics of the grains that can best be produced only in Michigan. 
       The technology that will be required for this production needs to be developed to suit 
specific end user needs, and the characteristics should be available preferably only in 
Michigan. 
       The long term survival of grain production in Michigan will depend on the success of 
the development of user demand, and varieties of seeds that can produce those needs.  The 
chance for growth and profitability in these areas will be critical to the survival of the 
Michigan grain producer.  The producer will need to be an active participant in the changes 
that will allow this growth and profitability. 
       The surviving grain producer could be small and produce specialty grains on a small 
but very specific scale for large premiums in price, or they could be medium or large sized  
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farms and use their economies of scale to produce maybe less specific crops at a lower 
premium, but important niche crops in larger quantities. 
       The Michigan grain producer’s income shows more negative variation from the 
national average than competing Midwestern states.  They must differentiate in order to 
provide growth and profitability enough to survive against competition from these other states 
and from other uses for land within the state. 
       The Michigan grain producer is in the business of producing grains that provide for the  
needs of consumers.  By providing grains that are for more specific types of demand, the 
producers would be shifting their emphasis to markets that niches that will pay more for their 
specific needs.  The customers producers serve will become those that require production of 
more specific characteristics in grains.   
       The existence of the Michigan grain producer may well depend on finding ways to 
grow specialty grains for specific uses  to ensure survival. 
         
  The Vision 
  The vision for the Michigan grain producer is to coordinate grain marketing with the 
grain handlers and processors that can provide the expertise needed to market all of their 
grains, and in order to improve profitability and reduce revenue risk. This coordination will 
allow the producer to concentrate on growing generic and specialty crops more efficiently.  
The development of production of grains that can increase per acre revenues needs to be a 
growing part of the vision.  
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4.2.4.2 Strategic Objectives   
 
       The primary and long term objective for grain producers in Michigan is to become 
more profitable.  This objective can be attained by shorter term objectives that develop their 
willingness to grow different types of commodities, in marketing knowledge, and in 
continuing to find ways to increase production and decrease costs. 
       Grain producers in Michigan need to find ways to manage production costs and 
maximize yields because of the negative variability in revenue compared to the national 
average.  They need to continue to accept and implement new technology that will continue to 
improve productivity. 
       They need to be adaptable in their willingness to pursue new products that can bring 
the opportunity for better returns than other crops.  These products could be different grains, 
but are more likely to be new and specialized varieties of corn, beans and wheat for specific 
uses. 
    The development of  particular grains that can be grown only in Michigan would be 
ideal, but unlikely in a large volume.  But production of specialty grains for specific uses is 
already being done and can be expanded. 
       Grain producers must also accept new ideas and develop and implement solid 
strategies in marketing grain  More time spent on marketing will improve marketing 
knowledge and chances to increase revenue.  This objective can by achieved by the producer 
individually or by coordinating those efforts with a grain marketing company or an advisor. 
       Working alliances with grain companies to develop markets and facilities to handle a 
variety of specialty grains would help achieve the objective.  Along with working together on 
specialty grains, the grain companies can help producers in their marketing strategies.  The 
grain companies would benefit from alliances to help assure volume, as well as help the 
producer gain more income.    
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           Attainment of the long term objective of profitability through shorter term objectives 
can be measured by the revenue variability and production costs compared to other major 
grain producing states.  If net farm incomes in Michigan become closer to the national 
average, and the other states in the study, then the objectives are being attained.  The 
competitive position for Michigan grain producers compared other states and for other uses of 
the land will improve. 
 
4.2.4.3 Core Strategy Analysis 
 
  The core strategy analysis will consider current and suggest new approaches to 
customer value/competitive advantage, strategic initiative, strategic scope, industry role and 
vertical coordination in order to achieve producer performance goals.  These approaches are 
summarized at the end of this section.  
 
       Customer Value / Competitive Advantage  
  The current strategy is one of price/cost advantage, where Michigan producers try to 
keep up with other grain belt states in profitability, but there are too many disadvantages.  A 
new quality/features strategy would provide the grain market with a product that has the 
quality and quantity that can add value to the consumer’s supply and the producer’s 
profitability. 
       The value that Michigan grain producers can bring to the market is the ability to grow 
grains for specific uses (with special qualities).  Specific use grains would be those that would 
be certain varieties with certain qualities unique to Michigan.  This could be low acidity, low 
protein, low oil soybean varieties, shorter season specialty corn or wheat varieties that have 
qualities specific to Michigan for milling or export demand.  
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       By coordinating through the grain industry, the producer would be better able to 
assure an outlet for the grains and be more aware of the types of grains demanded.  Specific 
areas of demand for wheat would include special characteristic varieties for food uses by 
millers  and exporters.  Michigan grain works well by rail into the East and Southeastern U.S. 
for soybean processing and corn feed demand markets. 
      
       Strategic Initiative  
       Currently the producers in Michigan are in a maintain and defend strategy, but they are 
losing ground to competing U.S. producers and other low cost producers around the world.  
The main new initiative would be a strategy to reposition.  The reason that the customer 
value/competitive advantage strategy above is not to a niche market is that the producer 
should not change too much too fast, which could increase risk.   Maintaining current 
production will be important as the producers reposition, and a more specialized production 
capability takes place. They should try and enhance their production efficiency by applying 
their knowledge to produce more specialty grains that can enhance their competitive position. 
It will take some time to increase the grain producer’s market knowledge and coordinate 
marketing with the grain companies in order to add value to production, and also to find ways 
to decrease per unit costs through scale economies or risk reduction..   
       If  the loss of the number of medium sized family farms could be reduced and farm size 
could be maintained, the expansion of non-farm uses for land would diminish.        Part of 
defending grain farming is to reposition the types of grain grown.  If there are other grains 
that can net more income, they should be pursued as a part of the overall strategy.  
 
       Strategic scope  
       The single dominant products of generic corn, soybeans and wheat production need to 
be changed.  The new strategic scope of the plan is diversification.  The producer needs to 
expand opportunities for improved profitability and at the same time minimize threats from  
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producers in other states and from uses of land for other purposes.  This plan for 
diversification is into specific varieties of grains.  Production can be on a small quantity for 
very specific uses, or in larger quantities for more widespread uses.  The important 
consideration is that producers look for opportunities to grow grains that can increase 
profitability in order to be more competitive.    
 
       Industry role  
       With an adopter role currently in place, the Michigan grain producers are trying to 
incorporate what is successful elsewhere into Michigan, but it doesn’t work well because of 
the unique characteristics of the state.  The new industry role for producers should be one of 
the challenger, a smaller competition that innovates in products and markets.  The strategy is 
an innovative one due to the uniqueness of the production and cost structures in Michigan.  
The challenge will be to find ways to be innovative not only to better compete with other 
grain belt states for yield and quality of grains, but to find ways to develop production and 
markets for grains that will do well in Michigan. 
       If there are ways that Michigan can differentiate and grow grain varieties for markets 
that other states cannot or do not need to do, then perhaps the challenger role will be the best 
to bring more profitability.  It will allow flexibility by being able to supply products for 
markets that may not be able to acquire quantities needed in very many other growing areas.  
Grain producers that can develop production as a challenger may be able to pick up additional 
profits by developing grain products for particular markets before others . 
      
       Vertical coordination  
       The current weak vertical linkages need to be abandoned.  Producers need to 
coordinate vertically; to become more willing to look at options that can make them more 
profitable in this state.  Grain producers have been reluctant to give up their independence.  In 
the author’s experience, grain marketing has probably been the weakest knowledge base for  
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producers, and so has resulted in the greatest loss of potential revenue.  The producers will 
need to coordinate vertically either by marketing agreement, advisory agreement or by 
contract production. 
       Michigan grain producers need to be willing to accept help with grain marketing, risk 
management, market information, and farm management from a variety of sources.  Certainly, 
the Michigan State University Extension offices can help, but professional help from grain 
industry experts can also provide access to ideas and information that can help profitability. 
       The author’s experience shows there is a need for more intensified coordination 
between grain producers and grain industry representatives.  Part of the reason for limited 
contact on the part of the grain industry may be because of the different nature of marketing 
grain for producers versus what the grain industry looks at when marketing their own grain.  
Much of the margin in the grain industry is in storing the grain, blending and reselling it, not 
from the margin taken when buying from producers. 
       The grain producer is generally interested in maximizing the flat price of grain, while 
the grain industry is more interested in the basis. This is because the grain industry hedges 
most flat price purchases and sales.  By doing so, the basis (the difference between the 
Chicago Board Of Trade price and the price the grain was bought or sold locally).and spreads 
between futures months (carries are when future months are higher than nearby months and 
inverses are when future months are worth less than nearby months) are much more important 
to the grain industry bottom line. 
       The interest of the grain industry in flat prices has been mainly to anticipate flow from 
the producer, and to provide information for them in a weak attempt to gain or maintain 
market share.  Since the producer activity is so driven by price, which is based off the Chicago 
Board of Trade price, plus or minus those characteristics at each elevator depending on where 
the elevator is located and what transportation capabilities it has, the need for attempting to 
capture market share by using sales techniques has not been a high priority.   
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         Price analysts in the grain industry are generally separate from the core business of 
buying, selling and warehousing grain.  The expertise provided by this part of the industry is 
quite analytical, and too detailed for most producers. 
        As the grain producers in Michigan begin to find more ways to differentiate their crops 
and concentrate on the markets they can supply the best, they will need to work more closely 
with the grain industry to make that happen.  The coordination should allow Michigan 
producers to market grain at higher prices (compared to the national average) than they do 
now, reduce risk, have better access and understanding of market information and be better 
able to manage all of the aspects of the farm with their help. 
 
Figure 4-f 
Core Strategy Summary - Producers 
Core Strategy     Current   New 
Customer  Value/    Price/Cost   Quality/Features 
Competitive  Advantage   Advantage   Advantage 
 
Strategic  Initiative    Maintain     Reposition   
     a n d   D e f e n d  
   
Strategic Scope      Single/ Dominant  Diversification  
     P r o d u c t    
 
Industry  Role     Adopter   Challenger 
 
Vertical  Coordination    Little    More  
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4.3.4.4  Action Strategies      
       
  The action would be to first identify the weakest areas in the farm operation, and 
negotiate help in these areas.  The two areas that would be the most important to the strategy 
would be finding specialty grains with the most profit potential and then marketing those 
grains.  Developing an action strategy is accomplished by: 
  1) Attacking gaps between resource needs and existing resources.  In this case, finding 
help in deciding which specialty grains to grow and how to market them. 
  2) Directing resources/investments into priority projects.  Once the specialty grains are 
found that can be produced and marketed, the producer needs to spend time developing a plan 
to direct resources or capital into the project. 
  3) Preparing appropriate feasibility studies.  With help from the resources found, the 
producer can study the possible scenarios and their results that will help them decide on a 
course of action.   
  4) Create specific links to changes in daily operations.  Once the most acceptable 
project is decided upon, the producer will have to institute changes in the farming operation to 
accommodate the project and its projected results. If the weakest knowledge area is grain 
marketing, for example, the producers should concentrate on improving their knowledge base 
by spending time on marketing on a daily basis (Peterson - How to Alter or Select Strategy) 
       The need for knowledge, and the great number of areas of expertise required to 
operate large farms increases the need for help in attaining goals from outside sources.  There 
are three action options that could allow a grain producer to become vertically coordinated 
with the grain industry to help achieve their goals.  The fourth is an exit option. 
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       Option 1 - Market Advisory 
       If a producer already has a good understanding of grain marketing, which would 
include a solid understanding of basis, options, fundamental and technical futures price 
analysis as well as local market values, an advisor would be the best choice. 
       Market advisory services generally work for a fee either by bushel or by acre, and the 
producer may not be under an obligation to market the grain following the advisors advice. 
       Without a good understanding of the marketing concepts mentioned, the producer 
would not know whether the advice would be an idea that would work for that particular farm 
or not.  The producer may try a strategy that would not necessarily fit into the other aspects 
of the business (financial, operational), if marketing ability was below the strategy level.  The 
producer could end up losing because of lack of understanding. 
       The pros would be that the advisor could offer ideas that could be acted on that could 
allow more margin on grain sales.  The cons would be that the added expense of an advisory 
service may not make the farm any more revenue, and could increase costs not just for the 
service itself, but in trading losses that might not have occurred with a more conservative 
approach.  Also, unless the advisor had previous experience in specialty grains, they may not 
be able to help develop markets for new varieties. 
 
       Option 2 - Marketing Agreement 
       If a grain producer would agree to market a percent of the total production through a 
particular company, there would be an agreed margin and probably some other breaks in 
charges in return for the guaranteed volume. 
       This strategy may help add a few cents per bushel to the bottom line and could also 
allow the producer to see some new marketing alternatives and varieties that may not have 
been noticed before.  
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       The improved level of communication would be the biggest advantage in this case.  
The producer would be in more consistent contact with the grain marketer/elevator and would 
have a better chance of improving marketing knowledge. 
       The pros would be that by becoming closer to the grain company, future opportunities 
could arise that could help profitability.  More open communication might cause the two 
parties to form a more formal alliance that could further help each party.  A larger grain 
company would have more access to demand for special varieties of grains that could be 
integrated into the marketing plan. 
       The cons would be that unless the agreement was with a destination and company in a 
very limited competitive area, the opportunity for gaining information or selling to other 
companies that may have a better price from competitors would be eliminated.  It could cost 
more in lost opportunity than is gained in the terms of the agreement. 
 
       Option 3 - Contract Farming 
       In this situation, the producer agrees on a price for production, and leaves all of the 
marketing decisions to the grain firm. 
       Depending on the price per bushel, or per acre that is agreed upon, and other terms, 
the producer in this case may be able to lock in a level of revenue acceptable to the goals of 
the farm, eliminate a lot of the risk associated with marketing the grain, and then concentrate 
on improving the production side of the operation. 
       The most difficult part of this option is the negotiation for revenue with the grain 
company.  Assessing the potential of possible revenue scenarios, particularly if prices went up 
substantially would need to be considered.  The marketing ability and history of the prices 
received by producers versus an average might help determine the necessity or feasibility of 
such an agreement.  A formula for determining the average price or some percent of it would 
help determine the formula or price level needed.  
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       The pros of this option are that the farmer can concentrate on production, he has a 
guaranteed revenue, and he doesn’t have to been extremely knowledgeable about grain 
marketing. 
       The cons are that the farmer has less control, and could miss some income if the 
market goes up. 
        
  Option 4 - Hang on and Eventually Exit 
       If the producer continues on the current course, the trend of unprofitability will most 
likely continue. The 2002 farm bill may slow down the process due to the amount of aid 
given, but the overall trend of fewer, larger farms will continue. 
       For the producer under 1000 acres and more than 100, that means the chances of 
continuing in the long run are limited. 
       The producers that are over 1000 acres will have a better chance of survival due to 
economies of scale opportunities, but without a strategy, mistakes could be made that on a 
large scale operation can be very costly.   
      
       Option 2 is the most acceptable and workable for the producer.  The producer should 
work on developing strong relationships with those grain operations that will be able to serve 
the best combination of all needs in grain marketing.  There is a trust and cooperation that 
must be found with the companies that perform the marketing activities.  The producer and 
the firm must continue to work together and concentrate on developing communication that 
allows the producer to increase revenues.  
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4.2.4.5 Evaluation 
 
  These strategies need to be evaluated to compare results after observable changes have 
taken place.  Improved profitability will certainly be key.  The yield variances should be less, 
with producers concentrating on varieties that perform to higher standards in the Michigan 
climate.  Prices for production should improve as producers find special grains that can offer a 
higher price.  Revenues should increase and be more competitive with other grain belt states 
with the increase in price and less yield variations.  If producers can maintain current costs per 
bushel of production or find a way to lower the cost, they will have an improved chance to 
increase profitability.   
 
4.2.5  Recommendations and Conclusions 
 
       The overall recommendation to Michigan grain farmers is to look for and begin 
development of the production of a value added crop to specialize in and align with one of the 
grain companies for marketing grains and to lower risk. 
       These things can help a farm business concentrate on the most knowledgeable end of 
the business while delegating those areas that have the greatest risk to the long term success 
of the operation to those who have more expertise in those areas. 
      




       The previous section of this chapter provided a strategic analysis of the Michigan grain 
producer and what strategies could be planned to achieve the desired results. The study will 
now proceed to study sufficient elements of a strategic analysis and plan for the Michigan  
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grain handlers and processors that will allow insight into the real feasibility of the producers’ 
strategies just discussed.  Much of the background and other information used has been 
presented earlier in the study, and to reduce redundancy, is not reiterated in this section.  
However, the author feels it is useful to bring out these and some new perspectives from the 
viewpoint of the Michigan grain handler and processor, and that the format used in the 
analysis and plan for the producer is best suited to do this.  
  
4.3.2  Description of the Michigan Grain Industry 
 
     The grain that is raised in Michigan goes to many different final destinations.  It is used 
for many different products.  It is handled in many different ways.  But the majority of the 
grain raised goes from the farm to a grain elevator for further distribution.  If the elevator 
doesn’t handle it, they are most likely involved in arranging transportation, documentation, 
accounting and pricing of the grain in between the farm and the buyer. 
       The grain firms face challenges that are directly related to the producer because they 
depend on the producer selling volumes of grain for their survival.  There is a growing need to 
be able to maintain volume of grains, and in order to achieve that, they need to be able to help 
producers in the state improve profitability, and to be able to compete with markets outside 
the state in order to maintain volume, margins and profitability.   
  In addition to volume, the grain handlers and processors must work with producers to 
supply the quality of grains that the consumer market demands.  Up to this time it has been 
mainly generic USDA Number 2 yellow corn or USDA Number 1 yellow soybeans or USDA 
Number 2 Soft Red Wheat or Soft White Wheat.  But specialty crops and quality 
specifications from buyers, driven by consumers, are becoming more restrictive and important 
as a value added production alternative.  
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  They must work together to ensure the volume necessary, and the quality necessary to 
supply the end user customers with the grains they need.  The Michigan grain handler and 
processing industry needs to have a strategic plan to guide them through the changing 
dynamics of this time.  This section of the chapter will explore these aspects. 
        There are three main types of grain firms in Michigan.  The largest are the subterminals 
that can ship train load quantities (50 cars or more).  The second are the smaller elevators that 
ship by truck or smaller rail units (1 - 15 cars), but also may use grains for feed or can clean 
grain (along with edible beans) for special uses.  The third are those that process the grains 
into other products, such as crushing soybeans for meal and oil, or making corn into ethanol, 
or wheat into flour. 
       As indicated in the Industrial Organization analysis, the number of grain facilities in 
Michigan has decreased from 292 in 1996 to 250 in 2000.  The average storage capacity has 
increased from 500,000 bushels to 564,000 in that same time period (MASS-Mich Ag Stats 
2000-01).  There has also been a consolidation in the number of firms that operate grain 
facilities.  Larger firms are acquiring smaller firms and in the process are closing smaller 
unprofitable elevators.   
       The decrease in the number of firms and the number of elevators means that 
competition should have decreased and volume to the remaining elevators should have 
increased.  But this is not necessarily the case.  Counteracting the grain industry consolidation 
is the farm consolidation.  Some farms are becoming larger, and with that has come a greater 
ability for them to market grain direct to other users outside their local market.  Additional 
storage capacity on the farm and producers owning and operating their own tractor trailers 
has enabled them to ship more grain direct from the farm to markets in Canada, Toledo, Ohio 
or to processors in Indiana and Ohio.  
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       The grain industry in Michigan finds itself in a competitive situation with handlers and 
processors out of state that can, at times, pay a higher price than Michigan facilities due to 
their advantage in location, mostly due to transportation cost advantages. 
  The main concerns about maintaining grain volume for the Michigan grain handlers 
and processors are those of urbanization, the loss of medium sized farms either selling out to 
non agricultural uses or to large farms, and the possibility of increased specialization.  The 
number of medium sized farms is decreasing, which means land that may have continued to 
have been used for grain production may now be urbanized.  If sold for smaller plots, land 
formerly used for grain production may be used for lawns, pasture for horses or vegetables for 
local sales instead.  Consumer driven specialization into specific varieties of grains means that 
grain handlers and processors must address their ability to identity preserve such crops in 
handling systems that were mainly designed for generic grains. These issues tie the grain 
elevators directly to the strategic analysis and plans for Michigan grain producers. 
 
4.3.3  Strategic Analysis for Michigan Grain Handlers and Processors 
 
       In this section of the analysis, performance, competition, government programs and 
consumer driven specialization are characterized as key background conditions for the 
analysis. The strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of grain industry handlers and 
processors in Michigan are then discussed.   A strategic synthesis will also be outlined and all 
the parts will then be summarized. 
        
  Performance 
  The grain handling system provides a quick and efficient way to move grain through 
the channel from the farm.  Some of the elevator grain moves to end users, some goes to 
other terminals, some for export and some for processors.  
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       Location, speed, and low cost per unit handling are the keys to success in the grain 
business.  Facilities that are not able to take grain in and ship it out quickly and in great 
enough quantities will not be able to generate enough volume to keep costs per unit down.  
Those facilities will eventually be unable to operate profitably and will close.  The more cost 
efficient facilities will be able to pay more for grain, remain profitable, and take market share 
away. 
  The industry has been consolidating rapidly in the last 15 years in order to continue to 
find ways to cut costs and maintain margins.  There is little building of new facilities, mostly 
only a few places adding storage capacity to existing facilities. 
       Smaller companies that are not aligned with a major grain company in the state 
(including cooperatives) may not be able to compete in the long run.  Larger companies have 
the ability to supply the knowledge, markets and marketing alternatives that larger farmers 
will need.  Much more of the grain is now kept within the originating grain company itself or 
with companies they are aligned with.  Agreements, alliances, vertical coordination and 
integration are all part of a large company that makes it able to ensure supplies and outlets, 
and it reduces the amount of grain that has to be traded in the open market.  Smaller 
companies that have to operate without these marketing benefits probably cannot be as cost 
effective as the larger companies. 
   
  Competition  
  Competition for grain elevators in Michigan comes from livestock growers, the 
Canadian market by truck, the Toledo, Ohio market, and millers and processors inside 
Michigan and in Northern Indiana and Ohio.  Most of the rest of the grain is handled by a 
grain elevator in Michigan before moving on to another more distant market.                
       Livestock producers often buy additional feed needs direct from grain producers.  
They can purchase this grain right from the field before it can get blended with other damage 
and foreign material at the elevator.  They can buy the grain with moisture to feed immediately  
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or to put in harvestores for later use.  This allows grain farmers who may have wet corn out of 
the field to sell it and avoid the cost of drying and storing, or at less of a discount than the 
elevators would charge.  Feed consumption of corn in Michigan is approximately 80 million 
bushels, which is about one third of the annual production (Proexporter). 
       The Canadian market offers farmers an outlet by truck off the farm that is many times 
a higher value fob the farm than the elevators can pay.  Trucks run sugarbeets, wheat and 
soybean meal to Michigan from Canada and are able to give reduced backhaul rates.  There 
are several markets available in Canada for corn and soybeans.   
       The Toledo, Ohio market offers higher prices because of their ability to load lakes 
vessels.  These values can be as much as 20 cents a bushel higher than rail values for corn.  
Boats are not loaded in the November to March period due to ice on the lakes, but this area 
has a large storage capacity, and so can buy grain to fill space until the lakes open for 
navigation again in the spring. 
       There are several soybean processing plants in Northern Indiana and Ohio that sell 
soybean meal into Michigan and, like Canada, the trucks are looking for backhauls .  These 
markets are not usually competitive until the summer months when soybeans in storage are 
more difficult to locate in their normal draw areas. 
       Competition inside Michigan for the use of the land is urbanization and diversification 
into other agricultural production such as vegetables, sugarbeets, and edible beans. This 
competition is based off of returns for other uses than for grain production. 
 
  Government Programs 
  Government programs have helped keep more producers in business, which has helped 
grain handlers and processor maintain more volume.  These programs directly effect the 
profitability of producers.  They have worked to allow marginal producers the chance to 
continue to farm.  Without the government assistance, low prices and rising costs would have 
meant that some farms would have discontinued operations, and more elevators to be closed.  
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       Government subsidies for grain producers have supplied more than 50% of the income 
for some producers over the last several years (Table-7).  The new 2002 farm bill is even 
larger than the 1996 bill (Young), and so will continue to be an important part of the reason 
grain farming continues with less change than it would without the bill. 
        
  Consumer Driven Specialization 
  While standard grain has moved through the system smoothly for years and still will, 
the changes in the organization of farms and variety of crops grown is changing the grain 
industry.   
  Trends toward health consciousness concerning foods will add pressure to grain 
producers to consider raising specialty crops.  Non-genetically modified (gmo) crops can 
provide an additional 2 -10% in price.  If the trend toward demand for these products 
increases, a balance between non-gmo and gmo crops should establish itself as premiums for 
non-gmo crops increase.  Up to now, the convenience and reduced costs of gmo grain 
production have amounted to more than the non-gmo premium. The premium offered for 
these crops can be especially important as a strategy as a niche market to supplement revenue 
in Michigan.  Elevators will need to begin to adapt to this change in trend by updating 
facilities to handle these identity preserved crops on order to increase market share, especially 
if premiums increase. 
  
4.3.3.1 Strategic Strengths of the Michigan Grain Industry 
  
  By recognizing what its strengths are, the grain industry leaders can act to make 
changes that enhance their position. The strengths of the system need to continue to be the 
backbone of the industry. 
  One of the strengths of Michigan handlers and processors is the ability to determine 
prices easily.  The price setting system for the grain business is based off the Chicago Board of  
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Trade futures contract prices with differentials back to any location, just as it can be done 
anywhere in the world.  The differential (or basis) changes, but much less often than the 
futures prices.  All a producer other marketer needs to know is the basis, and it can determine 
the price at any location anywhere based off the futures price.  It is a quick, efficient and fair 
way to price grain.  The flow of price information is quick, accurate and available to the world 
instantly as the trade takes place in Chicago. 
       Another strength for grain handlers and processors is the amount of storage available.  
Grain elevators are built to take grain in, store it, blend it, dry it and load it back out.  The 
consolidation of companies has caused the least efficient facilities to gradually close, any many 
times these are the elevators with less storage capability.  The ability of an elevator to store 
grain in the fall has been vital to the business.  In the past there has not been enough storage 
on the farm to store all of the crops at harvest.  The elevator has provided an outlet for the 
excess grain at harvest, and a way to allocate supply to the rest of the food and feed industries 
for the rest of the year.  Usually, the market will pay more for grain it needs later in the year 
(called carry) and this pays for the elevators to hold the grain over the time needed.   
       Another strength of the grain handlers and processors is their expertise in 
transportation.  Grain handlers and processors are handlers of grain in more ways than just 
accepting grain into the facility and loading it out.  Many of the companies also own or lease 
transportation equipment (such as rail cars), which can be a significant help to producers when 
crops are large.  The expertise of the grain handlers and processors in transportation helps 
move the grain through the system by truck, rail, barge and vessel.  The grain handlers and 
processors have provided a link in the transportation system to move the grain to markets 
down the chain quickly and in larger quantities than the producers can individually.  The 
ability of some facilities to ship by boats or in 50 or more car trains to markets down the chain 
has allowed them more margin for the competitive advantage.    
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       Grain handlers and processors provide a strength in the market information they 
provide.  The handlers and processors have been a place where producers can turn for 
information about the markets.  They typically have many sources of information and can 
provide insight into marketing decisions.  They typically offer several marketing alternatives 
for producers such as forward contracting, pricing orders, price later agreements, basis 
contracts and warehouse receipts.  This information about the grain markets, accumulated in 
one place, with local people has been a help to the producers as they market their grain during 
the year. 
       The accounting and record keeping that handlers and processors provide is a strength 
in that it is an essential part of running the business, and can be a service for records and 
information concerning crops for producers.  Bushels marketed, dollars paid, and price 
histories can all help producers during and after marketing their grain. 
 
4.3.3.2 Strategic Weaknesses of the Michigan Grain Industry 
 
       Weaknesses of the grain handling and processing industry need to be addressed in 
order to meet changes, adapt and move ahead.   
  Grain handlers in particular have a weakness in that many of the facilities are becoming 
outdated.  Most grain elevators in the state were built more than 20 years ago, and many are 
30-50 years old.  Many of the oldest and least efficient facilities have been closed.  This has 
meant that the remaining facilities are more efficient,  in that the ones that are still open are 
built to handle larger quantities of grain in a short period of time.  While this is still good at 
harvest time, the changes in farming toward specialty grains is turning even these abilities into 
a weaknesses.  It is more difficult for some of these more modern facilities to segregate grain, 
keep it identity preserved or to handle very many different types of commodities at a time.  
This inability to adapt to the trend toward specialty crops is slowing down the development  
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that the producers of this state need in order to increase net income.  In order for producers to 
increase their specialty crop production, they are forced to store these commodities at home.  
It is also forcing more direct marketing of grains from farm storage to user markets and 
bypassing the local elevators.  The elevator is being forced to change the way it accepts grain 
or to spend money on assets in order to capture a larger share of this market. 
  Another weakness is associated with the consolidation and centralization of 
knowledge in the grain companies to the home office.  As the grain industry has consolidated, 
the companies that are left are likely to be larger companies, with more decisions being made 
in a corporate office away from the local elevator.  Part of the reason for the consolidation is 
to decrease costs at the individual facilities.  Since labor is the highest cost item, most 
companies are trying to do more volume with less people, and automate as much as they can.  
Unfortunately the personnel at the elevators have less time and are probably not as 
experienced as they have been in the past.  While this does save costs, it is a detriment in the 
kind of market that is developing in Michigan.  This will only help drive the large producer to 
store more of the grain on the farm and find ways to market the grain to markets further away.  
The grain companies need to develop more personal business relationships with the larger 
producers.  They should be spending more time on supplying information and help in more 
aspects of marketing, particularly with the larger producers.  Instead, the grain industry has 
been focused on cutting back on costs, which has been necessary to maintain margins. 
   A weakness of the larger grain terminals is that they are designed and located to ship 
by trainload, but may be ill equipped to compete in truck or specialty markets.  More 
processing capacity in Michigan, such as the Zeeland soybean processing plant and the Caro 
ethanol plant makes it easier for producers to sell direct to local markets due to their 
proximity.  Local markets take away from one advantage that an elevator has over a producer 
when the best markets are beyond effective trucking distance.  Larger producers may be able  
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to load trucks as fast as some elevators. This again stresses the need for the grain industry to 
increase service to handle these local truck and export markets for producers.   
   
4.3.3.3 Strategic Opportunities for the Michigan Grain Industry 
 
       Opportunities for grain companies still exist in their abilities to blend, store and gather 
grain for shipments in larger quantities or to ship to specialty market destinations that are 
impractical for producers to ship to.  They won’t need to add storage in most cases because of 
the increase in the amount of farm storage, but it will be an advantage to be on a main line 
railroad where there is access to shipments of grain out in large quantities in a short period of 
time, and be able to dump grain into the facility quickly also. 
       The ability to provide the quality and quantity of specialty grains is an opportunity for 
grain handlers and processors to provide producers a market they cannot access on their own.  
To capture this opportunity, asset dollars for improvements as a whole, for companies and 
locations that are already in a competitive position, should be spent first on improving the 
ability of the facility to handle more specialty grains.  This would include equipment to ensure 
or enhance quality and identity preservation of the grain.  If the strategy for producers is to 
increase their production of specialty grains, then the elevators are going to need to be able to 
handle it. 
       The trend toward larger farms will also mean more need for services.  Not only should 
the elevator be able to handle grain, but the staff should have the capability to provide 
assistance in many different areas.  This will include grain marketing alternatives, market 
information, education about marketing, and possibly financial, banking, credit and other 
services that producers now go other places to obtain.  
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4.3.3.4 Strategic Threats for the Michigan Grain Industry 
 
       Volume is key to the grain business, so the greatest threats to the business will come 
from less grain being grown.  Factors such as land lost to urbanization, competition from 
other crops such as vegetables, beets, and edible beans, and government set aside programs 
are the biggest threats. 
       For smaller grain companies, competing on a cost per unit level with large grain 
companies will represent a big challenge.  If volume decreases, and the available markets are 
reduced due to consolidation, smaller companies will need to concentrate more fully on 
services and special needs of those customers in close proximity to try and hold on to market 
share. 
       The ability of larger farmers to ship directly from the farm to end user markets and 
bypass local elevators is a threat to the grain industry in Michigan too.  The threat of grain 
being shipped from the farm into Canada, Toledo or to processors in Indiana and Ohio direct, 
could develop into a larger problem.  This could also effect volume if the grain producers raise 
more specialty crops and ship those direct also.  If grain handlers elsewhere are better 
prepared to handle all aspects of growing and handling specialty grains and the industry in 
Michigan cannot keep up, business could be lost. 
 
4.3.3.5 Summary of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats 
 
  The grain handling and processing industry is well organized and provides prices, 
information, storage and arranges transportation for much of the grain in the state. 
  The grain handling firms will need to enhance their local facilities to better handle 
specialty grains.  As farms and farming operation become larger businesses, the grain handlers 
and processors will need to improve their personnel at the facilities by decentralizing.  As  
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markets become more domestic oriented, and more local, the rail shipping advantage may 
become less apparent. 
  The opportunities for grain handlers and processors are in supplying producers with 
storage, both generic and specialty markets, both out of state and off the farm, and to provide 
increased services for producers.  If grain handlers can not find ways to help producers 
become more profitable, then their volume and profitability may decrease. 
 
Figure 4-g 
SWOT Summary Table for the Grain Industry 
 
Strengths       Weaknesses 
Well understood pricing structure      Outdated facilities 
Available  storage  space     Centralized  knowledge/decisions 
Logistical  expertise      Facilities  unadaptable  to  specialties   
Market  information       
Accounting and record keeping 
 
Opportunities     Threats 
Blending,  storage,  shipping     Decreasing  volume 
Specialty grain origination        Small companies uncompetitive 
Providing increased service needs      Larger producers shipping direct  
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4.3.3.6 Strategic Issues Analysis  
 
       Core Competencies  
  The core competency of the grain industry in Michigan is that it provides a place for 
grain to be stored and marketed for farmers, and also provides a residual supply for the user 
markets during the year.  The elevators also provide grain market information, accounting 
information and grain market knowledge to the local community.  Part of this competency for 
handlers is the location, speed and low cost per unit 
handling of the commodities.  The logistical capabilities of the handlers are also an important 
competency that helps move grain from the farm around the world. 
        
  Competitive Advantages  
  The grain industry in Michigan is knowledgeable about agriculture, and in particular, 
grain markets, in their local areas and have personal contact with their producers.  The close 
proximity to the farms can provide an outlet for farm grain quickly at times when larger 
production requires it.  They have the opportunity to communicate with customers on a one 
on one basis, as opposed to companies that may be out of state. 
Michigan grain handlers also perform accounting functions that are important to local 
producers, who need checks for grain and business information on a personal and timely basis. 
 
  Scenarios for the Future of Michigan Grain Firms 
  The issues that will be affecting the grain industry in Michigan are different depending 
on which of the following scenarios develops. 
       Scenario One - Government programs provide a safety net that is adequate for 
survival for producers until the time that grain prices recover and profitability returns. Higher 
grain prices could be led by a worldwide demand for food at some point in the future.  There 
have been such concerns in the early 1970’s and in the mid 1980’s.  In this scenario, the  
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producers are not forced to alter their current crops or methods of marketing in order to stay 
in business.  The 2002 farm bill could allow marginal producers (60 - 1000 acres) to remain 
marginally profitable until grain prices recover.  If yields don’t continue to increase on the 
same level as the past 15 years, and usage increases at a faster rate, prices will go up in order 
to allocate supplies.  If the average cost of production for a marginal Michigan corn producer 
increases slowly, and the average price increases more quickly, then these producers, as well 
as the larger producer will have a better chance of being profitable in the short term, and could 
continue to farm until the safety net is no longer provided. This is not an acceptable long term 
scenario that is considered for the producer because it depends on the government, and does 
not develop a strategy for the producers to accomplish profit goals on their own.  In this 
scenario, however, the grain industry will not be forced to look for alternatives such as 
specialties, services or better transportation alternatives to maintain most of its market share.  
It may not be in position to change its strategies at a later date in time to adapt to the needs of 
the increased size of producers. In this scenario, the smaller companies eventually lose market 
share, but at a slower rate. 
       Scenario Two - A rapid decline in grain production acres occurs in Michigan, as 
urbanization, other crop alternatives not conducive to Michigan agriculture and low net 
farming income force more medium sized producers out of business.  The elevators that 
cannot access the volume necessary to control costs on a per unit basis are forced to close or 
sell out.  This forces the grain that is produced to be marketed only to those elevators that 
have a market advantage due to size, speed and transportation advantages. These few 
elevators might actually gain some volume when rail markets are strong.  In this scenario, 
large farms acquire some of the smaller farms and with it, more storage facilities.  Some could 
even purchase smaller grain elevators to use as their own for storage and shipping points.  
These large producers become big enough to hire professional people to market their grain 
and work on marketing alternatives with them.  The large farms actually become competitors  
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with the larger elevators for sales markets when truck market values are close to rail values.  
As the system for marketing from these large farms develops, the elevators lose volume, 
reduce asset expenditures including repair, and run as residual handlers of grain when rail 
values are strong or when production requires outlets for grain at harvest beyond usual 
capacities.  Less volume will force profitability down because of the fixed costs expenses, that 
cannot be reduced.  This scenario could lead to the industry exiting the state altogether. 
       Scenario Three - The user markets that develop the quickest are in areas that are not 
within a reasonable trucking distance of Michigan .  The elevators have an advantage by 
having the ability to handle and ship rail units in quantities that producers don’t have the 
ability to do.  In this scenario, rail would be able to compete with other modes of 
transportation such as trucks and vessels.  The poultry and hog markets in the Southeast have 
provided a large market for corn.  If that expansion continues, grain elevators on main rail 
lines would benefit from the demand.  The users would need a supply of corn from the Eastern 
corn belt all year round, and the demand would create values for Michigan corn that could 
compete with local livestock, Canadian and Toledo markets. 
       Scenario Four - Trend yields continue to increase, and production of grains in 
Michigan and other states grows fast enough, with prices that are high enough to make 
producers more profitable. Higher yields will increase production enough to counteract the 
decreases in acres from urbanization.  Competing markets don’t have to reach as far into 
Michigan to buy grain.  The handlers could keep volumes from declining even with less 
farmers and less acres.  This scenario is longer term and does not account for the possibility of 
natural disasters (such as drought) year to year. 
       Scenario Five- The grain industry is proactive in increasing services for producers in 
marketing alternatives, marketing programs such as perhaps contract farming, and other non-
traditional services such as banking, insurance or financial services, and they use these services 
to supplement their net income.  In this scenario, they would be drawing closer to their  
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customer base, which could allow them even greater market shares.  The larger grain 
companies would be most likely to have the capabilities to set up and operate these programs.  
The less innovative grain handlers lose market share to those that are more service oriented. 
  In summary, these five scenarios suggest in the real possibility that the trend of 
decreasing numbers of farms and the growth in size of grain producers continues, the grain 
facilities that have the advantage of loading larger train lots to more distant markets, and those 
that develop services for producers in marketing alternatives will have a better chance of 
surviving.  Those facilities that do not move toward this end will have a tougher time 
remaining profitable in the long term.  
 
       The Change Grid 
  The grain handlers and processors are in a stronger position than the producers, mainly 
due to consolidation and their ability to cut costs.  They need to make some changes in their 
facilities and improve personal contact with the larger producers.  The grain handlers and 
processors are also not as threatened as the producer, although the opportunities are limited if 
the volume of grain production in the state decreases.  The grid  
in figure 4-e illustrates this.  
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     F i g u r e   4 - h  
    The  Industry  Change  Grid 
 





  Critical issues 
       The critical issues are those that will affect total profitability of the grain elevators the 
most.  Those are volume, margins (sales value minus fixed and variable costs) and operational 
capabilities. 
       The grain industry needs to work to try and perform the grain marketing functions in a 
way that can maintain or increase volume of crops handled through their facilities.  Price and 
service are the keys to this effort. 
       The sales market price (basis) generated by consumer demand for grain products will 
supply the grain industry with incentives to improve margins in areas that will enhance volume 
and operational capabilities.  The industry needs to recognize these opportunities and 
concentrate on supplying quality grain in quantities demanded by their best sales market 
alternatives.  They need to work on maintaining sales market share as well as producer market 
share.  Working with a strategic plan through analysis of opportunities and reevaluating 
should provide chances to capture market share by being a step ahead of the competition. 
       Without operational capabilities to handle the flow of grain quickly both in and out, 
elevators will lose marketing advantages.  Elevators that can dump grain quickly can buy more  
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grain at harvest time when the margins are the greatest.  There are incentives offered by the 
railroads for loading quickly, and advantages in making future sales if loading trains can be 
done in a short period of time.  Being able to maintain quality (don’t create any quality 
problems) blend grain efficiently and dry it economically are all capabilities that offer 
additional margins.  Grain facilities that can capture another 3 -4 cents per bushel of income 
through efficient operations will have a better chance of being able to pay more, and that 
should translate into more market share. 
    
4.3.4  Strategic Plan for the Michigan Grain Industry 
 
  Introduction 
       The grain industry in Michigan needs to take the analysis as has been discussed and 
apply it to a plan that will enhance volume by addressing issues with grain producers.  They 
need to do this along with concentrating on creating as many operational efficiencies as 
possible.   
       Management needs to spend time analyzing the situation and acting in a manner that is 
positive and reinforcing to the plan.  That may take adjustments in cost from one area of the 
operation to another, for instance an increase in employee costs in order to bring marketing 
expertise to the local level while automating as many processes in operations as possible in 
order to cut other operational costs. 
       With that frame of mind, the strategic plan can be developed, implemented and 
evaluated.  The trade-offs between expenses and potential revenue enhancing strategies need 
to be considered.  The analysis can direct the development of the plan.  
 
   170
4.3.4.1 Michigan Grain Industry Strategic Mission/Vision 
 
  A mission statement for a Michigan grain handler or processor might read as follows:  
“To serve grain producers by offering a bundle of services that will provide price, knowledge, 
service products and marketing alternatives that will enhance the profitability of producers, 
and in turn increase volume and margins for handling and processing that will allow firms to 
achieve facility and company goal return to asset ratios.” 
       The changes in the grain industry as well as the farming trends are acting to change the 
way that grain business has been done in the past.  To be able to adjust to these changes, the 
grain industry needs to shift its mission and vision from a commodity orientation to a service 
and specialty grain orientation, and needs to coordinate more closely with the producer. 
       The grain business in the past has been mostly price oriented and competition for local 
production was between handlers that were closer together than they are now.  The farmer 
would haul his grain in a farm truck to the nearest two or three elevators at harvest, choosing 
the one that had the best bundle of services, which included price as the main determinant. 
       Price is still important, but the changes that have taken place with larger farms are that 
the producer has more storage on the farm and doesn’t have to haul as much in the fall to the 
elevator.  They can keep more of it on the farm, and sell it later in the year.  They also have 
greater transportation capabilities than they used to have, driving their own tractor-trailer over 
longer distances during the marketing year to attain the best price. 
       The Michigan grain firm must change its ways of originating this grain to adapt to the 
changes that have taken place.  They need to offer additional services to give producers the 
bundle of services they need to increase profits. 
       Working to increase marketing skills beyond just finding the best price is one service.  
Producers need help with increasing marketing knowledge, and they might feel more 
comfortable gaining that knowledge at the closest handling facility.  
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       Looking for ways to help farmers increase profitability by handling specialty grains 
could also be important.  The controls that are necessary in growing some identity preserved 
crops may be able to be done better locally. 
       To maintain volume and help producers reduce risk and ensure revenue, contract 
farming could be offered.  By offering a revenue guarantee per acre, the producer can spend 
more time dealing with production, government and other issues of importance. 
       To incorporate those aspects into a mission/vision statement would help a Michigan 
grain firm concentrate on those aspects that would help grain producers and themselves be 
profitable.     
 
4.3.4.2 Strategic Objectives 
 
      The strategic objectives for grain handlers are to maintain volume, keep costs down 
and maintain or increase revenues for long term profitability. 
       The grain handlers and processors need to maintain volume to be profitable.  The grain 
industry typically has run on low margins and high volume to be profitable.  Without volume 
of grain, it is difficult to keep fixed costs in cents per bushel down.  A rule of thumb is that 
storage elevators need to fill and empty their rated bushel capacity at least twice a year in 
order to be profitable.  The author’s experience is that fixed costs need to be at 15 cents per 
bushel or less, and variable costs at five cents per bushel or less to be at least break-even.  The 
market in Michigan doesn’t allow much more margin than that to be competitive. 
       If an elevator can not offer competitive prices, then it is difficult to maintain market 
share and subsequent volume at a high enough level to keep costs below these maximum 
levels. 
       There are tools other than price to increase volume also, such as service, specialty 
grains, marketing programs, promotions, etc., but price is the main factor.   
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       The objective is for management to understand all of these aspects of the facility and 
to bid for grain as aggressively as possible to find the level where marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost.  Finding the correct amount of volume to make this formula work is the key to 
profitability. 
  Part of the cost of operating a grain facility depends on the size of the facility, the 
book value and market value, its operating capabilities (speed of unloading and loading out), 
how much carry (a higher value in the future) there is in the market, competition in the area, 
competitive advantages such as main line rail loading ability, automation (to keep labor costs 
down) and many other smaller factors.  All of these things must be managed and considered in 
the price paid for the grain and to determine at what price to sell the grain. 
       Keeping costs down as low as possible has been a major thrust by grain companies to 
try and maintain margins versus trying to find innovative ways to increase revenues.  The 
consolidation that has taken place has reduced administrative, data processing, operational 
compliance (including OSHA standards monitoring and implementation), and expertise 
required in merchandising, logistics and accounting.  By managing several facilities, the cost 
per facility and per bushel for each of these functions is reduced. 
       By reducing costs, facilities can keep from increasing margins, which allows them to 
buy grain at more competitive prices and increase volume.  As already discussed, volume is 
critical to the overall profitability.  Controlling costs is important in keeping the facilities 
profitable.  If volume is increased, but costs per unit also increase, the net result could be a net 
loss. 
       Increasing volume and controlling costs can help achieve profitability goals, but a 
strategic objective for long term profitability must also include ways to increase revenues. 
       In storage facilities, part of the revenue is a calculation of maximizing the carry in the 
market.  This means being able to buy grain at the lowest possible basis (usually in the fall)  
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and holding the grain until either the chances for spoilage is too great or the basis is at its 
highest point.  This is usually in the April - July time period. 
       Another part of the revenue stream is the grain that is handled after the elevator is full.  
This grain must be purchased and then sold and shipped in a shorter period of time.  This 
margin usually covers only part of the average fixed and variable costs.   The grain that is 
stored over a longer period of time makes up the rest of the average fixed and  variable costs. 
       Also part of the revenue stream are charges for storage, drying and other services the 
handler may offer.  Diversification can offer additional revenues also, but must be weighed 
against costs.  For instance, handling specialty grains may increase volume, and the margins 
may be higher than for generic grains, but the costs associated with documentation, labor, 
operational requirements, and testing may be so high that the returns are inconsequential.  
Each new undertaking must be considered for its effect on net income.  What may appear to 
be a lucrative diversification may end up costing more than the revenue it generates. 
       Long term profitability is a daily consideration for the management of the grain facility 
as well as the centralized company office.  In Michigan, volume considerations may cause the 
most concern.  If total production continues to decrease, those operations that can not control 
costs and buy and sell the grain with adequate margin will have the most difficult time 
surviving in the long term.  
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4.3.4.3 Core Strategy Analysis 
 
  This section will analyze the components of the core strategy, describing the current 
strategy and the recommended strategy for the grain industry in Michigan.  A summary 
reference is illustrated at the end of the section.      
 
  Customer Value / Competitive Advantage  
       The current strategy of price/cost advantage has not allowed the grain industry in 
Michigan to grow.  Decreasing numbers of elevators tell the analyst that the usefulness and 
profitability of some facilities is inadequate for customer needs and company viability. 
       In order to create customer value and competitive advantage, the grain industry will 
need to shift to a quality/features strategy.  The quality/features advantage will be dominant in 
that it can help increase volume by providing services that other companies both in state and 
out of state may not or cannot offer.  These are the marketing programs, contract alternatives, 
financial programs, marketing knowledge and accounting capabilities that can separate a 
company into an advantageous position of respect in their trade area. 
       Grain companies can choose to concentrate on a niche commodity as an advantage.  
This would be the ability to handle specialized commodities that others in and out of the state 
choose not to concentrate on.  This shift in strategy is necessary in order to improve producer 
profitability.    
             
       Strategic Initiatives  
       The grain industry in Michigan is in a position where it should look at a strategy of 
growth, which will be needed to increase market share.  The current strategy of retrenching 
has resulted in less elevators and stagnant volume, and the grain firms must recognize this in 
order to move forward.  
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       Growth in services, marketing and contract alternatives or other innovative ideas can 
increase market penetration by acquiring new customers interested in new services or special 
commodities in order to maintain the amount of volume they currently have. 
       This new growth will help gain customers while the loss of medium sized farms 
continues.  Repositioning with the current customer base may help maintain market share of 
existing customers, but growth is more far reaching, expanding market share by gaining new 
customers.  
 
       Strategic Scope 
       Currently the scope of the business is a single/dominant product which is basically 
handling the generic grades of grain.   The grain industry will need to adopt a diversification 
strategy in order to gain competitive advantages over other grain belt producing states.  They 
would remain in the grain handling business, but look for expanded opportunities in areas such 
as specialty grains adding associated services such as banking or grain futures brokerage, or 
by looking for acquisitions or partnerships in other parts of the state that could reduce the risk 
of weather reducing volume.       
 
       Industry Role 
       The grain companies in Michigan will need to remain the leaders.  The most profitable 
companies will be those that have the capabilities to advance new ideas and initiate them into 
their facilities.  The larger companies will have the knowledge and resources to start new 
strategies and give them time to work, but medium sized companies may also be leaders in 
innovative methods to increase volume.  The handlers need to lead the changes in grain 
marketing and handling that will increase the chances for producers to be more profitable.     
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  Vertical Coordination 
        More vertical coordination with the producers could create an assured supply of grain 
for the grain companies.  An agreement where the producer receives a price per acre for 
production guaranteed to the grain firm might be one solution.  A contract such as this  would 
act to eliminate much of the risk of income for producers aside from the government 
payments.  Vertical coordination and integration down the chain to end users such as livestock 
or food manufacturers and for export can help by having consistent outlets for grain and by 
reducing transaction costs as the grain moves down the chain. 
       More handler control in contracting grain could be less involved form of vertical 
coordination than acre contracts.  By forming marketing agreements or by a closer 
relationship with larger producers, the handlers can move more gradually toward contract 
production.  The need for a closer relationship would be advantageous for grain handlers and 
producers so that they can find ways to work together and to align vertically.   
       The Michigan grain industry is going to be more successful if they can source 
competitive sales markets and provide expertise in marketing and/or origination programs by 
being aligned with national and international organizations.  The volume and expertise in 
Michigan alone will not be enough to compete with larger states. 
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Figure 4-i 
Core Strategy Summary - Grain Industry 
Core Strategy     Current   New 
Customer  Value/    Price/Cost   Quality/Features 
Competitive  Advantage   Advantage   Advantage 
 
Strategic  Initiative    Retrench   Grow   
        
Strategic Scope      Single/ Dominant  Diversification  
     P r o d u c t    
 
Industry  Role     Leader    Leader 
 
Vertical  Coordination    Little    More 
 
4.3.4.4 Action Strategies 
 
       The grain handlers and processors in Michigan are going to need to be more proactive 
and innovative in developing new alternatives for producers to market grain in order to 
maintain volume.  The nature of the business in Michigan will require an extra effort to 
develop strategies that bring the companies closer to the producers. 
       The primary actions that may be taken are to contract acres for production, provide 
marketing alternatives that encourage producers to market all of their production through the 
company, develop specialty grain markets so that producers can increase margins, and 
developing programs that provide innovative services in the financial or farm advisory areas.  
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       The pros of this strategy are that they bring the grain companies closer to the 
producers.  This vertical coordination will be key in keeping market share and volume while 
the grain production as a whole is decreasing. 
       It will also diversify the income base, which would enable the elevators (companies) to 
concentrate on the most profitable areas of their operation depending on the year. 
       The cons of this multi-tasked strategy are that the expertise required to do all of these 
strategies at once may not be feasible for all companies.  It will most likely lead to more 
concentration, particularly if the strategy is successful.  The knowledge and financial capability 
required for this strategy means that the firm must have personnel that can organize and 
implement these programs. 
       There will be costs involved in these programs as well as risk.  The firms that 
implement this strategy will need to carefully consider which strategy will be most important, 
and concentrate on them in order of anticipated net profit results and future opportunity and 
value.  If  projections show that profits are feasible only longer term, with short term start up 
costs above revenue, they may have to be implemented in stages versus a short period of time. 
 
4.3.4.5   Evaluation 
 
       The goal for the grain handlers and processors is a multi-faceted strategy to improve 
profitability.  This will be accomplished by increasing volume, at a profitable margin, by 
controlling costs and capturing revenue. 
       A record of the performance of the main product lines would be set up as follows for 
each program 
  1) generic grain 
  2) specialty grains 
  3) other services  
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       For each program, records of bushel volume by commodity, revenue by commodity, 
and cost by commodity, which includes drying, discounts, contract costs, and total costs/total 
bushels to get the per unit costs will be necessary. 
       In general terms, the business should be evaluated using ratio analysis in addition to 
total profitability.  Return to assets, total net income, and market share should also be 
monitored to be able to observe changes in overall results due to the strategies that are 
implemented. 
       The results should be analyzed and used to evaluate the overall operation as well as 
each individual program. 
 
4.3.5  Summary and Conclusions 
 
       Understanding the environment that the Michigan grain industry finds itself helps in 
putting together a plan to maximize business opportunities. 
       Agricultural land in Michigan is decreasing, and lack of production income in grain 
farming is limiting the potential for future growth.  It may be that grain production in 
Michigan has peaked. 
       In order for the grain industry to make acceptable income levels, some changes will 
need to be made in their current marketing strategy. 
       Increased vertical coordination with large grain producers would help handlers ensure 
volume.  Recognition and actions to increase the amount of specialty grains handled would 
help diversify horizontally, and could help both producers and the elevators gain extra 
revenues and income.  Handlers need to offer more services to provide more reasons for a 
producers to do business with them.  A bundle of services could offer convenience and 
expertise in several key aspects of farming as an independent business.  
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       In order for these changes in strategy to be implemented and then be successful, 
management of the companies must understand the importance of the need to shift focus.  The 
strategies must be further analyzed so that the refined final version of the plan is workable.  It 
should offer a good chance for long term success and it needs to be profitable. 
       After the strategies have been implemented, they should be evaluated and refined to 
increase total effectiveness. 
       The final result of analyzing and implementing a strategic plan should mean that the 
handlers and processors have successfully made changes that have increased profitability for 
producers and themselves.  
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Chapter Five 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
       This chapter serves to summarize the study.  It brings together the formal Industrial 
Organization and Strategic Management analysis with the author’s experience in the grain 
industry.  As stated in chapter one, consistent problems and consistent recommended solutions 
between the organizational and strategic studies mean that the solutions should be applicable 
and successful.  The study abbreviated some aspects of each study to avoid redundancy.  As it 
turns out, similarities between the two studies are more than a result of how they are 
organized.  Organization and strategy are intertwined because the structure, conduct and 
performance of the market affects how firms can fit their strategies into the structure, how 
other firms may react to the strategies and what performance results might be expected in a 
market with the changes that may be implemented by a firm. 
       The conclusions and opinions expressed are a combination of the economic analysis 
with the author’s interpretation of how the economic conditions will lead to a practical 
outcome.  As stated in the problem statements and methods in chapter one, the goal of this 
research is that this study can bring together practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge in 
a way that is practical in its applications and sound in its economic conclusions. 
 
5.1  Summary of the Industrial Organization Analysis 
 
       In the Industrial Organization analysis, the grain industry, first nationally and then 
specifically for Michigan, were studied.  The effects of the organization of the grain industry 
on grain producers was then discussed. 
       Based on this analysis, the problems that recurred for the grain industry were lower 
revenues and slow or little growth potential.   There has been consolidation and concentration  
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among grain handlers and processors, which has helped reduce competition and improve the 
possibility of increasing margins.  But the reduction in production acres, the decrease in the 
number of medium sized farms and the increase in the size and number of large farms has 
counteracted the effects of consolidation. 
       The consolidation has left grain handlers and processors with facilities that are more 
efficient operationally.  More of the remaining elevators can ship train load quantities, have 
more logistical capabilities as a whole,  have more storage capacity, and are more likely to be 
associated with a large grain company (few small stand- alone independently owned 
operations), with resources available to operate the facilities with lower costs per bushel. 
       There has been a decrease in the total number of grain facilities, which should mean 
that there is more grain available for those surviving facilities to handle.  But that is not 
necessarily the case. 
       The reduction in the number of acres farmed for grain production means that there is 
less grain available for the industry to handle.  This trend means that even though 
consolidation has reduced the number of facilities, there may not be any more grain for each 
of the existing facilities to handle. 
       The reduction in the number of medium sized farms also changes the topography of 
competition.  The medium sized farms are likely to have less on farm storage as a percent of 
production, less ability to haul grain long distances for a better bundle of services, and may 
not be as heavily burdened by debt.  These farms are decreasing because the producers are 
older and  may not be as interested in expansion, or may only be interested in maintaining  a 
level of income that will allow them to get to retirement age before they sell out.  These 
producers are more likely to take their grain to the local grain facility at harvest, and don’t 
have enough quantity to exert enough market power to offer the grain at a higher price.  They 
are the customers that have made the larger portion of the revenues for the grain industry for 
many years.  
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       The increase in the number and size of the large producer results in these producers 
demanding more from grain handlers and processors.  The larger producers have more storage 
capabilities to keep grain on the farm at harvest, when basis levels are at their low.  They have 
enough quantities to offer to exert their market power and offer and most likely sell their grain 
at a higher price.  They have more logistical capabilities, trucking their grain over longer 
distances in order to get a higher fob the farm price.  They are also more focused on working 
the market for more value because their debt structure is heavier than other producers. 
       All of these producer factors mean that competition from other facilities may have 
decreased, but competition for maintaining the same or increasing grain volume, particularly 
from this growing class of larger grain producers has increased.  This will force the grain 
industry to continue to look for ways to reorganize in order to increase efficiencies by 
garnering more volume. 
       There are several alternatives that can serve as solutions to this problem.  The most 
prominent solutions are developing better capabilities for handling specialty grains, devising 
convenience products (associated services), developing more personalized marketing 
programs and having more direct communications with producers, increasing fob farm 
purchasing programs and finding innovative marketing programs to increase volume.  The 
most dynamic solution would be contract farming, because of its potential in solving 
profitability problems for both producers and grain handlers and processors, and because of its 
societal implications. 
       In order to improve the performance of both grain producers and grain handlers and 
processors, tighter vertical coordination is needed.  If the programs that are developed in the 
grain industry are designed to help the producer, and the if the producer makes an effort to 
utilize the marketing and service programs offered, both can achieve higher returns through 
increased efficiencies.  
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 5.2  Summary of the Strategic Management Analysis 
 
       The Strategic Management approach analyzed and set plans for grain producers and 
then the grain industry in Michigan.  Creating customer value, sustaining competitive 
advantages and achieving performance targets is the goal of the analysis. 
       If grain producing customers can increase their value to the grain handlers and 
processors, the industry will more intensely pursue the use of price, risk management, and 
associated services and develop marketing programs to draw those producers to their 
facilities.  That value can be created by producers  accepting innovative ideas in producing 
specialty grain crops, using their volume as market power, striving for better and more open 
communication with the industry, and gaining knowledge necessary to use more innovative 
marketing alternatives. 
       For the grain handlers and processors, creating value for customers can be 
accomplished by increasing specialty grain programs, which can pay premiums to standard 
grade commodities.  They could use their expertise in markets to develop marketing programs 
for producers that can help them achieve a higher average price for their grain.  Risk reduction 
for producers could be accomplished by contract farming, where the grain industry can use 
their knowledge to hedge risk more efficiently than producers.  Providing an array of services 
such as financial, banking or credit, that could help producers save time and money could 
create loyalties that would bring grain volume with it. 
       The producer’s competitive advantages include the varying soil types and a different 
climate in Michigan, which could help differentiate a special crop that may not grow as well or 
have the same characteristics in competing grain belt states or elsewhere.  The producers are 
efficient in producing high yields.  The grain producers in Michigan may also be more willing 
to diversify due to the variety of soils and the need for more revenue.  
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       The grain handlers and processors in Michigan have the ability to handle grain quickly 
and efficiently, and have expertise in marketing grain in markets that are different than in other 
states.  They have adequate storage facilities and are a good information source for their 
producer customers.  They can provide additional services to help producers market grain and 
also to provide assorted services such as financial and insurance programs. 
       For producers to achieve their performance targets, the study points to raising more 
specialty crops and working on alliances with the industry to raise revenues and also to reduce 
risk. 
       The grain handlers and processor targets are to increase volume and keep costs down.  
They also can accomplish their goals by increasing their handling of specialty crops, forming 
alliances with producers that will guarantee more bushels, use their logistical advantages to 
bid competitively with competition from outside Michigan, and provide innovative services 
and marketing alternatives to increase market share. 
       Most of the strategies that were discussed would be enhanced by increased vertical 
coordination between the producer and the industry.  They share common interests and would 
both be able to benefit form working more closely together.  The biggest problem is trading 
the desire for independence for improved profitability.   
        
5.3   Final Conclusions and Recommendation 
 
           One conclusion arrived at from the in-depth analysis of grain producers and the grain 
handlers and processors in Michigan is that tighter vertical coordination is needed. 
       These two groups of participants in the grain system should work together to increase 
production of specialty crops, provide services to each other to help increase utility for both, 
and begin the process of designing programs that lead to contract farming (through a process 
of industrialization).  
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       At the end of all this analysis, the final and ultimate question, is what characteristics 
will prevail in Michigan grain production and utilization over the coming years?  If our 
analysis is complete and the strategic plan for tighter vertical coordination works, Michigan 
grain production may decline, but at a slower rate.  Grain producers will be more successful 
extracting margins from their business.  The grain industry will adapt their approach to satisfy 
the needs of the end consumer, but fit it into what is functional for the producer. 
       There are three main strategies that are recommended to create coordination between 
the grain producer and the grain industry in Michigan.  These are increasing the production of 
specialty grains, increasing services (both by the producer and the grain industry),  and 
beginning the development of contract farming (industrialization). 
       If vertical coordination is beneficial, the final beneficiary is the end consumer, who will 
obtain a higher level of utility from the entire process.  The end consumer will still have a low 
cost food or feed source that can satisfy all of the demands for health, variety, taste, etc.  This 
satisfaction will be transferred up the chain all the way to the producer. 
       The production process and the grain industry functions in this chain required a study 
of how the system is organized and what strategies each part must recognize and implement to 
be successful. Both of these analyses point to more coordination as the key to achieving the 
goals.  If coordination between each party in each transition is as efficient as it can be, then 
clearer lines are drawn as to what actions need to take place.  In our study, the actions of the 
grain industry and grain producers will lead to production of crops that generate more income, 
and a handling system that gets these products to markets where, when and how they need to 
be for the next participant in the chain. 
  The study has covered substantial territory.  It is hoped that the information included 
in the study can be used to help guide current and future participants to a greater 
understanding of  problems and solutions, and help them initiate new thought processes about 
how the system can be improved.    
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       The recommendations made in this study would benefit both producers and handlers of 
grain.  Both could use a coordinated system to improve their profitability.   
       The study only analyzes two parts of the food chain, and the analysis looks at those 
parts through two techniques for understanding the many aspects of the system.  While the 
study has generated some ideas for success of the participants in the system, it cannot pretend 
to be all inclusive. 
       It is hoped that the study has jarred some thoughts and created conversation that will 
bring criticism and hopefully consideration for solutions to the grain production system in 
Michigan. 
       The history of grain production in the state is extensive, and it has made several 
transitions during its course, which has allowed it success. To continue its viability in the long 
run, it must make another transition.  Michigan cannot hope to be a powerhouse grain 
producing state, but it can offer the market some products, services and ideas for coordination 
that may be able to be used in other states years from now when they are also trying to deal 
with similar problems. 
       Further research into specialization of crops through genetic modification or through 
organics or somewhere in between that can be grown more exclusively in a climate, and with 
varying soil types such as Michigan will be important. 
       Implementation of marketing programs that can help producers reduce risk and 
increase revenues and profits needs to be suggested, and trials studied to see if there are ways 
to bring these objectives about.  Again, coordination between grain producers, grain 
companies and university studies can work to advance new ideas.  
             Table 1 Corn, Soybean and Wheat Revenue Summary - 1990 - 2001  (Dollars per Acre)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
National Corn Revenue 270.18 257.38 272.21 251.75 313.33 367.74
Soybean Revenue 195.73 190.84 209.06 208.64 226.87 237.22
Wheat Revenue 106.63 101.32 123.77 121.81 135.47 166.26
Total Revenue 572.55 549.54 605.03 582.20 675.67 771.21
Michigan Corn Revenue 254.15 257.40 204.75 270.60 260.91 368.00
Soybean Revenue 213.94 209.76 182.49 240.16 200.91 260.80
Wheat Revenue 132.00 122.12 172.48 124.64 172.25 246.00
Total Revenue 600.09 589.28 559.72 635.40 634.07 874.80
Total Variation 27.54 39.74 -45.31 53.20 -41.60 103.59
Ohio Corn Revenue 280.72 238.08 294.58 282.70 309.97 401.72
Soybean Revenue 226.59 204.84 226.00 243.96 239.69 254.60
Wheat Revenue 162.00 143.57 162.18 152.36 178.06 241.56
Total Revenue 669.31 586.49 682.76 679.02 727.72 897.88
Total Variation 96.76 36.95 77.73 96.82 52.04 126.67
Indiana Corn Revenue 297.99 225.40 307.23 331.32 324.00 381.94
Soybean Revenue 238.21 221.52 241.23 290.26 259.91 265.84
Wheat Revenue 147.68 108.80 159.50 144.56 185.44 237.60
Total Revenue 683.88 555.72 707.96 766.14 769.35 885.38
Total Variation 111.33 6.18 102.93 183.94 93.68 114.16
Illinois Corn Revenue 299.72 263.22 314.39 334.10 354.12 372.90
Soybean Revenue 228.15 213.75 244.67 279.07 255.26 268.32
Wheat Revenue 132.00 81.92 177.12 123.64 170.24 190.61
Total Revenue 659.87 558.89 736.18 736.81 779.62 831.83
Total Variation 87.32 9.35 131.15 154.61 103.94 60.62
Iowa Corn Revenue 278.46 269.10 294.00 195.20 337.44 393.60
Soybean Revenue 233.65 223.16 243.76 196.54 274.22 292.60
Wheat Revenue 123.30 81.60 118.95 50.00 148.05 141.75
Total Revenue 635.41 573.86 656.71 441.74 759.71 827.95
Total Variation 62.86 24.31 51.68 -140.46 84.03 56.74
Minnesota Corn Revenue 269.08 266.40 217.74 158.20 316.66 373.66
Soybean Revenue 216.45 197.47 176.64 142.14 214.80 266.90
Wheat Revenue 73.80 101.52 121.80 82.80 94.54 182.49
Total Revenue 559.33 565.39 516.18 383.14 626.00 823.05
Total Variation -13.22 15.84 -88.85 -199.06 -49.67 51.83
Nebraska Corn Revenue 291.84 297.18 282.15 262.08 323.87 357.42
Soybean Revenue 192.86 183.25 225.54 223.20 248.63 216.48
Wheat Revenue 96.14 96.32 94.80 106.40 115.26 186.96
Total Revenue 580.84 576.75 602.49 591.68 687.76 760.86
Total Variation 8.29 27.20 -2.54 9.48 12.09 -10.35
Source: National Agricultural Statistical Service 188Table 1 Corn, Soybean and Wheat Revenue Summary - 1990 - 2001  (Dollars per Acre)
12 Year
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Average
National Corn Revenue 344.44 307.88 260.74 243.52 253.27 276.40 284.90
Soybean Revenue 276.36 251.68 191.78 169.46 172.97 170.28 208.41
Wheat Revenue 160.64 144.06 118.19 109.46 112.20 119.63 126.62
Total Revenue 781.44 703.62 570.70 522.44 538.44 566.31 619.93
Michigan Corn Revenue 250.04 280.80 210.90 231.40 235.60 199.50 252.00
Soybean Revenue 203.78 249.10 194.61 184.40 163.44 126.00 202.45
Wheat Revenue 148.58 202.12 125.82 146.28 151.92 156.80 158.42
Total Revenue 602.40 732.02 531.33 562.08 550.96 482.30 612.87
Total Variation -179.05 28.39 -39.37 39.64 12.52 -84.00 -7.06
Ohio Corn Revenue 305.25 332.32 286.23 238.14 279.30 276.00 293.75
Soybean Revenue 259.70 285.56 219.56 169.92 194.46 180.40 225.44
Wheat Revenue 153.66 199.08 144.64 140.70 145.44 167.50 165.90
Total Revenue 718.61 816.96 650.43 548.76 619.20 623.90 685.09
Total Variation -62.83 113.34 79.73 26.32 80.76 57.60 65.16
Indiana Corn Revenue 341.94 308.66 289.07 248.16 279.30 304.20 303.27
Soybean Revenue 278.92 286.67 212.10 183.69 212.06 215.60 242.17
Wheat Revenue 154.28 184.44 129.80 140.58 145.59 158.40 158.06
Total Revenue 775.14 779.77 630.97 572.43 636.95 678.20 703.49
Total Variation -6.30 76.14 60.27 49.99 98.51 111.90 83.56
Illinois Corn Revenue 379.44 326.37 387.64 267.40 288.41 311.60 324.94
Soybean Revenue 305.78 282.08 220.44 199.50 203.28 202.50 241.90
Wheat Revenue 156.56 191.54 112.80 126.60 119.13 149.45 144.30
Total Revenue 841.78 799.99 720.88 593.50 610.82 663.55 711.14
Total Variation 60.33 96.37 150.18 71.06 72.38 97.25 91.21
Iowa Corn Revenue 358.80 321.54 269.70 256.28 253.75 306.60 294.54
Soybean Revenue 323.84 291.18 229.92 201.59 195.32 189.20 241.25
Wheat Revenue 143.50 132.72 121.00 102.34 101.05 135.00 116.61
Total Revenue 826.14 745.44 620.62 560.21 550.12 630.80 652.39
Total Variation 44.70 41.82 49.92 37.77 11.68 64.50 32.46
Minnesota Corn Revenue 308.75 283.80 261.63 240.00 247.95 240.50 265.36
Soybean Revenue 275.88 241.80 195.30 185.64 179.58 153.55 203.85
Wheat Revenue 153.36 103.04 65.07 66.00 109.48 75.40 102.44
Total Revenue 737.99 628.64 522.00 491.64 537.01 469.45 571.65
Total Variation -43.45 -74.98 -48.70 -30.80 -1.43 -96.85 -48.28
Nebraska Corn Revenue 377.52 306.24 272.60 243.25 239.40 294.00 295.63
Soybean Revenue 323.55 254.34 212.52 189.98 168.72 191.10 219.18
Wheat Revenue 150.15 118.40 116.84 105.60 93.96 103.60 115.37
Total Revenue 851.22 678.98 601.96 538.83 502.08 588.70 630.18
Total Variation 69.78 -24.64 31.26 16.39 -36.36 22.40 10.25
189Table 1-1 Variations in Yield, Price and Revenue to National Averages - Corn - 1990 - 2001
State 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
National Yield / acre 118.5 108.6 131.5 100.7 138.6 113.5
Avg. Farm Price 2.28 2.37 2.07 2.5 2.26 3.24
Revenue / acre 270.2 257.382 272.205 251.75 313.236 367.74
Michigan Yield 115 110 105 110 117 115
Variation -3.5 1.4 -26.5 9.3 -21.6 1.5
Avg. Price 2.21 2.34 1.95 2.46 2.23 3.2
Variation -0.07 -0.03 -0.12 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04
Revenue 254.2 257.4 204.75 270.6 260.91 368
Variation -16 0.018 -67.455 18.85 -52.326 0.26
Ohio Yield 121 96 143 110 139 121
Variation 2.5 -12.6 11.5 9.3 0.4 7.5
Avg. Price 2.32 2.48 2.06 2.57 2.23 3.32
Variation 0.04 0.11 -0.01 0.07 -0.03 0.08
Revenue 280.7 238.08 294.58 282.7 309.97 401.72
Variation 10.54 -19.302 22.375 30.95 -3.266 33.98
Indiana Yield 129 92 147 132 144 113
Variation 10.5 -16.6 15.5 31.3 5.4 -0.5
Avg. Price 2.31 2.45 2.09 2.51 2.25 3.38
Variation 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.14
Revenue 298 225.4 307.23 331.32 324 381.94
Variation 27.81 -31.982 35.025 79.57 10.764 14.2
Illinois Yield 127 107 149 130 156 113
Variation 8.5 -1.6 17.5 29.3 17.4 -0.5
Avg. Price 2.36 2.46 2.11 2.57 2.27 3.3
Variation 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.06
Revenue 299.7 263.22 314.39 334.1 354.12 372.9
Variation 29.54 5.838 42.185 82.35 40.884 5.16
Iowa Yield 126 117 147 80 152 123
Variation 7.5 8.4 15.5 -20.7 13.4 9.5
Avg. Price 2.21 2.3 2 2.44 2.22 3.2
Variation -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04
Revenue 278.5 269.1 294 195.2 337.44 393.6
Variation 8.28 11.718 21.795 -56.55 24.204 25.86
Minnesota Yield 124 120 114 70 142 119
Variation 5.5 11.4 -17.5 -30.7 3.4 5.5
Avg. Price 2.17 2.22 1.91 2.26 2.23 3.14
Variation -0.11 -0.15 -0.16 -0.24 -0.03 -0.1
Revenue 269.1 266.4 217.74 158.2 316.66 373.66
Variation -1.1 9.018 -54.465 -93.55 3.424 5.92
Nebraska Yield 128 127 135 104 139 111
Variation 9.5 18.4 3.5 3.3 0.4 -2.5
Avg. Price 2.28 2.34 2.09 2.52 2.33 3.22
Variation 0 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07 -0.02
Revenue 291.8 297.18 282.15 262.08 323.87 357.42
Variation 21.66 39.798 9.945 10.33 10.634 -10.32
Source: National Agricultural Statistical Service 190Table 1-1 Variations to National Averages - Corn - 1990-2001
State 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
National Yield / acre 127.1 126.7 134.4 133.8 136.9 138.2
Avg. Farm Price 2.71 2.43 1.94 1.82 1.85 2
Revenue / acre 344.4 307.881 260.736 243.516 253.265 276.4
Michigan Yield 94 117 111 130 124 105
Variation -33.1 -9.7 -23.4 -3.8 -12.9 -33.2
Avg. Price 2.66 2.4 1.9 1.78 1.9 1.9
Variation -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.1
Revenue 250 280.8 210.9 231.4 235.6 199.5
Variation -94.4 -27.081 -49.836 -12.116 -17.665 -76.9
Ohio Yield 111 134 141 126 147 138
Variation -16.1 7.3 6.6 -7.8 10.1 -0.2
Avg. Price 2.75 2.48 2.03 1.89 1.9 2
Variation 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.05 0
Revenue 305.3 332.32 286.23 238.14 279.3 276
Variation -39.2 24.439 25.494 -5.376 26.035 -0.4
Indiana Yield 123 122 137 132 147 156
Variation -4.1 -4.7 2.6 -1.8 10.1 17.8
Avg. Price 2.78 2.53 2.11 1.88 1.9 1.95
Variation 0.07 0.1 0.17 0.06 0.05 -0.05
Revenue 341.9 308.66 289.07 248.16 279.3 304.2
Variation -2.5 0.779 28.334 4.644 26.035 27.8
Illinois Yield 136 129 141 140 151 152
Variation 8.9 2.3 6.6 6.2 14.1 13.8
Avg. Price 2.79 2.53 2.04 1.91 1.91 2.05
Variation 0.08 0.1 0.1 0.09 0.06 0.05
Revenue 379.4 326.37 287.64 267.4 288.41 311.6
Variation 35 18.489 26.904 23.884 35.145 35.2
Iowa Yield 138 138 145 149 145 146
Variation 10.9 11.3 10.6 15.2 8.1 7.8
Avg. Price 2.6 2.33 1.86 1.72 1.75 2.1
Variation -0.11 -0.1 -0.08 -0.1 -0.1 0.1
Revenue 358.8 321.54 269.7 256.28 253.75 306.6
Variation 14.36 13.659 8.964 12.764 0.485 30.2
Minnesota Yield 125 132 153 150 145 130
Variation -2.1 5.3 18.6 16.2 8.1 -8.2
Avg. Price 2.47 2.15 1.71 1.6 1.71 1.85
Variation -0.24 -0.28 -0.23 -0.22 -0.14 -0.15
Revenue 308.8 283.8 261.63 240 247.95 240.5
Variation -35.7 -24.081 0.894 -3.516 -5.315 -35.9
Nebraska Yield 143 132 145 139 126 147
Variation 15.9 5.3 10.6 5.2 -10.9 8.8
Avg. Price 2.64 2.32 1.88 1.75 1.9 2
Variation -0.07 -0.11 -0.06 -0.07 0.05 0
Revenue 377.5 306.24 272.6 243.25 239.4 294
Variation 33.08 -1.641 11.864 -0.266 -13.865 17.6
191Table 1-1 Variations to National Averages - Corn - 1990 - 2001
State
National Yield / acre 125.71 Avg. Yield
Avg. Farm Price 2.29 Avg. Price
Revenue / acre 284.89 Avg. Revenue
Michigan Yield 112.75 Avg.  Yield
Variation -12.96 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.24 Avg. Price
Variation -0.05 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 252.00 Avg. Revenue
Variation -32.89 Avg. Revenue variation
Ohio Yield 127.25 Avg. Yield
Variation 1.54 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.34 Avg. Price
Variation 0.05 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 293.75 Avg. Revenue
Variation 8.86 Avg. Revenue variation
Indiana Yield 131.17 Avg. Yield
Variation 5.46 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.35 Avg. Price
Variation 0.06 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 303.27 Avg. Revenue
Variation 18.37 Avg. Revenue variation
Illinois Yield 135.92 Avg. Yield
Variation 10.21 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.36 Avg. Price
Variation 0.07 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 316.61 Avg. Revenue
Variation 31.71 Avg. Revenue variation
Iowa Yield 133.83 Avg. Yield
Variation 8.13 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.23 Avg. Price
Variation -0.06 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 294.54 Avg. Revenue
Variation 9.64 Avg. Revenue variation
Minnesota Yield 127.00 Avg. Yield
Variation 1.29 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.12 Avg. Price
Variation -0.17 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 265.36 Avg. Revenue
Variation -19.53 Avg. Revenue variation
Nebraska Yield 131.33 Avg. Yield
Variation 5.63 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.27 Avg. Price
Variation -0.02 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 295.63 Avg. Revenue
Variation 10.73 Avg. Revenue variation
192Table 1-2 Variations -Yield, Price and Revenue to National Averages - Soybeans 1990-2001
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
National Yield / acre 34.1 34.2 37.6 32.6 41.4 35.3
Avg. Farm Price 5.74 5.58 5.56 6.4 5.48 6.72
Revenue / acre 195.73 190.836 209.056 208.64 226.872 237.216
State
M i c h i g a n Y i e l d 3 8 3 83 33 83 74 0
Variation 3.9 3.8 -4.6 5.4 -4.4 4.7
Avg. Price 5.63 5.52 5.53 6.32 5.43 6.52
Variation -0.11 -0.06 -0.03 -0.08 -0.05 -0.2
Revenue 213.94 209.76 182.49 240.16 200.91 260.8
Variation 18.206 18.924 -26.566 31.52 -25.962 23.584
O h i o Y i e l d 3 9 3 64 03 8 4 3 . 53 8
Variation 4.9 1.8 2.4 5.4 2.1 2.7
Avg. Price 5.81 5.69 5.65 6.42 5.51 6.7
Variation 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.03 -0.02
Revenue 226.59 204.84 226 243.96 239.685 254.6
Variation 30.856 14.004 16.944 35.32 12.813 17.384
Indiana Yield 41 39 43 46 47 39.5
Variation 6.9 4.8 5.4 13.4 5.6 4.2
Avg. Price 5.81 5.68 5.61 6.31 5.53 6.73
Variation 0.07 0.1 0.05 -0.09 0.05 0.01
Revenue 238.21 221.52 241.23 290.26 259.91 265.835
Variation 42.476 30.684 32.174 81.62 33.038 28.619
Illinois Yield 39 37.5 43 43 45.5 39
Variation 4.9 3.3 5.4 10.4 4.1 3.7
Avg. Price 5.85 5.7 5.69 6.49 5.61 6.88
Variation 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.16
Revenue 228.15 213.75 244.67 279.07 255.255 268.32
Variation 32.416 22.914 35.614 70.43 28.383 31.104
Iowa Yield 41.5 40.5 44 31 50.5 44
Variation 7.4 6.3 6.4 -1.6 9.1 8.7
Avg. Price 5.63 5.51 5.54 6.34 5.43 6.65
Variation -0.11 -0.07 -0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07
Revenue 233.65 223.155 243.76 196.54 274.215 292.6
Variation 37.911 32.319 34.704 -12.1 47.343 55.384
Minnesota Yield 39 36.5 32 23 40 40.5
Variation 4.9 2.3 -5.6 -9.6 -1.4 5.2
Avg. Price 5.55 5.41 5.52 6.18 5.37 6.59
Variation -0.19 -0.17 -0.04 -0.22 -0.11 -0.13
Revenue 216.45 197.465 176.64 142.14 214.8 266.895
Variation 20.716 6.629 -32.416 -66.5 -12.072 29.679
Nebraska Yield 34.5 33.5 42 36 47 33
Variation 0.4 -0.7 4.4 3.4 5.6 -2.3
Avg. Price 5.59 5.47 5.37 6.2 5.29 6.56
Variation -0.15 -0.11 -0.19 -0.2 -0.19 -0.16
Revenue 192.86 183.245 225.54 223.2 248.63 216.48
Variation -2.879 -7.591 16.484 14.56 21.758 -20.736
Source: National Agricultural Statistical Service 193Table 1-2 Variations to National Averages - Soybeans - 1990 - 2001
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
National Yield / acre 37.6 38.9 38.9 36.6 38.1 39.6
Avg. Farm Price 7.35 6.47 4.93 4.63 4.54 4.3
Revenue / acre 276.36 251.683 191.777 169.458 172.974 170.28
State
Michigan Yield 28.5 38.5 39 40 36 30
Variation -9.1 -0.4 0.1 3.4 -2.1 -9.6
Avg. Price 7.15 6.47 4.99 4.61 4.54 4.2
Variation -0.2 0 0.06 -0.02 0 -0.1
Revenue 203.775 249.095 194.61 184.4 163.44 126
Variation -72.585 -2.588 2.833 14.942 -9.534 -44.28
O h i o Y i e l d 3 5 4 44 43 64 24 1
Variation -2.6 5.1 5.1 -0.6 3.9 1.4
Avg. Price 7.42 6.49 4.99 4.72 4.63 4.4
Variation 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.1
Revenue 259.7 285.56 219.56 169.92 194.46 180.4
Variation -16.66 33.877 27.783 0.462 21.486 10.12
Indiana Yield 38 43.5 42 39 46 49
Variation 0.4 4.6 3.1 2.4 7.9 9.4
Avg. Price 7.34 6.59 5.05 4.71 4.61 4.4
Variation -0.01 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.1
Revenue 278.92 286.665 212.1 183.69 212.06 215.6
Variation 2.56 34.982 20.323 14.232 39.086 45.32
I l l i n o i s Y i e l d 4 0 . 5 4 34 44 24 44 5
Variation 2.9 4.1 5.1 5.4 5.9 5.4
Avg. Price 7.55 6.56 5.01 4.75 4.62 4.5
Variation 0.2 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.2
Revenue 305.775 282.08 220.44 199.5 203.28 202.5
Variation 29.415 30.397 28.663 30.042 30.306 32.22
Iowa Yield 44 46 48 44.5 43.5 44
Variation 6.4 7.1 9.1 7.9 5.4 4.4
Avg. Price 7.36 6.33 4.79 4.53 4.49 4.3
Variation 0.01 -0.14 -0.14 -0.1 -0.05 0
Revenue 323.84 291.18 229.92 201.585 195.315 189.2
Variation 47.48 39.497 38.143 32.127 22.341 18.92
Minnesota Yield 38 39 42 42 41 37
Variation 0.4 0.1 3.1 5.4 2.9 -2.6
Avg. Price 7.26 6.2 4.65 4.42 4.38 4.15
Variation -0.09 -0.27 -0.28 -0.21 -0.16 -0.15
Revenue 275.88 241.8 195.3 185.64 179.58 153.55
Variation -0.48 -9.883 3.523 16.182 6.606 -16.73
Nebraska Yield 45 40.5 44 42.5 38 45.5
Variation 7.4 1.6 5.1 5.9 -0.1 5.9
Avg. Price 7.19 6.28 4.83 4.47 4.44 4.2
Variation -0.16 -0.19 -0.1 -0.16 -0.1 -0.1
Revenue 323.55 254.34 212.52 189.975 168.72 191.1
Variation 47.19 2.657 20.743 20.517 -4.254 20.82
194Table 1-2 Variations to National Averages - Soybeans - 1990 - 2001
National Yield / acre 19.14 Avg. Yield
Avg. Farm Price 2.69 Avg. Price
Revenue / acre 102.71 Avg. Revenue
State
Michigan Yield 17.67 Avg. Yield
Variation -1.48 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.66 Avg. Price
Variation -0.02 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 93.44 Avg. Revenue
Variation -9.27 Avg. Revenue variation
Ohio Yield 20.17 Avg. Yield
Variation 1.03 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.72 Avg. Price
Variation 0.04 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 109.13 Avg. Revenue
Variation 6.42 Avg. Revenue variation
Indiana Yield 21.46 Avg. Yield
Variation 2.32 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.73 Avg. Price
Variation 0.04 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 115.75 Avg. Revenue
Variation 13.04 Avg. Revenue variation
Illinois Yield 21.54 Avg. Yield
Variation 2.40 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.75 Avg. Price
Variation 0.06 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 117.80 Avg. Revenue
Variation 15.09 Avg. Revenue variation
Iowa Yield 22.50 Avg. Yield
Variation 3.36 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.65 Avg. Price
Variation -0.03 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 119.25 Avg. Revenue
Variation 16.54 Avg. Revenue variation
Minnesota Yield 19.92 Avg. Yield
Variation 0.78 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.59 Avg. Price
Variation -0.10 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 102.65 Avg. Revenue
Variation -0.07 Avg. Revenue variation
Nebraska Yield 21.29 Avg. Yield
Variation 2.15 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.62 Avg. Price
Variation -0.07 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 111.68 Avg. Revenue
Variation 8.97 Avg. Revenue variation
195Table 1-3 Variations in Yield, Price and Revenue to National Averages - Wheat - 1990-2001
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
National Yield / acre 40.7 34.7 38.2 40.2 40.2 37.7
Avg. Farm Price 2.62 2.92 3.24 3.03 3.37 4.41
Revenue / acre 106.634 101.324 123.768 121.806 135.474 166.257
State
M i c h i g a n Y i e l d 5 5 4 35 64 15 3 6 0
Variation 14.3 8.3 17.8 0.8 12.8 22.3
Avg. Price 2.4 2.84 3.08 3.04 3.25 4.1
Variation -0.22 -0.08 -0.16 0.01 -0.12 -0.31
Revenue 132 122.12 172.48 124.64 172.25 246
Variation 25.366 20.796 48.712 2.834 36.776 79.743
O h i o Y i e l d 6 0 4 95 35 25 8 6 1
Variation 19.3 14.3 14.8 11.8 17.8 23.3
Avg. Price 2.7 2.93 3.06 2.93 3.07 3.96
Variation 0.08 0.01 -0.18 -0.1 -0.3 -0.45
Revenue 162 143.57 162.18 152.36 178.06 241.56
Variation 55.366 42.246 38.412 30.554 42.586 75.303
Indiana Yield 52 40 50 52 61 60
Variation 11.3 5.3 11.8 11.8 20.8 22.3
Avg. Price 2.84 2.72 3.19 2.78 3.04 3.96
Variation 0.22 -0.2 -0.05 -0.25 -0.33 -0.45
Revenue 147.68 108.8 159.5 144.56 185.44 237.6
Variation 41.046 7.476 35.732 22.754 49.966 71.343
Illinois Yield 48 32 54 44 56 49
Variation 7.3 -2.7 15.8 3.8 15.8 11.3
Avg. Price 2.75 2.56 3.28 2.81 3.04 3.89
Variation 0.13 -0.36 0.04 -0.22 -0.33 -0.52
Revenue 132 81.92 177.12 123.64 170.24 190.61
Variation 25.366 -19.404 53.352 1.834 34.766 24.353
I o w a Y i e l d 4 5 3 43 92 54 7 3 5
Variation 4.3 -0.7 0.8 -15.2 6.8 -2.7
Avg. Price 2.74 2.4 3.05 2 3.15 4.05
Variation 0.12 -0.52 -0.19 -1.03 -0.22 -0.36
Revenue 123.3 81.6 118.95 50 148.05 141.75
Variation 16.666 -19.724 -4.818 -71.806 12.576 -24.507
MinnesotaYield 30 36 42 30 29 33
Variation -10.7 1.3 3.8 -10.2 -11.2 -4.7
Avg. Price 2.46 2.82 2.9 2.76 3.26 5.53
Variation -0.16 -0.1 -0.34 -0.27 -0.11 1.12
Revenue 73.8 101.52 121.8 82.8 94.54 182.49
Variation -32.834 0.196 -1.968 -39.006 -40.934 16.233
Nebraska Yield 38 32 30 35 34 41
Variation -2.7 -2.7 -8.2 -5.2 -6.2 3.3
Avg. Price 2.53 3.01 3.16 3.04 3.39 4.56
Variation -0.09 0.09 -0.08 0.01 0.02 0.15
Revenue 96.14 96.32 94.8 106.4 115.26 186.96
Variation -10.494 -5.004 -28.968 -15.406 -20.214 20.703
Source: National Agricultural Statistical Service 196Table 1-3 Variations to National Averages - Wheat - 1990 - 2001
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
National Yield / acre 37.1 44.6 46.9 47.8 44.7 43.5
Avg. Farm Price 4.33 3.23 2.52 2.29 2.51 2.75
Revenue / acre 160.643 144.058 118.188 109.462 112.197 119.625
State
M i c h i g a n Y i e l d 3 8 6 25 46 97 2 6 4
Variation 0.9 17.4 7.1 21.2 27.3 20.5
Avg. Price 3.91 3.26 2.33 2.12 2.11 2.45
Variation -0.42 0.03 -0.19 -0.17 -0.4 -0.3
Revenue 148.58 202.12 125.82 146.28 151.92 156.8
Variation -12.063 58.062 7.632 36.818 39.723 37.175
O h i o Y i e l d 3 9 6 36 47 07 2 6 7
Variation 1.9 18.4 17.1 22.2 27.3 23.5
Avg. Price 3.94 3.16 2.26 2.01 2.02 2.5
Variation -0.39 -0.07 -0.26 -0.28 -0.49 -0.25
Revenue 153.66 199.08 144.64 140.7 145.44 167.5
Variation -6.983 55.022 26.452 31.238 33.243 47.875
Indiana Yield 38 58 55 66 69 66
Variation 0.9 13.4 8.1 18.2 24.3 22.5
Avg. Price 4.06 3.18 2.36 2.13 2.11 2.4
Variation -0.27 -0.05 -0.16 -0.16 -0.4 -0.35
Revenue 154.28 184.44 129.8 140.58 145.59 158.4
Variation -6.363 40.382 11.612 31.118 33.393 38.775
Illinois Yield 38 61 48 60 57 61
Variation 0.9 16.4 1.1 12.2 12.3 17.5
Avg. Price 4.12 3.14 2.35 2.11 2.09 2.45
Variation -0.21 -0.09 -0.17 -0.18 -0.42 -0.3
Revenue 156.56 191.54 112.8 126.6 119.13 149.45
Variation -4.083 47.482 -5.388 17.138 6.933 29.825
I o w a Y i e l d 3 5 4 24 44 34 7 5 4
Variation -2.1 -2.6 -2.9 -4.8 2.3 10.5
Avg. Price 4.1 3.16 2.75 2.38 2.15 2.5
Variation -0.23 -0.07 0.23 0.09 -0.36 -0.25
Revenue 143.5 132.72 121 102.34 101.05 135
Variation -17.143 -11.338 2.812 -7.122 -11.147 15.375
MinnesotaYield 36 32 27 30 46 29
Variation -1.1 -12.6 -19.9 -17.8 1.3 -14.5
Avg. Price 4.26 3.22 2.41 2.2 2.38 2.6
Variation -0.07 -0.01 -0.11 -0.09 -0.13 -0.15
Revenue 153.36 103.04 65.07 66 109.48 75.4
Variation -7.283 -41.018 -53.118 -43.462 -2.717 -44.225
Nebraska Yield 35 37 46 48 36 37
Variation -2.1 -7.6 -0.9 0.2 -8.7 -6.5
Avg. Price 4.29 3.2 2.54 2.2 2.61 2.8
Variation -0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.09 0.1 0.05
Revenue 150.15 118.4 116.84 105.6 93.96 103.6
Variation -10.493 -25.658 -1.348 -3.862 -18.237 -16.025
197Table 1-3  Variations to National Averages - Wheat - 1990 - 2001
National Yield / acre 41.36 Avg. Yield
Avg. Farm Price 3.10 Avg. Price
Revenue / acre 126.62 Avg. Revenue
State
Michigan Yield 55.58 Avg. Yield
Variation 14.23 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.91 Avg. Price
Variation -0.19 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 158.42 Avg. Revenue
Variation 31.80 Avg. Revenue variation
Ohio Yield 59.00 Avg. Yield
Variation 17.64 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.88 Avg. Price
Variation -0.22 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 165.90 Avg. Revenue
Variation 39.28 Avg. Revenue variation
Indiana Yield 55.58 Avg. Yield
Variation 14.23 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.90 Avg. Price
Variation -0.20 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 158.06 Avg. Revenue
Variation 31.44 Avg. Revenue variation
Illinois Yield 50.67 Avg. Yield
Variation 9.31 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.88 Avg. Price
Variation -0.22 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 144.30 Avg. Revenue
Variation 17.68 Avg. Revenue variation
Iowa Yield 40.83 Avg. Yield
Variation -0.53 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 2.87 Avg. Price
Variation -0.23 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 116.61 Avg. Revenue
Variation -10.01 Avg. Revenue variation
Minnesota Yield 33.33 Avg. Yield
Variation -8.03 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 3.07 Avg. Price
Variation -0.04 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 102.44 Avg. Revenue
Variation -24.18 Avg. Revenue variation
Nebraska Yield 37.42 Avg. Yield
Variation -3.94 Avg. Yield variation
Avg. Price 3.11 Avg. Price
Variation 0.01 Avg. Price variation
Revenue 115.37 Avg. Revenue
Variation -11.25 Avg. Revenue variation
198Table 2 Production Percentages of Corn, Soybeans and Wheat for States 
(In Millions of Bushels)
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Corn
National 7934 7475 9477 6336 10103 7374
Michigan 238 253 242 226 255 250
% of total 3.00% 3.38% 2.55% 3.57% 2.52% 3.39%
Ohio 417 326 508 361 487 375
% of total 5.26% 4.36% 5.36% 5.70% 4.82% 5.09%
Indiana 703 511 878 713 858 599
% of total 8.86% 6.84% 9.26% 11.25% 8.49% 8.12%
Illinois 1321 1177 1646 1300 1786 1130
% of total 16.65% 15.75% 17.37% 20.52% 17.68% 15.32%
Iowa 1562 1427 1904 880 1915 1427
% of total 19.69% 19.09% 20.09% 13.89% 18.95% 19.35%
Minnesota 763 720 741 322 916 732
% of total 9.62% 9.63% 7.82% 5.08% 9.07% 9.93%
Nebraska 934 991 1067 785 1147 855
% of total 11.77% 13.26% 11.26% 12.39% 11.35% 11.59%
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Soybeans
National 1926 1987 2190 1871 2517 2177
Michigan 43 53 48 55 57 60
% of total 2.23% 2.67% 2.19% 2.94% 2.26% 2.76%
Ohio 136 136 147 156 174 153
% of total 7.06% 6.84% 6.71% 8.34% 6.91% 7.03%
Indiana 171 173 194 223 215 197
% of total 8.88% 8.71% 8.86% 11.92% 8.54% 9.05%
Illinois 355 341 405 387 429 378
% of total 18.43% 17.16% 18.49% 20.68% 17.04% 17.36%
Iowa 328 350 359 257 443 407
% of total 17.03% 17.61% 16.39% 13.74% 17.60% 18.70%
Minnesota 179 195 173 115 224 235
% of total 9.29% 9.81% 7.90% 6.15% 8.90% 10.79%
Nebraska 81 82 103 90 134 101
% of total 4.21% 4.13% 4.70% 4.81% 5.32% 4.64%
Source: National Agricultural Statistics Service 199Table 2 Production Percentages of Corn, Soybeans and Wheat for States 
(In Millions of Bushels)
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Wheat
National 2730 1980 2467 2396 2321 2183
Michigan 41 24 35 22 31 37
% of total 1.50% 1.21% 1.42% 0.92% 1.34% 1.69%
Ohio 80 53 59 53 68 74
% of total 2.93% 2.68% 2.39% 2.21% 2.93% 3.39%
Indiana 50 29 25 35 38 40
% of total 1.83% 1.46% 1.01% 1.46% 1.64% 1.83%
I l l i n o i s 8 94 56 26 85 06 8
% of total 3.26% 2.27% 2.51% 2.84% 2.15% 3.11%
I o w a 322121
% of total 0.11% 0.10% 0.08% 0.04% 0.09% 0.05%
Minnesota 139 67 140 71 71 72
% of total 5.09% 3.38% 5.67% 2.96% 3.06% 3.30%
Nebraska 86 67 56 74 71 86
% of total 3.15% 3.38% 2.27% 3.09% 3.06% 3.94%
200Table 2 Production Percentages of Corn, Soybeans and Wheat for States 
(In Millions of Bushels)
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Average
Corn
National 9233 9207 9759 9431 9968 9507 8817.00
Michigan 212 255 228 254 244 200 238.08
% of total 2.30% 2.77% 2.34% 2.69% 2.45% 2.10% 2.76%
Ohio 311 476 471 403 485 437 421.42
% of total 3.37% 5.17% 4.83% 4.27% 4.87% 4.60% 4.81%
Indiana 670 702 760 748 816 885 736.92
% of total 7.26% 7.62% 7.79% 7.93% 8.19% 9.31% 8.41%
Illinois 1469 1425 1473 1491 1669 1649 1461.33
% of total 15.91% 15.48% 15.09% 15.81% 16.74% 17.35% 16.64%
Iowa 1711 1642 1769 1758 1740 1664 1616.58
% of total 18.53% 17.83% 18.13% 18.64% 17.46% 17.50% 18.26%
Minnesota 869 851 1033 990 957 806 808.33
% of total 9.41% 9.24% 10.59% 10.50% 9.60% 8.48% 9.08%
Nebraska 1180 1135 1240 1154 1014 1139 1053.42
% of total 12.78% 12.33% 12.71% 12.24% 10.17% 11.98% 11.99%
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Average
Soybeans
National 2380 2689 2741 2654 2758 2891 2398.42
Michigan 47 72 74 78 73 64 60.33
% of total 1.97% 2.68% 2.70% 2.94% 2.65% 2.21% 2.52%
Ohio 157 191 193 162 186 188 164.92
% of total 6.60% 7.10% 7.04% 6.10% 6.74% 6.50% 6.92%
Indiana 204 231 231 216 252 274 215.08
% of total 8.57% 8.59% 8.43% 8.14% 9.14% 9.48% 9.02%
Illinois 399 428 464 443 460 478 413.92
% of total 16.76% 15.92% 16.93% 16.69% 16.68% 16.53% 17.39%
Iowa 416 478 497 478 465 480 413.17
% of total 17.48% 17.78% 18.13% 18.01% 16.86% 16.60% 17.16%
Minnesota 224 255 286 290 293 266 227.92
% of total 9.41% 9.48% 10.43% 10.93% 10.62% 9.20% 9.41%
Nebraska 135 144 165 181 174 223 134.42
% of total 5.67% 5.36% 6.02% 6.82% 6.31% 7.71% 5.47%
201Table 2 Production Percentages of Corn, Soybeans and Wheat for States 
(In Millions of Bushels)
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Average
Wheat
National 2277 2481 2547 2299 2232 1958 2322.58
Michigan 23 32 31 41 36 36 32.42
% of total 1.01% 1.29% 1.22% 1.78% 1.61% 1.84% 1.40%
Ohio 52 69 74 72 80 60 66.17
% of total 2.28% 2.78% 2.91% 3.13% 3.58% 3.06% 2.86%
Indiana 27 37 36 34 35 25 34.25
% of total 1.19% 1.49% 1.41% 1.48% 1.57% 1.28% 1.47%
Illinois 42 66 58 61 52 44 58.75
% of total 1.84% 2.66% 2.28% 2.65% 2.33% 2.25% 2.51%
I o w a 211 11 1 1 . 5 0
% of total 0.09% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.05% 0.06%
Minnesota 107 77 80 79 97 80 90.00
% of total 4.70% 3.10% 3.14% 3.44% 4.35% 4.09% 3.86%
Nebraska 74 70 83 82 59 59 72.25
% of total 3.25% 2.82% 3.26% 3.57% 2.64% 3.01% 3.12%
202Table 3 Total Farm Production Expenses 
State 1987 1992 1997
Michigan Census Census Census
Total Production Expense Dollars (in 000's) $2,211,823 $2,583,189 $2,835,658
Total Cropland Acres 8,181,320 8,156,388 7,891,802
Expense Dollars / Acre $270 $316 $359
Average Net Cash Return / Farm $6,252 $9,257 $14,919
Ohio Total Production Expense Dollars (in 000's) $2,730,026 $3,119,014 $3,608,883
Total Cropland Acres 11,920,433 11,528,727 11,340,967
Expense Dollars / Acre $229 $270 $318
Average Net Cash Return / Farm $8,645 $11,133 $15,152
Indiana Total Production Expense Dollars (in 000's) $3,178,679 $3,645,379 $4,011,772
Total Cropland Acres 13,592,873 13,366,034 12,848,950
Expense Dollars / Acre $234 $272 $312
Average Net Cash Return / Farm $12,533 $15,324 $20,089
Illinois Total Production Expense Dollars (in 000's) $4,557,450 $5,088,894 $5,542,904
Total Cropland Acres 25,102,092 24,164,457 23,920,923
Expense Dollars / Acre 182 211 232
Average Net Cash Return / Farm 19495 27954 37365
Iowa Total Production Expense Dollars (in 000's) $6,647,645 $7,744,947 $8,405,838
Total Cropland Acres 27,290,868 27,195,676 26,821,844
Expense Dollars / Acre $243 $285 $313
Average Net Cash Return / Farm $20,412 $22,718 $32,705
MinnesotaTotal Production Expense Dollars (in 000's) $4,427,445 $5,244,708 $6,362,110
Total Cropland Acres 21,876,066 21,387,063 21,491,743
Expense Dollars / Acre $202 $245 $296
Average Net Cash Return / Farm $14,503 $16,209 $25,015
Nebraska Total Production Expense Dollars (in 000's) $5,409,171 $6,711,544 $7,596,196
Total Cropland Acres 23,320,162 22,402,132 22,092,954
Expense Dollars / Acre $232 $300 $343
Average Net Cash Return / Farm $20,314 $27,638 $40,717
Author's note - While expenses include crops and livestock, the cost per acre of cropland
still gives a good indication of overall expenses in farming.  Michigan is higher than
the other states in the study
     This information has been retrieved by the county data in the U.S. Census reports in the
years and states indicated.
     With expenses per acre at $359, a farm that raised just corn would have to sell it at $2.872
a bushel to break even if yields were 125 bushels per acre.  With average corn prices 
including government payments much less than that in the years after 1997, producers have
been forced to find ways to cut costs and/or raise yields and prices in order to be profitable.
     This explains the necessity of size, more so in Michigan with expenses higher per acre 
than other competing midwestern grain belt states.  If corn was $2.20 per bushel, a yield of 
125 bu per acre would generate revenues of only $275 per acre.  Producers have been forced
to increase size to increase economies of scale in order to force expenses lower, and have
also been pressured to increase yields and be better marketers at the same time.
203Table 4 Average Net Cash Return per Acre including Government Payments
(Dollars per Acre)
State 1987 1992 1997
Michigan
Net Cash Return (Dollars per Farm) $6,252 $9,257 $14,919
Average Farm Size - Acres/Farm 202 217 215
Net Cash Return (Dollars per Acre) $30.95 $42.66 $69.39
Ohio
Net Cash Return (Dollars per Farm) $8,645 $11,133 $15,152
Average Farm Size - Acres/Farm 189 201 206
Net Cash Return (Dollars per Acre) $45.74 $55.39 $73.55
Indiana
Net Cash Return (Dollars per Farm) $12,533 $15,324 $20,089
Average Farm Size - Acres/Farm 229 249 261
Net Cash Return (Dollars per Acre) $54.73 $61.54 $76.97
Illinois
Net Cash Return (Dollars per Farm) $19,495 $27,954 $37,365
Average Farm Size - Acres/Farm 321 351 372
Net Cash Return (Dollars per Acre) $60.73 $79.64 $100.44
Iowa
Net Cash Return (Dollars per Farm) $20,412 $22,718 $32,705
Average Farm Size - Acres/Farm 301 325 343
Net Cash Return (Dollars per Acre) $67.81 $69.90 $95.35
Minnesota
Net Cash Return (Dollars per Farm) $14,503 $16,209 $25,015
Average Farm Size - Acres/Farm 312 342 354
Net Cash Return (Dollars per Acre) $46.48 $47.39 $70.66
Nebraska
Net Cash Return (Dollars per Farm) $20,314 $27,638 $40,717
Average Farm Size - Acres/Farm 749 839 885
Net Cash Return (Dollars per Acre) $27.12 $32.94 $46.01
Author's note - In Michigan, a farm with 500 acres would generate $34,695 average net cash return.
Data from the county summary highlights of the 1997 Census of Agriculture.
204Table 5 Percent of Sales of Net Farm Related Income by Class
Net Farm Dollars of Sales
Related  $25,000 $25000 to $50,000 to $100,000 to $250,000 to $500,000 to $1,000,000
 State Income or less $50,000 $100,000 $250,000 $500,000 $1,000,000 or more
Michigan $3,097 4.90% 4.40% 6.00% 14.00% 15.90% 16.50% 38.30%
Ohio $2,190 8.10 6.90 10.80 29.30 18.70 14.10 12
Indiana $3,573 4.20 7.50 8.30 24.40 21.50 19.50 14.5
Illinois $3,389 3.80 4.20 6.90 24.80 29.50 18.40 12.3
Iowa $5,406 2.80 5.10 8.30 24.70 22.10 15.20 21.7
Minnesota $5,278 2.80 3.70 7.10 21.40 21.80 14.20 28.8
Nebraska $8,258 1.70 2.70 5.60 20.60 16.30 8.00 45
Source: Agricultural Census of 1997
205Table 6 State Property Taxes - Dollars per acre
State 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Michigan Taxes $ 211.3 248.1 228.3 211.8 221.0
Acres 10.6 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4
Tax$/ Acre 19.9 23.9 22.0 20.4 21.3
Ohio Taxes $ 166.5 182.6 194.1 188.2 194.2
Acres 14.9 14.9 14.9 14.9 14.9
Tax$/ Acre 11.2 12.3 13.0 12.6 13.0
Indiana Taxes $ 231.2 241.7 256.8 249.0 257.0
Acres 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.5 15.5
Tax$/ Acre 14.8 15.5 16.5 16.1 16.6
Illinois Taxes $ 449.5 498.9 530.1 514.2 530.6
Acres 27.9 27.8 27.8 27.7 27.7
Tax$/ Acre 16.1 17.9 19.1 18.6 19.2
Iowa Taxes $ 512.4 461.1 489.9 475.2 490.4
Acres 33.0 33.0 33.0 33.0 32.8
Tax$/ Acre 15.5 14.0 14.8 14.4 15.0
Minnesota Taxes $ 353.8 433.5 398.9 370.1 386.2
Acres 29.2 29.1 28.9 28.8 28.6
Tax$/ Acre 12.1 14.9 13.8 12.9 13.5
Nebraska Taxes $ 412.3 428.3 426.3 413.8 424.4
Acres 46.4 46.4 46.4 46.4 46.4
Tax$/ Acre 8.9 9.2 9.2 8.9 9.1
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service, Data, Farm Income Database, 
     Net Value Added (with net farm income).
     Acres are from the individual state statisticians offices
206Table 7 Net Farm Income minus Direct Government Payments - all farms
State 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Michigan
Net Farm Income 410.3 399.1 356.5 728.5 313.8
Direct Govt. Payments 109.6 121.3 210.6 401.4 381.1
Farm Income 300.7 277.8 145.9 327.1 -67.3
Ohio
Net Farm Income 1329.1 1875.7 1362.8 872.7 1103.6
Direct Govt. Payments 163.1 186.4 315.6 650.2 678.1
Farm Income 1166.0 1689.3 1047.2 222.5 425.5
Indiana
Net Farm Income 1296.3 1276.7 761.4 392.8 779.7
Direct Govt. Payments 213.6 265.1 468.9 852.1 938.5
Farm Income 1082.7 1011.6 292.5 -459.3 -158.8
Illinois
Net Farm Income 2501.6 2050.6 1368.2 986.1 1537.1
Direct Govt. Payments 386.7 552.5 944.9 1798.8 1943.9
Farm Income 2114.9 1498.1 423.3 -812.7 -406.8
Iowa
Net Farm Income 4184.3 3721.2 2170.3 1553.1 2427.2
Direct Govt. Payments 508.3 712.8 1168.7 2061.9 2302.1
Farm Income 3676.0 3008.4 1001.6 -508.8 125.1
Minnesota
Net Farm Income 2190.2 753.8 1299.6 1232.8 1302.5
Direct Govt. Payments 349.3 417.0 794.5 1409.9 1502.2
Farm Income 1840.9 336.8 505.1 -177.1 -199.7
Nebraska
Net Farm Income 3430.9 2014.6 1785.1 1687.6 1357.1
Direct Govt. Payments 388.7 454.5 814.7 1411.9 1407.0
Farm Income 3042.2 1560.1 970.4 275.7 -49.9
Source: USDA, Economic Research Servie - data, Farm Income Database,
     Net Value Added (with net farm income)
207Table 8 Reduction in Livestock Production and Growth in Grain Production in Michigan
Commodity 1987 1992 1997 Change
Beef Cows Number of Animals 110156 116106 116399 6243
Number of Farms 8163 7548 7566 -597
Milk Cows Number of Animals 344550 316954 300641 -43909
Number of Farms 6499 5198 3990 -2509
Hogs and Pigs Number of Animals 1227069 1231641 1032014 -195055
Number of Farms 5577 4774 2853 -2724
Sheep and Lambs  Number of Animals 101330 97433 72107 -29223
Number of Farms 2057 1831 1628 -429
Layers and pullets Number of Animals 8428623 5388894 6043468 -2385155
Number of Farms 3550 2454 2276 -1274
Broilers and chickens Number of Animals 702431 400262 393028 -309403
Number of Farms 495 386 336 -159
Total Number of Animals 10914159 7551290 7957657 -2956502
Number of Bushels
Corn Number of Bushels 189779819 226824263 238319219 48539400
Number of Farms 25140 18962 16712 -8428
Number of Acres 1982401 2221271 2122283 139882
Soybeans Number of Bushels 36267622 41633625 62242411 25974789
Number of Farms 12734 13175 12561 -173
Number of Acres 1023599 1332114 1694872 671273
Wheat Number of Bushels 16465394 29350586 28432159 11966765
Number of Farms 10327 12433 8976 -1351
Number of Acres 356073 583245 499742 143669
Total Number of Acres 3362073 4136630 4316897 954824
Total Number of Bushels 242512835 297808474 328993789 86480954
Michigan Total Number of Farms 51172 46562 46027 -5145
Total Number of Acres 10316861 10088170 9872812 -444049
The number of acres for corn, soybeans and wheat has increased while the number of farm acres has 
decreased, as well as the number of animals on farms in these catagories.
Source: Michigan Agricultural Statistical Service
208Table 9 Number of Michigan Farms and Land in Farms 
By Economic Sales Class 1996 - 2000
Number of Farms (thousands)
Year $1,000 - $9,999 $10,000 - $99,999 $100,000 and over Total
1996 29.8 17.0 7.2 54.0
1997 28.5 17.0 7.5 53.0
1998 27.0 17.0 8.0 52.0
1999 28.5 16.5 8.0 53.0
2000 27.5 16.5 8.0 52.0
Million Acres
1996 2.2 3.1 5.3 10.6
1997 2.0 2.9 5.5 10.4
1998 1.9 2.8 5.7 10.4
1999 1.9 2.8 5.7 10.4
2000 1.9 2.8 5.7 10.4












Source: Michigan Agricultural Statistical Service 2001 Yearbook
National Agricultural Statistical Service Historical Data
209Table 10 Wages - Manufacturing Average Hourly Earnings by State
Annual Average 1997 - 2001
State 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Michigan 17.18 17.61 18.38 19.26 19.71
Ohio 15.30 15.79 16.26 16.71 17.13
Indiana 14.79 14.97 15.26 15.83 16.20
Illinois 13.35 13.75 14.05 14.36 14.55
iowa 13.57 13.91 14.20 14.46 14.92
Minnesota 13.63 13.92 14.34 14.99 15.36
Nebraska 12.10 12.32 12.77 12.94 13.39
Data is from the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment, Hours and Earnings from
the Current Employment Statistics Survey (Stae and Metro Area) 
Manufacturing Average Hourly Earnings Not Seasonally Adjusted.
210Table 11 Planted Acre Comparison for Edible Beans and Sugarbeets
versus Corn, Soybeans and Wheat
(in 1,000 Acres)
Commodity 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Dry Beans 340 315 300 350 285 215
Sugarbeets 153 163 177 194 189 180
Total 493 478 477 544 474 395
Change -15 -1 67 -70 -79
All Corn 2600 2500 2300 2200 2200 2200
Soybeans 1650 1870 1900 1950 2050 2150
Wheat 680 530 600 610 530 570
Total 4930 4900 4800 4760 4780 4920
Change -30 -100 -40 20 140
This table shows the correlation between total acres of dry beans and 
sugarbeets compared to corn, soybeans and wheat.  The effect is more noticeable  
in the thumb area where more dry beans and sugarbeets are grown.
Planted Acre Comparison for Tuscola and Huron Counties
Commodity 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Dry Beans 163 156 143 167 140.5 99.5
Sugarbeets 82 77.2 84 89 85 82
Total 245 233.2 227 256 225.5 181.5
Change -11.8 -6.2 29 -30.5 -40
All Corn 240 247 207 190 203 196
Soybeans 84 77.2 118 99 124 171
Wheat 84 62 71 75 57 69.5
Total 324 324.2 325 289 327 367
Change 0.2 0.8 -36 38 40
Source: Michigan Agricultural Statistics Service
211Table 12 State Fact Sheets
1997 1997
1997 US Census % employment             Ratios - 2000 1997 % of operators
Population in farm & related Debt/Equity Debt/Assets Average  listing farming
State Total jobs - production Operator Age as occupation
Michigan 9785450 1.4 15.1 13.2 53 47.9
Ohio 11212498 1.5 13.3 11.8 53 45.2
Indiana 5872370 2.3 17.5 14.9 53 46.6
Illinois 12011509 1.4 15.2 13.2 53 57
Iowa 2854396 6.4 23.2 20.1 52 62
Minnesota 4687726 3.2 25.2 21.8 51 60
Nebraska 1656042 6.1 27.9 53 69.5
Farms by sales dollars (percent)
State $50000 or less $50000 - 99999 $100000 - 499999$500000 or more
Michigan 76.2 8 13 2.8
Ohio 75.4 9 13.6 2
Indiana 69.3 9.9 17.4 3.4
Illinois 55.6 12.7 27.6 4.1
Iowa 50.2 15.1 30.3 4.3
Nebraska 49.1 15.6 30.5 4.9
Farms by size in acres (percent)
State 1 - 99 100 - 499 500 - 999 1000 - 1999 2000 or more
Michigan 52.3 37.1 7 2.9 0.8
Ohio 50.6 39.4 6.7 2.6 0.7
Indiana 49.8 35.1 9.1 4.8 1.2
Illinois 36 38.9 15.9 7.4 1.8
Iowa 29.2 48 16.3 5.6 0.9
Minnesota 30.3 48.9 13.3 5.8 1.7
Nebraska 21.5 36.3 20.1 13.1 9.1
     The population figures are from the US Census Bureau archives, state population time series
annual time series.     The rest of the data is from the USDA Economic Research Service 
stae facts database, web site www.ers.usda.gov/StateFacts.htm.
212Table 13 Operators by Principal Occupation
1987 1992 1997 Number Percent
State Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Change Change
Michigan
Farming 26112 51.03% 24396 52.39% 22043 47.89% -4069 -15.58%
Other 25060 48.97% 22166 47.61% 23984 52.11% -1076 -4.29%
Total 51172 46562 46027 -5145 -10.05%
Ohio
Farming 39569 49.91% 34604 48.94% 31022 45.23% -8547 -21.60%
Other 39708 50.09% 36107 51.06% 37569 54.77% -2139 -5.39%
Total 79277 70711 68591 -10686 -13.48%
Indiana
Farming 36654 51.99% 31547 50.25% 26993 46.61% -9661 -26.36%
Other 33852 48.01% 31231 49.75% 30923 53.39% -2929 -8.65%
Total 70506 62778 57916 -12590 -17.86%
Illinois Farming 57122 64.34% 47875 61.69% 41645 57.01% -15477 -27.09%
Other 31664 35.66% 29735 38.31% 31406 42.99% -258 -0.81%
Total 88786 77610 73051 -15735 -17.72%
Iowa Farming 75279 71.57% 66885 69.28% 56256 61.96% -19023 -25.27%
Other 29901 28.43% 29658 30.72% 34536 38.04% 4635 15.50%
Total 105180 96543 90792 -14388 -13.68%
Minnesota Farming 58519 68.78% 51021 67.96% 44047 60.04% -14472 -24.73%
Other 26560 31.22% 24058 32.04% 29320 39.96% 2760 10.39%
Total 85079 75079 73367 -11712 -13.77%
Nebraska Farming 45387 75.02% 39123 73.92% 35742 69.46% -9645 -21.25%
Other 15115 24.98% 13800 26.08% 15712 30.54% 597 3.95%
Total 60502 52923 51454 -9048 -14.95%
Source: Census of Agriculture 1997 213Table 14 Farm Real Estate - Average Value Dollars per Acre
1998-2002
State 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Change
Michigan
Real Estate $1,670 $1,850 $2,150 $2,300 $2,500 $830
Cropland $1,480 $1,670 $2,000 $2,100 $2,300 $820
Ohio
Real Estate $2,040 $2,220 $2,300 $2,480 $2,700 $660
Cropland $2,150 $2,350 $2,420 $2,600 $2,750 $600
Indiana
Real Estate $2,060 $2,220 $2,350 $2,500 $2,590 $530
Cropland $2,100 $2,270 $2,400 $2,550 $2,640 $540
Illinois
Real Estate $2,130 $2,250 $2,380 $2,530 $2,640 $510
Cropland $2,240 $2,370 $2,500 $2,650 $2,750 $510
Iowa
Real Estate $1,700 $1,770 $1,820 $1,900 $1,980 $280
Cropland $1,860 $1,930 $1,970 $2,050 $2,120 $260
Minnesota
Real Estate $1,160 $1,230 $1,280 $1,360 $1,450 $290
Cropland $1,160 $1,230 $1,270 $1,340 $1,420 $260
Nebraska
Real Estate $645 $670 $695 $730 $755 $110
Cropland $1,040 $1,080 $1,110 $1,170 $1,210 $170
United States Department of Agriculture
National Agricultural Statistical Service, land, August 2002.
214Table 15
World Production, World Exports, U.S. Exports and Market Share, U.S. Domestic Use
All Data in Metric Tonnes
World Production World Exports
Crop Year Wheat Corn Soybeans Total Crop Year Wheat Corn Soybeans Total
1993 561.87 533.19 117.18 1212.24 1993 123.85 69.85 29.59 223.29
1995 524.75 560.22 137.78 1222.75 1995 110.93 72.32 32.13 215.38
1997 582.74 590.39 131.67 1304.80 1997 125.27 73.31 36.96 235.54
1999 588.19 605.27 159.83 1353.29 1999 122.92 75.06 38.67 236.65
2001 581.07 599.03 184.42 1364.52 2001 108.08 75.99 53.36 237.43
2002 564.11 601.74 195.81 1361.66 2002 104.27 78.48 63.30 246.05
U.S. Exports U.S. Domestic  Use
Crop Year Wheat Corn Soybeans Total Crop Year Wheat Corn Soybeans Total
1993 36.84 42.25 20.94 100.03 1993 30.69 172.93 38.37 303.65
1995 32.34 55.31 22.81 110.46 1995 35.01 183.58 42.40 329.05
1997 27.25 45.60 24.00 96.85 1997 35.40 177.64 42.43 309.89
1999 28.36 50.31 21.90 100.57 1999 37.69 185.68 48.74 323.94
2001 26.23 48.38 28.95 103.56 2001 32.66 201.25 50.87 337.47
2002 23.25 40.64 28.30 92.19 2002 30.62 203.46 47.95 326.27
U.S. Market Share - Exports
Crop Year Wheat Corn Soybeans Total
1993 29.75% 60.49% 70.77% 44.80%
1995 29.15% 76.48% 70.99% 51.29%
1997 21.75% 62.20% 64.94% 41.12%
1999 23.07% 67.03% 56.63% 42.50%
2001 24.27% 63.67% 54.25% 43.62%
2002 22.30% 51.78% 44.71% 37.47%
Source: USDA - World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates - World Outlook Board
215Table 16
Commercial Grain Elevator Numbers and Capacity Comparisons by State
(In Millions of  Bushels) Commercial
2001 Bushel Average Bushels Bushels Capacity Number  of
State Number Capacity Capacity roduction Per Elev % Prod Turns  (1)
Michigan 245 146 0.60 300 1.22 0.49 2.05
Ohio 467 353 0.76 685 1.47 0.52 1.94
Indiana 425 370 0.87 1184 2.79 0.31 3.20
Illinois 995 1127 1.13 2171 2.18 0.52 1.93
Iowa 490 1040 2.12 2145 4.38 0.48 2.06
Minnesota 623 507 0.81 1152 1.85 0.44 2.27
Nebraska 519 690 1.33 1421 2.74 0.49 2.06
2002
Michigan 235 148 0.63 343 1.46 0.43 2.32
Ohio  (2) 454 357 0.79 444 0.98 0.80 1.24
Indiana 420 367 0.87 885 2.11 0.41 2.41
Illinois 980 1136 1.16 1978 2.02 0.57 1.74
Iowa 465 1070 2.30 2460 5.29 0.43 2.30
Minnesota 611 506 0.83 1423 2.33 0.36 2.81
Nebraska 508 690 1.36 1166 2.30 0.59 1.69
Two Yr Avg 531.21 607.64 1.11 1268.36 2.36 0.49 2.15
Source: National Agricultural Statistics Service, Agricultural Statistic Board, USDA
Note (1) - Number of times the inventory capacity is replaced (volume/capacity)
Note (2) - Ohio production was extremely low due to drought.
216Table 17 Comparison of Field and Miscellaneous Crops to Other Principal Crops
Michigan      Other Study States Combined
Field and Other Principal Total Crop Field and Other Principal Total Crop
Year Misc Crops Crops Value % other Misc Crops Crops Value % other
2002 $1,681 $354 $2,035 17.40% $28,347 $456 $28,803 1.58%
2001 $1,298 $426 $1,724 24.71% $25,069 $473 $25,542 1.85%
2000 $1,429 $438 $1,867 23.46% $24,397 $426 $24,823 1.72%
1999 $1,615 $424 $2,039 20.79% $24,300 $389 $24,689 1.58%
1998 $1,503 $389 $1,892 20.56% $26,001 $373 $26,374 1.41%
5 year avg 21.38% 1.63%
Michigan ranked 11th in corn production for grain, soybeans and wheat in 2002.
Source: Michigan Agricultural Statistics Serve 2002-03 Annual Report - Farm Economics
U.S. Totals
Field and Other Principal Total Crop
Misc Crops Crops Value % other
2002 $71,290 $23,433 $94,723 24.74% Source: National Agricultural Statistics Service,
2001 $66,493 $21,959 $88,452 24.83% USDA, Publications, Crop Values.
2000 $65,709 $22,474 $88,183 25.49%
1999 $65,572 $21,501 $87,073 24.69%
1998 $70,573 $20,638 $91,211 22.63%
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Of Grain Industry Terms 
 
 
  Arbitrage - The act of simultaneously buying and selling in two nearly identical 
markets in order to take advantage of what is thought by a trader to be a temporary 
discrepancy in price.  
 
  Basis - The difference between cash prices at a given location and a given contract 
month in the futures market.  Basis is quoted in terms of cents over or under the futures. 
 
  Bids - What the elevator or processor is willing to pay for a commodity (Author). 
 
  Blending - The mixing together of differing grades of a given commodity in order 
to obtain a third grade. 
 
  Broker - A person or company that arranges transactions between buyers and 
sellers without owning the commodity.  They usually charge a fee for bringing the two 
sides together (Author). 
 
  Carry - The difference between the value of a commodity now and a higher value 
at some point in the future.  It can be a cash carry or a carry in the futures market between 
futures contract months (Author). 
 
  Draw Area - The area around a handler or processor that they usually buy from 
(Author) 
 
  Grain Flow - How a commodity moves (all the transactions and logistical 
considerations) from the original production area through the system to a final use 
(Author). 
 
  Hedged To Arrive - An unpriced forward contract in which the futures price 
component of the final cash price is set, but not the basis.  The basis is set later using the 
current spot bid for a particular cash market agreed to in the contract.   
 
  Margin - This paper the author refers to margin in the grain industry as the 
difference between the price paid for the grain and the price is can be sold for.  This 
margin is the per bushel profit plus all the variable costs and some of the fixed costs.  The 
other part of the fixed costs are paid for by the carry times the owned bushels stored at the 
facility (Author) 
 
  Origination - Programs that a handler or processor may have to buy grain for 
their facilities (Author). 
  
227 
  Ownership - The bushels that a handler or processor has purchased either for 
future (forward contracts) delivery or that they already have title to either in their facility 
or, at times in other facilities (Author). 
 
  Shrink - The pounds of a commodity that are lost by handling.  This could be by 
spilling, mechanical wear, deterioration or other operational functions (Author). 
 
  Train - In this study, the author is referring to shipments of 50 or more cars at one 
time (Author). 
 
  Turns - A common term in the grain industry that refers to the amount of bushels 
a facility handles in a year divided by the total bushel storage capacity (Author). 
 
  Volume - The number of bushels that a facility handles (Author). 
 
 
The terms in this glossary are from the author as noted, or otherwise were taken from the 
Practical Grain Encyclopedia (2002) - Commodity Center Corporation, 8541 N. 600 W., 
Lake Village, IN 46349.  Published by Hugh Ulrich. (www.practicalgrain.com), which 
provides a more complete glossary for further research. 